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Foreword
This book is a mirrored study on the conceptualization of viole-
nce in Middle Eastern and European contemporary geography through
a theoretical inter-religious and gender background, thanks to work on
specific case studies.
In the last twenty years, both the narrative of the “Clash of
Civilizations” in the Western world and, previously, the building pro-
cess of a national identity in the Middle East’s post-colonial phase, de-
veloped and impacted on both geographies, emphasizing our inability
to live in a plural society. However, as this work will clearly show, be-
hind a detrimental attitude towards religious minorities, there is a
political purpose capable of strengthening prejudices, conflicts and
new fascisms.
Furthermore, in these essays the investigation is biunivocal: on
the one hand, violence is regarded as the expression of an autocratic
domination in a Middle East as seen through the case studies on
Egypt, Iraq and Iran, and on the other hand, violence is symptomatic
of a democratic European geography, France and Italy in particular,
sparking off damaging reactions.
Introduced by an essay focused on the Orientalist-Occidentalist nar-
rative of violence within Islam as a peculiarity from the beginning of
its history (Ed. Said, 1978, 1981/Baruma-Margalit, 2004) and that in
recent decades has been emphasized by the motto of “Islamic Suprem-
acism”, this work is an in-depth part of a contemporary dynamic of inter-re-
ligious confrontation.
This juxtaposition, although having its roots in the debate of
inter-religious conflict, has remained far from being able to deal with
complex religious issues; on the contrary, the differentiation of reli-
gion assumes an ideological connotation to support discriminatory
policies based on national and identity issues that have nothing to do
with real differences in belief.
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In recent decades, religious minorities or gender issues have be-
come an important field of comparison between the “Western” and the
Islamic world, narratively supporting autocratic desires.
More specifically, thinking about the case studies analysed be-
fore Western democracies and Arab autocracies supported a further
fragmentation of Middle East (from 2003), women and religious
minorities (Christians of different churches, but also Yazidis) were
discriminated in relation to the ideological perspective of the modern
nation-state narrative and the devolution of distinct nationalistic- reli-
gious projects:
The figure of Fatima (the Prophet's daughter), for example, as a
symbol of purity and religious commitments within a new ideological
perspective for Iranian women after the Revolution of 1979.
Mubarak's political need to obtain support from the Copts for
his anti-terrorism policies but also to create a magnificent image of in-
terreligious harmony, which allowed Coptic independence in com-
munity affairs, but without a real and concrete political representation in
the country's institutions.
The Arabization and Ba'athification of Iraq's Christian minorities
under the secularized regimes, which preceded and proceeded during
the narrative of Saddam Hussein's personality cult, giving him the im-
age of an autocratic inter-religious figure (like Hafez and Bashar al-
Assad in Syria) able to preserve the unity of the country's plurality but
more specifically to preserve a Christian presence in those areas.
On the other side of the Mediterranean, violence against reli-
gious minorities, in this case, whether Muslim citizens or not, is cer-
tainly less impactful, but no less dangerous, in particular in relation to
the preservation of a democratic system. The radicalization process of
young foreign fighters in France cannot be univocally attributed to the
difficulties of integration into a secularized –highly ideological soci-
ety, or, on the contrary, to Kepel's exceptionalist vision of Islam and
Salafism.
The malaise under examination is that of a state in which the
presence of a secular-republican ideology is particularly strong, but
also that of some areas, parts of France, where the state is completely
absent. Jihadist radicalization cannot be considered a generalized
European problem if there are countries where foreign fighters are nu-
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merically predominant. It is clear that there are specific French factors
which have emphasized a radicalization within its no-state areas, a na-
tional “hidden” violence which has accelerated in specific parts of the
country (the banlieues) and that shows a huge contrast with the re-
volutionary motto: Liberté, Egalitè, Fraternité.
The Italian case, on the contrary, is less studied, difficult to in-
terpret and curiously still free from terrorist attacks. The key to under-
stand the Italian case is the “amateurish” political level of violence
against minorities still lacking integration and rights.
It is a keg of gunpowder, but Italians are blissfully unaware of
it. The lack of Italian citizenship for children born in the country to
parents who are recognized and integrated in the state, will produce
evident identity difficulties in future decades; the Islamophobic atti-
tude of the Italian media, on the other hand, will clearly risk increas-
ing the “acceleration” factor previously seen in the French case, in-
creasing, as is already evident, the citizens' fearful approach to inter-
religious and inter-cultural dynamics.
Finally, Italian political instability and the inability to find so-
cial-political continuity in the party coalition programmes, in particu-
lar concerning topics related to minorities and migrants, have clearly
developed an ineffective capability to find coherent solutions.
The debate remains open, on the contrary: the possibility of pre-
serving the Christian religious minorities in the Middle East and of
limiting extremist right-wing and neo-fascists' political deviances in
Europe is related to the capacity to properly understand these sets of
problems.
These chapters were presented for the first time at an International
Workshop organized with the ICS (Institute for Culture and Society)
of the University of Navarra in October 2017.
We would like to express our gratitude to the ICS (Universidad
de Navarra), in particular the Research group on Religion and Civil
Society for the publication of this volume, and to the Marie Curie Fel-
lowship project DeRadIslam (no. 746451) which provided economic
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Islamic Supremacy, The early “Islamic” century and the violence
against the Other. A historical-religious perspective
Marco Demichelis
1. Introduction. Arab or Islamic conquests?Whose Supremacism?
The decrease of religious praxis in Western countries partially
coincided with the advent of the “New Age”1 and the end of the Cold
War –overlooking the increasing role played by the Gulf States in the
internal policies of Arab countries, shaping the “Global Jihad” ap-
proach with the support of the United States during the final
confrontation with the Soviet Union (Soviet-Afghan war 1979-1989).
In parallel, the weakening of Arab-Islamic2 university curricula
as well as hermeneutic religious understanding in the contemporary
world3 clearly emerged at the same time with a major political and
economic pressure pushing Islam and political leaders to play an in-
creasing ideological role, shaping it as a form of “Political Islam”.
This became a phrasal idiom overemphasized in the media
which is not that different from S. Huntington's “Clash of Civilizations”.
However, the main risk of contemporary religious violence in
the Middle East and Europe, like the inability of the media to properly
interpret the on-going situation, stimulated a “standardizing” repres-
entation of Islam and “oriental” geography as perennially at war, bar-
baric and without any possibility of “redemption”.
The absence of Western discernment of the recent events which
have affected this area has increased an Islamophobic attitude based
1 By “New Age” I define all the artificial versions and practices of distortion
of non-Western religious tradition served up in particular from the '80s to a European
or North American audience, usually unable to fully understand it: Native North
American spirituality, Islamic Sufism, different forms of Yoga, Buddhism etc. These
are just a few examples in which Western marketing speculation in the sphere of
spirituality and religion has been able to bring to Western society the “dangerous”
idea that all, even intimate aspects, are easily comprehensible and reproducible even
though they come from a thousand year-old culture and civilization.
2 H. Djait, Islamic Culture in Crisis: A Reflection on Civilizations in History
(London: Routledge, 2011), Ch. 4; A. Allawi, Ali, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), pp.109ff., 229ff.
3 O. Roy, La Sainte Ignorance. Les temps de la religion sans culture (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 2008); R. Bettini, Religione e Politica. L'ibridazione Islamica
(Roma: Armando Editore, 2013); H. Lauziere, The Making of Salafism: Islamic
Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
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on false prejudices, clichés and a regrettable dread of diversity that has
exploded in parallel with the concern over an invasion by sub-Saharan
emigrants.
The “Islamic attitude to supremacy” that short story writers and
journalists have also already foreseen and depicted referring to Islam
as the future majority European religious community after 2050,4 is a
fictional speculation not only un-supported by statistical data,5 but det-
rimental of a concept of Islamic “Supremacy” which emphasized a
narrative of fear, particularly evident after 9/11.
E. Said on the one hand, like A. Margalit and I. Baruma on the
other, have already analyzed and described how the Old Continent and
the USA have adopted since the 19th century a representing “narrative”
to define the Others in order to produce an image of the “Orients” built
up through our cultural stereotypes and most intimate weaknesses.6
The attitude of religious and violent Islamic “Supremacy” is
one of these and in the following pages it will be discussed using a
historical and a religious methodological approach.
The first one tries to clarify the “Supremacist” early Arab con-
quering campaigns as dissociated from a real and already concrete
new Islamic religious identity.
Over the last forty years the historical comprehension of the
first century of Islam has been deconstructed and analysed in a more
interdisciplinary way; different sources: archaeological, numismatic,
inter-religious etc., have greatly reshaped a previous understanding
which is bringing early Islamic history towards new insights.
Historians and experts in Islamic Studies and History such as J.
Wansbrough, P. Crone, U. Rubin, G. R. Hawting, F. Donner and R.
4 M. Houellebecq, Soumission (Paris: Flammarion, 2015); O. Fallaci, La
Forza della Ragione (Milano: Rizzoli, 2004); Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Nomad. From Islam to
America: a Personal Journey through the Clash of Civilization (New York: Free
Press, 2010); S. Gouguenheim, Aristote au Mont S. Michel. Les Racines grecques de
l'Europe Chrétienne (Paris: Ed. Du Seuil, 2008).
5 http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/europe/ [Last access: 20.07.2018].
6 E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Covering Islam:
how the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world (New York:
Vintage Books, 1981); A. Margalit, I. Baruma, Occidentalism: the Western in the eyes
of the enemies (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).
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Hoyland7 have contributed, since the 1970s, to showing a new im-
agery of early Islamic history, inasmuch reformulating it within a
more inclusive monotheistic milieu than a clearly identified and struc-
tured new religion (Islam).
For the first time, the advent of Islam was not described as an
extremely fast experience which coincided with the extremely rapid
conquering campaigns that in a century brought a huge geographical
area from the border of the Indian Subcontinent to the Iberian penin-
sula under “Arab” control.
For the first time, the two historical events were divided and
analysed separately.
To the fairly “common” question: how was it possible for the
Arabs of the Peninsula to conquer this extended empire in such a short
time?
R. Hoyland's reply is quite convincing:
The Arabs' victories were certainly stunning and their progress was
much faster than that of settled powers like the Romans, but it is
comparable with armies comprising a high proportion of nomads.8
This is historically clear, uni-vocally considering nomadic
populations such as the Mongols of Genghis Khan, the Turk-Mongol
hordes of Timur, Attila's Huns and the Hephthalite. It is also signific-
ant to highlight that they had tremendous conquering capabilities,
even though more limited in preserving an effective state control. For
this historical reason, it is important to make a major distinction
7 J. Wansbrough, Quranic Studies: sources and methods of scriptural
interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); P. Crone, M. Hinds, God's
Caliph. Religious Authority in the first centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986); P. Crone, M. Cook, Hagarism. The Making of the Islamic
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); U. Rubin, Muhammad the
Prophet and Arabia (London: Routledge, 2011); U. Rubin, “Al-Ṣamad and the High
God. An Interpretation of Sura CXII”, Der Islam, 61, 2 (1984), pp. 197-217; U.
Rubin, “Quran and Tafsir. The case of ‘an yadin’”, Der Islam, 70 (1993), pp. 133-
144; F. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers. At the Origin of Islam, tr. Italian,
Maometto e le origini dell'Islam (Torino: Giulio Einaudi ed., 2011); R. Hoyland,
Seeing Islam as Others saw it. A survey of evaluation as Christian, Jewish and
Zoroastrian writings on Early Islam (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1997).
8 R. Hoyland, In God's path. The Arab conquests and the Creation of an
Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 3.
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between the Arab conquests from the concrete and inner elaboration
of a new form of religiosity with Abrahamic roots called Islam.
Can we think about a Christian religion after Jesus' ascension?
Or do we need to wait until we understand how the Christians differ-
entiated themselves from Pharisaic Judaism? Can we talk about Islam
immediately after the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632? Or do we
need to wait until some clear differences emerged between this new
form of religiosity and previous Abrahamic traditions?
This is the main reason why we cannot talk about “Islamic con-
quests” from the beginning; we probably need to wait until the
first/second decade of the 8th century to start identifying the leading
political rulers of this extended empire as the Caliph of a new reli-
gious community “in progress.”9
The first half of the 8th century is a historical phase in which the
Arab conquests were already ending, as was the first Arab empire in
history, the Umayyad empire (661-750).
What historiography has always shown is a paradigmatic date,
usually adopted to distinguish different periods: the Fall of the Roman
Western Empire in 476 has a great meaning for European histori-
ography, but is quite limited in relation to the eastern part of the Medi-
terranean where late Antiquity merged with the early Islamic age. His-
torical passages are usually not so catastrophic, but need time to be
absorbed.
This is also clear in relation to “oral transmission” and “reli-
gious revelations” which for many reasons –historical, linguistic, geo-
graphical and logical– do not follow the common “collecting tradi-
tions” that are usually attributed to them. The 'Abbasid Islamic narrat-
ive which historically clarifies how the third Khulafa al-Rashidin,
'Othman ibn 'Affan (d. 656) gathered the early Mushaf (today's mean-
ing: collection) from seven or nine versions into a canonical one,
shaping three or four copies which were sent to the cities of Damas-
cus, Basra and Kufa, while one probably remained in Medina, can be
properly considered as a real fact with difficulty and even if it were
9 A. Fuess, J.-P. Hartung, Court Cultures in the Muslim World. Seventh to
nineteenth century (London: SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East, 2011), pp.
21-90.
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true, a few copies of God's revelation cannot make a new religion
already rooted within a new extended geography.10
The complexity of this topic cannot be discussed here in full, as
the interdisciplinary multi-factorial analysis would be too complex.
However, a few logical and non-literary aspects need to be briefly
considered to introduce the main reasons for this scepticism:
1. Archaeological and numismatic findings (such as tomb-
stones), at least until now, have clarified that we need to wait until the
Marwanid phase (684-750) in Ummayyad history and more specific-
ally the caliphate of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan (685-705) to discover
a “complete” profession of the Islamic faith (Shahada) with the full
declaration: “There is no god but God. Muhammad is the messenger of
God” with the Muhammad's allusion also appearing on Umayyad
coins, tombstones of “believers” and religious buildings.
This initial absence suggested that Muhammad's importance
was not so great, probably for different reasons starting from the non-
believers' contribution to the Arab conquering campaigns, or the milit-
ary support for the Sufyanid Umayyad dynasty (661-684) offered by
the Arab Christian confederation (Banu Kalb, Banu Ghassan) in the
Syrian area.11
2. The early Arab conquering campaigns were certainly led by
Caliphs such as Abu Bakr and 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, generals such as
Khalid ibn al-Walid and 'Amr ibn al-'As, prominent figures in the
community of the “believers”. However, two outstanding aspects, that
are not usually considered, need to be discussed: (1) part of the con-
quering forces were members of semi-nomadic populations and
10 Th. Nöldeke, Fr. Schwally, G. Bergsträßer, O. Preztl, The History of the
Qur'an, ed. and tr. by Wolfgang H. Behn (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 209ff.; Th.
Nöldeke, The Qur'an: An introductory essay, N. A. Newman (ed.) (Haytfield:
Interdisciplinary Biblical Research Institute, 1992); A. Neuwirth, N. Sinai, M. Marx,
The Qur'an in context. Historical and literary investigations into the Qur'anic Milieu
(Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 255ff., 281ff., 407ff.
11 J. Johns, “Archaeology and the History of Islam: the first seventy years”,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 46, 4 (2003), pp. 411-436;
Younis al-Shdaifat, Ahmad al-Jallad, Zeyad al-Salameen, Rafe Harahsheh, “An early
Christian Arabic Graffito mentioning Yazid, the king”, Arabian Archaeology and
Epigraphy, 28 (2017), pp. 315-324; A. Elad, “Why did 'Abd al-Malik build the Dome
of the Rock? A re-examination of the Muslim Sources”, Bayt of Maqdis, 'Abd al-
Malik's Jerusalem, Julian Raby and Jeremy Johns (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992), pp. 33-58.
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Bedouin fighters who had not yet been Islamicized, who a few months
earlier had fought in the Ridda wars (632-633) against the Hijazi tent-
ative to make them respect the agreements previously signed when
Muhammad was still alive.12 (2) In the first phase after the Prophet's
death, and probably when Muhammad was still alive, the early com-
munity of the believers was not hierarchically structured as described
by the Islamic narrative in the following centuries: Muhammad was an
eminent member but with strong connections with others important
figures as Abu Bakr, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, Khalid ibn Sa‘id, Uthman
ibn Mazhum etc. in a sort of polycentric community in which relevant
decisions were more based on consensus and arbitration. This is prob-
ably also one of the main reasons why the “religious” figure of
Muhammad did not emerge immediately after his death in 632, but
important policies were implemented in contrast with previous conclu-
sions.13
3. The Arabian Peninsula confederate clan system was partially
already absorbed in the Byzantine and Sasanian empires in the same
way as the “German” populations were in the Western Roman empire
at the end of it; at the same time, both empires had important urban
areas (Damascus, Antioch, Edessa, Jerusalem, Ctesiphon, Nineveh,
Gaza, Caesarea etc.) surrounded by countryside that was already in-
habited by Arabs (but not only by them). It is important to imagine
that in the 6th century, as well as during the devastating Byzantine-
Sasanian war (602-628), a part of the northern Arab confederation
tribes of the Peninsula, many of them monophysite Christians, were
fighting each other as “Foederati” in the armies of both empires. The
war ended in 628 with a Byzantine victory under Heraclius, but after
that the Persians had previously conquered Palestine, Syria, Egypt and
part of Anatolia in 613-615, with a huge destruction of urban territor-
12 F. Donner, The early Islamic conquests, pp. 96ff.; Muhammad and the Be-
lievers. At the Origin of Islam, pp. 139ff.
13 R. Hoyland, In God's Path, pp. 56-65; F. Donner, The Early Islamic Con-
quests, pp. 98-110; Muhammad and the Believers. At the Origin of Islam, pp. 41ff.; G.
M. Morony, “Religious Communities in Late Sasanian and Early Muslim Iraq”,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 17, 2, (1974), pp. 113-135;
M. Haddad, “'Umar ibn al-Khattab and the Meccan Aristocracy”, Chronos, 6 (2002),
pp. 163-170; Al-Madani, M., Nazrat fi Ijitihadar al-Faruq 'Umar ibn al-Khattab
(Beirut: Dar al-Nafa'is, 1990).
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ies. This highlights the state of uncertainty of the entire region of
Mesopotamia and Bilad al-Sham after 628, including probably the part
of Arab confederate system that survived.14
The points above partially emphasize some of the main reasons
why at the beginning of the “Arab” conquests (633- 656), in particular
in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates plains and the Syria-Palestine re-
gion, the focus on a new religious identity of the conquerors was not
clarified or supported by new local governors. To define them as “Is-
lamic conquests” would be a way to highlight an “Islamic religious
identity” which was fairly non-existent at least at the end of ‘Abd al-
Malik's caliphate (705) and of the second Fitna, when, the political
clash between Umayyads, the Alid party and the followers of ‘Abd
Allah ibn al-Zubayr (d. 692) greatly increased an anti-Umayyad
propaganda detrimental to their real religious identity.15
This is the main reason why, when in contemporary times west-
ern media but also academia began to “elaborate” a narrative on an
“Islamic Supremacist” attitude emphasizing how from the beginning
this Abrahamitic religion supported “conquering” attitudes, it would
have been more relevant to highlight that the first century of “Islamic”
history is so complex and so partially illustrated that we should be
more cautious in supporting certain statements about the Jihad “state”
and similar positions.16
14 Abd al- Raziq, Al- Khilafa wa-usul al-hukm (Cairo: 1925); Al-Baladhuri,
Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, tr. by Ph. Hitti (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916),
2 vols.; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Sirat 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, ed. Ahmad 'Ubayd (Beirut:
1965); Jawad Ali, Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-'Arab qabl al-Islam (Beirut: 1978), pp.
24ff.; Kh. 'Athamina, “The pre-Islamic roots of the Early Muslim Caliphate: the
emergence of Abu Bakr”, pp. 1-32; Ph. Wood, “Christians and the Arabs in the sixth
century”, G. Fisher, J. Djiskra, Inside and Out: interactions between Rome and the
people of the Arabian and Egyptian frontiers in late antiquity (Leuven: Peeters 2014),
pp. 353-368.
15 G. Rotten, Die Umayyaden und die zweite Bürgerkrieg (680-692)
(Weisbaden: Steiner, 1982); F. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers. At the Origin
of Islam, pp. 185ff., 204ff.
16 D. Cook, Understanding Jihad (Oakland: California of University Press,
2005); Kh. Yahya Blankinship, The End of Jihad State: The reign of Hisham ibn 'Abd
al-Malik and the collapse of the Umayyads (New York: Suny Press, 1994); A. G.
Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad (New York: Prometheus Book, 2008); D. Hayden,
Muhammad and the Birth of Islamic Supremacism: the War with the Jews 622-628
A.D. (New York: Bird Brain Production, 2012); L. B. Jackson, Islamophobia in Bri-
tain: the Making of a Muslim Enemy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp.
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2. The historical debate in recent decades: revisionists and
reformists
The words that I have used to define the dual scientific ap-
proach that affected Academia in recent decades considering the early
century after the death of the prophet Muhammad (d. 632), are “revi-
sionism” and “reformism”: the first highlights an innovative scientific
approach which is added to those previously used, but also a theoret-
ical outcome that usually goes beyond the real investigative result; the
second, on the contrary, emphasizes a clearer attention on what can be
verified using the same interdisciplinary methodological approach, but
without any kind of excessive revisionist attitude.
This duplicity does not want to favour an internal clash showing
a clear preference; both are necessary and the former usually puts for-
ward an interesting thesis which is partially confirmed by the latter;
however, clear differences persist in identifying reformists as more en-
gaged in preserving a less revolutionary historical attitude, while the
revisionists are often more likely to innovate without real support
from the sources, but with a greater capability of insight.
A. Noth's Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu Themen, Formen
und Tendenzen frühislamischer Geschichtsüberlieferung, published in
1970,17 played a relevant role, even though it was not translated into
English until many years after its German edition, because for the first
time it considered a textual critical analysis of “Islamic conquests”
and the first Muslim century using studies of the Hebrew Bible and
the Christian Gospels.
In parallel, G. Lüling in Über den Ur-Koran (Erlangen, 1974)
assumed as many other Western scholars did, that the Qur’an was not
only the word of God, but more drastically the elaboration of
Muhammad's own life and thought and tried to understand it in the
context of the standard Islamic biography, the Sira al-Nabawiyya.
Lüling's work was deeply criticised for its unfounded and arbitrary
thesis, such as that the Prophet was a Christian at the beginning; how-
184-185.; R. Spencer, Confessions of an Islamophobe (Brentwood: Bombardier
Books, 2017).
17 The essay in its second edition was subsequently translated into English by
Michael Bonner, with the title The Early Islamic Historical Tradition, A. Noth, L. I.
Conrad (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1994).
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ever, his methodological approach more than his theoretical outcomes
persisted, being adopted to implement future investigation into Early
Islamic History.
A stronger and clear revisionist formulation emerged in particu-
lar after the publication of J. Wansbrough's Quranic Studies and P.
Crone-Michael Cook's Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World.
The former supports the idea that the Quranic text became a definitive
canon of scripture only a couple of centuries after Muhammad's death,
hazarding and this is more convincing, that the Prophet in Mecca did
not try to found a new religion, but a “milieu” able to convince all the
most important inter-clan confederations of the Peninsula. This is an
idea which obtains increasing support with the Western Histori-
ography of the Middle East, in particular in the writings of F. M. Don-
ner and R. G. Hoyland.18 In other words, in the first century, Islam
was not Islam yet, but a more comprehensive and inclusive
monotheistic creed with a praxis and doctrine that were still uncertain.
The latter, in continuity with a few previous essays, emphasized
the use of non-Arabic primary sources only because they were in-
creasingly suspected of being historically weak and apologetic, with
manuscripts in Greek, Armenian, Syriac, old-Persian, Coptic and
Hebrew of the 7th century, which could not ignore “prominent” con-
quering campaigns coming from the Arab Peninsula. However, Crone-
Cook's revisionist narrative in some occasions emerged as a little too
surprising, in particular concerning the idea that after the eviction of
Jews by the Byzantines, many of them reached Muhammad's forces
conquering the Holy Land, in particular Jerusalem, with the Prophet
still alive and supporting the Arab campaigns.
18 F. Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins: The beginnings of Islamic
Historical writing (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1998), pp. 132ff.; The Early Islamic
Conquests, pp. 251ff.; Muhammad and the Believers. At the Origin of Islam, pp.
214ff.; “The formation of the Islamic State”, JAOS, 106, 2, (1986), pp. 283-296;
“Centralized Authority and Military Autonomy in the Early Islamic Conquests”, The
Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, A. Cameron (ed.) (Princeton: Darwin Press,
1995); R. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others saw it. A survey of evaluation as
Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian writings on Early Islam (Princeton: Darwin Press,
1997), pp. 53ff.; “New Documentary Texts and the Early Islamic State”, BSOAS, 69,
3, (2006), pp. 395-416; “Epigraphy and the Emergence of Arab Identity”, From al-
Andalus to Khurasan. Documents from the Medieval Muslim World, AA.VV. (eds.)
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 220-242.
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This thesis is clearly related to the Emperor Heraclius' anti-
Judaic stance after the insurrection in Palestine against the Byzantines
during the Sasanian invasion of the Romans territories in the first
phase of the war between Constantinople and Ctesiphon (602-628).19
Regardless of some indefensible theories, the “revisionist”
works revitalized the study of early Islam and Hagarism remains an
important essay for its multilingual methodological approach; at the
same time, a less revisionist group of Scholars, “reformists”, follow-
ing Peter Brown's The World of Late Antiquity (1971), developed a
broadened perspective, reformulating the historical age of Late An-
tiquity and the use of archaeological and numismatic sources imple-
menting the possibility of a better understanding of the early Islamic
age.
Coins, Arabic papyrology and new archaeological findings
closely connected with Byzantine or Sasanian studies, have started in
recent decades to re-shape the historical comprehension of the seventh
century, reformulating the understanding of this crucial period with a
more solid basis.20
However, in this case too, some studies have favoured deeply
revisionist theories which have developed fairly imaginative premises,
like Volker Popp's21 idea that the Byzantine defeat was a Sasanian
post 627-628 counteroffensive22 led by Christian Nestorians with local
and rural anti-Constantinople discontent.
19 Eutychius, Das Annalenwerk des Eutychios von Alexandrien, ed. and trans.
M. Breydy (Louvain: 1985), pp. 471-472, Sebeos (attrib), Histoire d'Héraclius par
l'évêque Sebéos, trans. F. Macler, (Paris: 1904); R. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others
saw it, pp. 540ff., Ch. F. Robinson, Empires and Elites after the Muslim Conquests
(London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 23, 41, 56-57.
20 P. Pentz, The Invisible Conquest. The Ontogenesis of Sixth and Seventh Century
Syria (Copenhagen: The National Museum of Denmark, 1992); F. M. Donner, “Visions of
the Early Islamic expansion: from the Heroic to the Horrific”, Byzantium in Early Islamic
Syria, N. El-Cheick, S. O'Sullivan (eds.) (Beirut: American University of Beirut and
Balamand: University of Balamand, 2011), pp. 9-29.
21 V. Popp, “Die Frühe Islamgeschichte nach inschriftlichen und
numismaticschen Zeugnisses”, Die dunklen Anfänge. Neue Forschungen zur
Entstehung und frühen Geschichte des Islam, K.-H. Ohling, G.-R. Puin (eds.) (Berlin:
Schiler, 2005), pp. 16-123.
22 After Heraclius' victorious campaigns against the Sasanian-Persian, Para-
vaneh Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire. The Sasanian-Parthian
confederacy and the Arab conquest of Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 161ff.
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Another one is Y. Nevo's hypothesis that the Arab confederation was
strengthened against the Byzantines, whose increased religious
fragmentation in Syria and Egypt favoured at the beginning their
control in the area, being defeated by the Umayyad empowerment,
also thanks to their major and historically rooted economic duty in the
Damascus region.23
Notwithstanding, neither case is based on solid roots because
they do not consider the historical background of internal Christians
contradistinctions and the complexity of the inter-tribal relationship of
the Arab clans; however, some intuitions should be reconsidered in
relation to new evidence.
Many revisionist theories have the merit of having developed a
concrete interdisciplinary analysis of this “obscure” historical period;
however, the large amount of recently added information usually
needs a certain period of “incubation” and a very broad analytical ca-
pacity able to appease and rationalize the plurality of this interdiscip-
linary understanding. This capability relates all singular historical
events in connection with a literary understanding of it, a better com-
prehension of the Qur’an, a geographical and sociological ability to
distinguish urban from rural areas and an aptitude to read events
through a broad analytical spectrum.
The contemporary age of “religious nationalism”24 in the Middle
East, recently developed another analytical trend according to which
Arab-Islamic expansion was more linked to a formative Arab national
identity than to a real and new religious one,25 while on the other hand,
other scholars26 have developed the idea that Islam was subject from
the beginning to a strongly monotheistic impact and this impulse re-
23 Y. Nevo, J. Koren, Crossroads to Islam. The Origins of the Arab Region
and the Arab State (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003).
24 M. Demichelis, P. Maggiolini, The Struggle to Define a Nation. Rethinking
Religious Nationalism in Contemporary Islamic World (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias
Press, 2017).
25 S. Bahear, Arabs and Others in Early Islam (Princeton: Darwin Press,
1997); R. Hoyland, In God's Path: the Arab conquest and the creation of an Islamic
Empire, pp. 207ff.
26 J. Waardenburg, “Towards a Periodization of Earliest Islam according to
its relations with Other Religions”, The Qur'an. Style and Contents, A. Rippin (ed.)
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 93-115; Y. D. Nevo, Z. Cohen, D. Heftmann, Ancient
Arabic Inscriptions from the Negeve (Jerusalem: IPS Press, 1993).
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cognized in previous Prophets (Anbiya’) and Messengers (Rusul)
(Moses and Jesus specifically), a Unitarian background (the hanifiyya)
with a still unclear Islamic identity: this thesis, with the passing of the
decades, is becoming more convincing.27
In parallel, all the lucubrations of the revisionists as well as
those of the reformists cannot be properly considered without under-
standing the genesis of the Qur’an as the historical information con-
tained in the revelation.
The lack of critical editions of the Qur’an which affected for
many centuries western and Islamic geography, like the clear delay in
its study, has been only partially remedied by Nöldeke-Scwhally-
Bergsträßer-Pretzl, Geschichte des Qoran, as well as by R. Bell's revi-
sionist attitude.
The works published after the discovery of the old Qur’an ma-
nuscripts in the Great Mosque of Ṣan‘a’ in 1972, like those following
Prof. G. Bergsträßer's and O. Pretzl's archive microfilms and photo
collections of the Qur’an, reappeared a few years ago and were given
to Prof. A. Neuwirth. They have remained fairly miraculous, but par-
ticularly relevant in trying to get answers about the origin of the Is-
lamic religion, its revelation and its initial socio-political structure.
The relationship between early historical and Quranic studies is
clearly prominent. Every historical revisionist and reformist hypo-
thesis needs a major understanding which possibly is confirmed or can
be confirmed not only by numismatic, archaeological and non-Arabic
literary sources, but also in the hermeneutic comprehension of the
Muslim revelation, in particular if the discovery of early manuscripts
is going to change the scriptural version of God's word.
All the questions related to the early Arab conquering cam-
paigns, the primordial Arab-Islamic state and the empire as the inter-
religious relationship within it, could drastically modify their answers,
with a great impact on early Islamic studies.
3. Western “Supremacism” and the race debate
All the above studies, like their interdisciplinary methodological
approach have deeply affected Western academic works on Early Is-
27 F. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers. At the origins of Islam, pp.
204ff.; R. Hoyland, In God's Path, pp. 207ff.
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lamic history in recent decades. However, in parallel, a previous aca-
demic tradition had elaborated from the 19th century, a first “Oriental-
ist” early understanding of Islamic culture and history as deeply im-
bued with post-Enlightenment and positivist European values and atti-
tudes.28
This Western “Supremacist” attitude did not come to an end
with the de-colonization phase, but has continued through a different
methodology and tools in which the first use of the mass media also
increased the impact of political and religious propaganda.
For the vast majority of Islamic countries as for the Arabs more
specifically, the phases of post-colonialism (1946-1991) and the post-
Cold War (1991-today) have not identified a concrete improvement in
institutional solidity; in any case the failed “Arab Springs” (2011) in-
creased the anarchy in previously stable autocratic states. The Middle
Eastern29 conflicts which erupted from the beginning of the
decolonization process highlighted internal economic, political and re-
ligious clashes which usually assumed an increasing class fragmenta-
tion linked to internal and external reasons.
Assuming a general overview, all the Middle Eastern countries
were involved in the Cold War (1946-1991). However, the real
peculiarity of this historical phase was that the Arab world passed
from being an auxiliary of the Soviet Union until the end of the 1960s,
to opening their economy to the free market (Infitah) so as to decree a
clear independence from the Seven Sisters in the hydrocarbon- energy
market as well.
The failure of Pan-Arabism and the Arab socialist ideologies
which emphasized secular culture as well as religious reformists atti-
28 A. Hourani, Islam and the European Thought (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 54ff.; B. Lewis, What went wrong? The clash between
Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003); Z.
Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East. The History and Politics of
Orientalism (London: Cambridge University Press, 2ed., 2009).
29 Geographical terms are usually significant to identify countries and areas.
In this work the term “Islamic world” identifies the entire area in which a majority or
minority Islamic community is established, from South East Asia, the Philippines to
Paraguay; the term “Middle East” is comprehensive of the Arab world, plus Turkey
and Iran, finally, the Arab world, inclusive of the Maghreb, the Mashrek and the
Arabian peninsula is to be considered in its entirety, from Syria to Yemen and from
'Oman to Mauritania.
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tudes, coincided with, quoting Oliver Roy: “[…] a re-inculturation of
Islam within an ongoing globalizing world, secularized de facto”.30
This “Islamic revanchism” emphasized the conservative attitudes of
Islamic culture in contrast with the opening of the internal market as
the ulterior exploitation of the masses which on one hand had been
deeply re-Islamicized, while, on the other, they were losing every
chance to shape a welfare system. The same system that at the begin-
ning, in the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood association would have
like to improve.31
The great majority of Arabs were convinced of being stricter
and more conservative Muslims while they were losing, decade after
decade (from the 1970s to the 1990s), the possibility of achieving a
more balanced social and economic society.
This “trapping” system was not only particularly useful for pro-
longing autocratic control and regimes with the “Democratic” support
of the United States and EU, but emphasized the creation of an ideolo-
gical Islamic “supremacist” attitude nurtured by the petro-dollar Emir-
ates simply by updating the most exclusivist and violent praxis and
ideas that every religion has shaped within a long historical formative
process.
In parallel, they identified in Western “Orientalist” narratives
their alter ego, exploiting and defining an “Orientalism in reverse”
among Islamists which produced a mixture of anti-Christian and
Judaic literature with Classical Ḥanbalite authors such as Ibn Tay-
miyya (d. 1328/728) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350/751) as
with clear “Occidentalist” cliché: the non-religiosity of the West, the
lack of Western moral values, previous European anti-Judaic
Semitism etc.32
30 O. Roy, La Sainte Ignorance. Les temps de la religion sans culture, pp.
233ff.
31 A. Belkeziz, The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought. A Historical
Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Age (London: I. B.
Tauris, 2015), pp. 128ff.; M. Zahid, The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's succession
crisis. The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East (London: I. B.
Tauris, 2012), pp. 39ff.; M. Campanini, L'alternativa Islamica (Milano: Bruno
Mondadori, 2012), pp. 94ff.
32 B. Tibi, Islam's predicament with Modernity. Religious Reform and cul-
tural change (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 209ff.; I. Buruma, A. Margalit, Occidental-
ism: the west in the eyes of its enemies (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); W. B. Hal-
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The lower and middle classes were easily convinced of it, in
parallel, the academic crisis of the Humanities, like the anti-demo-
cratic US foreign policy in the region, in particular after the terrorists
attacks of 9/11, boosted the theory of a “Clash of Civilizations”.
Huntington's premise, although methodologically abstruse, fol-
lowed a twofold Islamic religious attitude, which emerged in particu-
lar after the failure of Arab left-wing ideologies: the political ideology
of the religious and the denial of the plurality background in Islam.
The former aspect was clearly emphasized to promote a better
political control of society so as to give the impression that religious
praxis was again in the lead;33 the latter accentuated the inter-religious
fraction highlighting a “Supremacist” attitude as an anti-democratic
approach.34
The main problem, as argued by B. Tibi is that:
The overall inner-Islamic debate on the self and authenticity remains
under the influence of an Arab word that generates valid standards for
the prevailing attitudes that shape Islamic civilization. […] Thus, the
embracing of pluralism between religions by Muslims, as a cultural
requirements for placing the non-Muslim other on an equal footing, is
flatly rejected by Islamists and Salafism alike.35
If B. Tibi includes the Islamic supremacist attitude in the con-
temporary debate on democracy, religious and gender equality and hu-
man rights, the deconstruction of this aspect is particularly relevant
laq, Restating Orientalism: a critique of Modern Knowledge (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018).
33 M. Qasim Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a radical age, religious au-
thority and internal criticism (London: Cambridge University Press, 2012); G. Kepel,
Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley: California of Uni-
versity Press, 1985), pp. 103ff.
34 Bat Ye'or, Islam and Dhimmitude, where civilizations collide (Madison,
NJ: Fairleight Dickinson University Press, 2001), pp. 201ff.; Eurabia: the Euro-Arab
axis (Madison, NJ: Fairleight Dickinson University Press, 2005); Europe,
Globalization and the coming of Universal Caliphate (Madison, NJ: Fairleight
Dickinson University Press, 2011); Understanding Dhimmitude (New York: RVP
Press, 2013); Le Dhimmi: Profil de l'opprimé en Orient et en Afrique du Nord depuis
la Conquete Arabe (Paris: Editeur Anthropos, 1980); The Decline of Eastern
Christianity under Islam, from Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, NJ: Fairleight
Dickinson University Press, 1996).
35 Ibid., p. 229.
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because artificially shaped, starting from a non-Islamic matrix concep-
tualization, but clearly linked to a Western social and cultural back-
ground.
I. Baruma and A. Margalit in Occidentalism also highlighted
the way in which European anti-Semitism was culturally absorbed
within Islamic anti-Judaism and anti-Zionism;36 the use of the term
Supremacism has nothing in common with Islamic history or thought
but again with the Western one; in the 19th century, during
colonialism, the “White's man burden” was usually identified in the
Anglo-Saxon world with the moral obligation of bringing
“civilization” to other societies, justifying de facto, all imperialist
policies as a noble endeavour.37
The Scotsman Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) in his historical
work on the French Revolution,38 argued that European supremacist
policies were justified because they provided a better benefit for the
“native” populations; however, his approach to the employment of a
“supremacist” attitude had nothing in common with a concrete reli-
gious awareness of superiority, as emerged in his following essay en-
titled: On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History.39 In this
work, he compared a wide range of different kinds of heroic figures
from Odin to Muhammad, from Oliver Cromwell to Napoleon,
passing through Martin Luther, John Knox, Dante and Shakespeare
and he gave particular attention to the Islamic Prophet describing him
as a reformist figure, able to transform the Bedouin Arab tribes' life-
style into a deeply civilized nation in a limited period of time.
In this case, the figure of Muhammad is understood and appre-
ciated in relation with his historical and reformist capability, like those
of religious figures such as Martin Luther and John Knox, in the fol-
lowing chapters,40 showing how Carlyle's “Supremacist” formulation is
not connected with a “religious” sense of belonging, but more a racial-
anthropological one. Heroes are those who confirm themselves within
36 I. Baruma, A. Margalit, Occidentalism, pp. 91ff.
37 S. C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Phil-
ippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 5.
38 Th. Carlyle, The French Revolution. A History (London: Chapman&Hall, 1837).
39 Th. Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (London:
James Fraser, 1841), pp. 41ff.
40 Ibid., pp. 112ff.
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a life process, accepting its cruelty as necessary and as part of its
evolution. For them bravery is a more valuable virtue than love; her-
oes are noblemen, not saints, emphasizing a clear dissociation from a
religious approach, which is probably one of the main reasons for Ni-
etzsche's appreciation of this work. Muhammad is recognized as a
great Man and Hero not because he brought a new religion into exist-
ence, but for his important role as a Prophetic figure, a vital reformist
who brought light into the darkness of the Arab nation.
In the following decades, the meaning of Supremacism assumed
a more evident racial understanding. Before the United States' Civil
War, the Confederate states of America founded a constitution that
implemented the segregation policy as the clear superiority of white
people over “Negroes”. In the Cornerstone Speech (21 March 1861),
Alexander Stephens, the Confederate Vice-President, declared: “Our
new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its
foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests upon the great truth that the
Negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the
superior race is his natural and normal condition.” This was an as-
sumption that after the Civil War continued to be patronized by the
KKK secret society, which had the main aim of restoring White Su-
premacism during the reconstruction period.
We need to wait until the beginning of the 20th century for the
foundation of the second KKK in Atlanta to consider “White Suprem-
acism” ideology as not only related with the “racial factor”, but with
the religious one, in particular the flourishing of an “One hundred per
cent Americanism” theorization against Catholics, Jews and other reli-
gious minorities. Their “Supremacist” positions were directly linked
with the newly arrived southern European emigrants, such as the Itali-
ans, or catholic Irish, who were becoming numerically visible in the
main urban areas of the USA.
On the contrary, as a racial-religious reply, we need to wait
until the 1960s and the debate on the “segregation” status in the
southern United States to consider the establishment of a “Black
Supremacist” ideology as well as a Black theology of liberation for
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African-Americans, approached by the philosopher Cornel West “au
rebours” from the side of the oppressed.41
In spite of this, during the 20th century, different racial
“Supremacist” attempts came into being during which a state or an
ethnic ideological propaganda highlighted the superiority of a race
over those in the same geographical area: the German myth of the
Aryan race adopted by Nazism was specular to the Empire of Japan's
long-standing concept of hakko ichiu which declared the superiority of
the Yamato race over all those conquered in south East Asia during its
military campaigns before World War II. The South African apartheid
system is historically considered one of the last “White supremacist”
regimes in the contemporary world which considered itself part of a
superior race with a deep impact on the legislation of a state system.
At the same time, “Arab Supremacism” in particular in Africa is
historically related with the relevant function that slavery played since
early Arab-Islamic domination in the regions of Mauritania and Sudan
from the 10th century42.
However, it is important to clarify as shown above, that the con-
ceptualization of “Supremacism” did not assume a religious identity in
recent centuries, as the contemporary attribution to Islam seems to
emphasize.
The term under examination started to be adopted in the 19th
century, continuing into the following one, but in a clear racial and
ethnic “milieu”.
Its adoption and attribution to Islam, in recent decades, is more
related to Islamophobia than to a real “Religious Supremacist” atti-
tude, at least in relation to a Western geography in which statistical
projections underscore how the European Muslim population will re-
main under a percentage of 15% for 2050.43
41 C. West, Race Matters (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); Prophetic Thought
in Postmodern Times: Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism (Monroe: Common
Courage Press, 1993).
42 P. E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery. A History of Slavery in Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2ed. 2000).
43 http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/europe/
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4. Conclusion. Western colonialism, Islamic Supremacism and Re-
ligious minorities
Baruma and Margalit also highlight in Occidentalism the adop-
tion of racist and anti-Semitic positions in the Islamic world as an ex-
pression of Western colonialist and post-colonialism cultural influ-
ence; the idea of a religious “Islamic Supremacism” is again the ex-
pression of a conceptualization shaped in the 19th century Anglo-
Saxon western world without, at least, until the 20th century, a
concrete religious background.
This “Islamic Supremacism” propaganda shows us that a
“Clash of Civilizations” ideology is clearly winning, even though
many differences emerged between Egypt and Indonesia for example,
or between Tunisia-Morocco and Saudi Arabia, in particular if we
consider the reforms in recent years.44
One of the main difficulties of inter-disciplinary contemporary
studies is the inability to promote an analysis “au rebours” able to cla-
rify the passages which brought the ongoing situation as antithetic
with the previous state of affairs.
Moreover, academic-scientific incongruence becomes evident
when high impact revolutionary events accentuate new discernment of
interpretation, shaping popular understanding as worsening human re-
lationships and plurality. This is the case of the 9/11 terrorists attacks.
If previously, relevant as well as questionable works such as
Bat Ye'or essays45 highlighted and theorised the “fragile” status of
Dhimmi in Arab lands, her more recent works, like those by A.
Bostom, K. Yahya Blankship and D. Cook on Jihad, have favoured
the “false” understanding that religious- violence within Islam was a
common practice from its expansionist and conquering campaigns of
the first century (7th-8th centuries).
Their theoretical perspective is clearly rooted in the “inter-reli-
gious violence” in the Qur’an, in the Traditions of the Prophet, con-
cerning the early Islamic treatises of Jihad like the famous Ibn al-
Mubarak (d. 797) Kitab al-Jihad, one of the first published on the ar-
44 T. Bassam, Islam's predicament with Modernity, p. 236.
45 Bat Ye'or, Le Dhimmi: Profil de l'opprimé en Orient et en Afrique du Nord
depuis la Conquete Arabe (Paris: Editeur Anthropos, 1980); The Decline of Eastern
Christianity under Islam, from Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, NJ: Fairleight Dickin-
son University Press, 1996).
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gument, like those by Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 805),
Kitab al-Siyar al-Saghir and Abu Ishaq al-Fazari (d.804) or on Ibn
‘Omar al-Waqidi al-Aslami (d. 823) Kitab al-Maghazi and Kitab al-
Futuh (properly attributed to a pseudo-Waqidi author).46
However, if concerning violence in the Qur’an, in particular
against non- Muslims, the analysis needs a specific comprehension in
a hermeneutic study also in relation with the “creation” of a Quranic
“milieu”, the ongoing debate on the complete collection of this
Revelation is still at the beginning, according to the historical sources
which already clarify low- intensive intra-religious fighting activities
during the Arabs' Futuh (conquering campaigns).
On the contrary, the Sunna shows a huge analytical range
between condemnation and approval which is established in a historical
Islamic period of great confusion and artificial creation of singular
Hadith which scientifically and partially disempower their credibil-
ity.47
The contemporary debate on the authenticity of the Islamic Tra-
dition shows us one of the major inconsistencies between reciprocal
Western and Islamic academic comprehension, at least, since the be-
ginning of the 20th century.48
In spite of this, the historical-theoretical approach which identi-
fied a Jihadist Islamic attitude from the beginning must still be proven
and clearly supported, also because Ibn al-Mubarak's Kitab al-Jihad,
and all the above texts were thought out and written in the second half
46 A. Ibn al-Mubarak, Kitab al-Jihad (Beyrut: Dar an-Nur, 1971); M. Khadduri,
The Islamic Law of Nations, Shaybani's Siyar (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,
1966); F. Hammada, Kitab al-Siyar li-saghir al-Islam Abi Ishaq al-Fazari (Beirut:
1987), pp. 13-86; Al-Waqidi, Kitab al-Maghazi (Beirut: 'Alam al-Kutub, 1984); J.
Wellhausen, Mohammed in Medina. Das ist Vakidi's Kitab al-Maghazi in verkurzter
deutsher Wiedergabe (Berlin: Reimer, 1882).
47 Racha el-Omari, “Accommodation and Resistance: classical Mu'tazilites
on ḥadith”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 71, 2, (2012), pp. 231-256; E. Dickinson,
The Development of early Sunnite Ḥadith criticism (Leiden: Brill, 2001); S. C. Lucas,
Constructive Critics. Ḥadith literature and the articulation of Sunni Islam (Leiden:
Brill, 2004); G. H. A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition, Studies in Chronology, Provenance
and Authorship of Early Ḥadīth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
48 D. F. Womack, “The authenticity and authority of Islam. Muhammad
Rashid Rida's response to Twentieth-century Missionary publications”, Social Science
and Missions, 28, 1-2, (2015), pp. 89-115.
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of the 8th century, during the early ‘Abbasid period, when the phase
of the first “Islamic conquests” was completely over.49
Bat Ye'or's approach has already been deeply criticised by his-
torians such as R. B. Betts and by the main expert of Semitic Studies,
S. Griffith. However, an evident merit of Ye'or's thesis is the criticism
of an excessively naive “convivencia” understanding of the Islamic
World, that as well as her hypothesis on Dhimmitude haphazardly as-
sumed quite ideological positions.
Moreover, after 9/11, the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe
and the USA have concretely emphasized an Islamophobic attitude
through which it has been easy to achieve a deep sense of rejection
and disdain towards a world that is usually not known and of which it
is easy to have only a rough understanding. The passage to identify Is-
lam as a “Supremacist” religion historically rooted from the beginning in
violence, and forced conversions50 is really effortless, in particular if
framed by the concept of Jihad.51
Nevertheless, the historical reality is quite different: the Cru-
sades, the Reconquista, Colonialism and post-Colonialism underline
how, if the religious-political concept of Jihad has existed from the II
century of Islamic age as expressions of personal internal struggle of
every believer on the path of God (Jihad fi sabili-llah), we need to
consider that it was profoundly restored from the 1950s assuming a
most violent offensive anti-colonialist and aggressive connotation52.
49 The battle of Talas (751) fought between an Abbasid army with the support
of the Tibetans against a Chinese Tang army in what is today Kyrgyzstan, like the
battle of Poitiers/Tours of 732 challenged by an Umayyad army against Charles Mar-
tel and Odo, Duke of Aquitanie's men, are historically considered the concrete con-
flicts which at least for the next three centuries were to set a limit on the expansion of
the Muslim armies (Indus River on the eastern side like Pyrenees on the Western one).
50 All historical sources agree in highlighting how for the first couple of cen-
turies, in the “Islamic” empires, the “Muslims” remained a religious minority until at
least the end of the 9th century, the beginning of the 10th. A. Hourani, A History of
the Arab People (London: Faber & Faber, 2002), pp. 41-48; H. Goddard, Christians
and Muslims: from Double standards to mutual understanding (London: Routledge,
1995), pp. 126-131; I. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), pp. 200-201.
51 N. Massaoumi, T. Mills, D. Miller, What is Islamophobia? Racism, Social
Movements and the State (London: Pluto Press, 2017), pp. 35ff.
52 S. Qutb, Milestones, A. B. el-Mehri (ed.) (Birmingham: Maktabah Publish-
ers, 2006); S. Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyya in the thought of Sayyid Qutb”,
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Very different is the concrete Islamic “Supremacist” attitude as-
sumed against religious and ethnic minorities in the Muslim majority
countries in the last decades of the 20th century. In this case the
debate is quite significant, in particular if we compare the plural and
inter-religious society of the last Islamic empires-Ottoman, Safavid
and Moghul-before the contemporary period, with the European
religious wars in the 16th and 17th centuries.
However, if the Cuius Regio Eius Religio doctrine purified
Western European countries from internal religious dissent, the Is-
lamic world, generally more “tolerant” until the contemporary age,
during colonialism discovered the ideology of “state-nationalism” in-
ternally developing a clear fragmentation in which the religious
minorities usually became the “sacrificial lamb”.
Colonialism deeply affected inter-religious relationships in the
Middle East: every internal reform (Tanzimat) was perceived by the
Muslim majority as being an imposition of European countries which
was clearly favouring the Christian minorities, rather than a require-
ment perceived by the people. This prominent passage needs to be bet-
ter explored to properly understand the main reasons behind the fail-
ure of the concept of citizenship in the late Ottoman Empire. The most
important cases can be broadly summarized as follows:
The Ottoman inability to equalize the Berat trade; as reported in the E. I.,
“[…] the Berat were originally distributed by the European diplomatic mission in
abusive extension to their rights under the capitulations (18th century). Originally
intended for local recruited consular officers and agents, they were sold or granted to
growing numbers of foreign and local Christian and Jewish merchants to acquire a
privileged and protected status.” In return for a fee of 1500 piastres, the Berat
conferred the right to trade with Europe with the same rights as European traders:
fewer custom duties and more tax exemptions, thus making these merchants richer
than their Muslim colleagues53. These grants enforced the Ottoman Dhimmi to
compete on more or less equal terms with foreign merchants, creating a new richer
and privileged class. The same privileges were not extended to Muslim merchants
Middle Eastern Studies, 38, 3, (2002), pp. 145-170; S. E. William, “Sayyid Qutb's
doctrine on Jahiliyya”, IJMES, 35, 4, (2003), pp. 521-545; Abul a 'la al-Maududi, Ji-
had in Islam (Beirut: The Holy Quran Publishing, 1980); Towards the Understanding
of the Qur'an, tr. and ed. by Zafar Ishaq Ansari (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation,
1988), 3 vols.
53 G. L. James, The Modern Middle East. A History (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), tr. in Italian, Storia del Medio Oriente Moderno (Torino:
Einaudi, 2009), p. 126.
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until the first half of the 19th century; however, those, who without external support,
could afford to buy a similar right were limited, in opposition to a huge number of
Ottoman Christian and Jewish subjects who received the consular privileges. It is
clear to imagine how the Berat crashed into the internal trade relationship between the
Muslim majority and the other religious minorities in the Middle East.54
At the same time as this socio-economic dynamic, Istanbul's de-
cision to reform the traditional social-cultural and religious balances
of power favoured the development of new understandings of the rela-
tionship between religious affiliation and ethno-political identity.
Whereas before the 18th century the Ottoman administrative system al-
lowed the universality of religious faith to prevail over ethnic and lin-
guistic differences, although without destroying them, the “reactual-
isation” of the traditional “millet” system according to the institution
of the religious community55 opened the door to devastating conflicts.
On one hand, the Great Powers intervened in Ottoman internal affairs,
imposing their role (through renewed capitulations and Berat) as the
protectors of non-Muslim religious minorities and supporting the
evolution of new and stronger separatist movements (concerning the
Armenians). On the other hand, reforming the millet system,56 the
formal abolition of civil disparities among Ottoman subjects, re-
defined the Empire's relationship with its non-Muslim population,
without allowing Istanbul to re-impose its authority over the provinces
and its subjects. A Western racial “Supremacism” ideology, like
European Colonialism policies, shaped the basis for the development
of an “Islamic Supremacism” which emerged as the expression of
“Political-ideological” elaboration in Neo-Wahhabism, Turkish Kem-
54 M. Demichelis, “Citizenship and Equity. An Excursus within the Nahda,
Islamic Pluralism and Religious Exclusivism”, in B. Airò, M. Zaccaria, I Confini della
Cittadinanza nel Nuovo Medio Oriente, (Roma: Viella Ed., 2015), p. 23.
55 K. H. Karpat, “Millets and Nationality: the Roots of Incongruity of Nation
and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, Christian and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the
Functioning of a Plural Society, B. Braude, B. Lewis (eds.) (New York: Holmes and
Meier Publishers, 1982), vol. I, pp. 147-148; P. Kitromilides, An Orthodox Commonwealth:
Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeaster Europe (Aldershot: Ashg-
ate Variorum, 2007), pp. IX-X.
56 Since Mehmet II, the traditional millet system made it possible to take into
account and rule over the various religious-ethnic groups that composed the Empire.
K. H. Karpat, Millets and Nationality, p. 143.
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alism and post-Kemalist ideology,57 as in the thought of authors as
Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Shakib Arslan (d. 1946). In this case as
well, the track is “au rebours”, Western colonialist ideology of the
“state-nationalism” has brought about the peculiarity of a new form of
Supremacism, an Islamic-religious-nationalist one,58 which in the last
century has widely restricted the presence of religious minorities in
the Islamic majority regions, while, in Europe as in North America, it
is “populist” politicians and media that have performed a dangerous
role-playing game in our democracies and our democratic beliefs.
57 U. Cizre, The Turkish Ak party and its leaders. Criticism, Opposition and
Dissent (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 57; U. Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey:
Kemalism, Religion and Nation State (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 13ff.
58 M. Demichelis, P. Maggiolini, The Struggle to Define a Nation. Rethinking
Religious Nationalism in Contemporary Islamic World, pp. 1-15.
Divide et impera:
The political application of sectarianism in the Egyptian context.
From the Sadat years to the reign of Mubarak (1970-2011)
Alessia Melcangi
1. Introduction
Looking from the Sadat presidency until now it is possible to
notice that the top-down sectarianism in Egyptian politics has repres-
ented a strategy used by the different political leaders to hold on to
power through a strong manipulation and exacerbation of divisions in
society.
Religious or communal pluralism does not definitely lead to
political sectarianism but its development is strictly linked with the
elites' political behaviour and interests: as Yusri Hazran states
“sectarianism takes the form of the instrumental exploitation of a
religious or communal identity or framework in order to enable
political organization, the gaining of political legitimacy, the
promotion of political change, or the preservation of the control held
by interest groups”.1
In fact, the nature of the executive-centered Egyptian political
system based on a strong and autocratic presidential leadership, typ-
ical of both military regimes and single-party dominant system, led
the recent regimes to manage sectarianism as a tool for maintaining
their power.2 The strategy was that of containment, repression and ex-
ternal diversion realized through the use of co-optation of key figures
and social groups, the balance of key power centers against one an-
other and the turning of public attention away from unresolved prob-
lems.
The sectarian tensions, which characterised the Sadat (1970-
1981) and Mubarak (1981-2011) regimes, were the product of a divis-
ive rhetoric widespread within the framework of continuous reproduc-
tions of their authoritarian survival and of their quest for power. The
1 Y. Hazran, “The origins of sectarianism in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent”,
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, (2017), p. 2.
2 C. R. Ryan, “Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt”, Journal of
Third World Studies, 18/2 (2001), p. 3.
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result was an increasing amount of violence which hit all the Egyptian
minorities, in particular the Christian Copts.
After the colonial period, the establishment of the nation-state
in North African societies as the dominant political form put into play
a new rationale of governance that divided the governed in order to
maintain and enhance their legitimacy: instead of recognizing parallel
communities distinct by their confessional, tribal or ethnic affiliation,
the nation-state sought to represent the image of a unique group of
people united by a shared history, culture and territory, trying to erad-
icate, eliminate or assimilate the “others”.3 The way in which the elites
started to deal with difference and diversity was based on the ex-
ploitation and politicization of divisions among society, often based
on economical disparities, manipulated by various groups to gain
legitimization.4
Moreover, the (ab)use of religion to justify rule and seek legit-
imacy and non-functional representation of minorities in the govern-
ment became a component of this top-down sectarianism as a strategy
to keep consensus. If on the one hand the official regimes' discourse
evoked the modern Western culture, the mechanism of control and the
normative system used in order to control the masses rest on utilitarian
interpretation of values belonging to from the religious traditional
world5: the appeal to nationalism or national unity, in a formal level,
let the elites curb the sub-national affiliations, in particular religious,
in the service of political interests.
Sectarianism has deep political roots which overlapped the
ideological one increasingly, causing, however, violence and hostility.
It goes around “the sources of political and economic power of
the territorial state, the religious divergence being exploited by the rul-
ing elite, the majority vs. minority divide forming a decisive factor in
the relations between the two communities within the political frame-
work”.6
3 F. Elhusseini, “The Arab World between the Dilemma of Nationalism and
Sectarian Conflicts”, Hemispheres, 30/2, (2015), p. 42.
4 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Two Years of Sectarian Vi-
olence: What happened? Where Do We Begin? (2011), pp. 20-22.
5 Y. Hazran, “The origins of sectarianism in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent”, p. 4.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
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This is a matter of state-society relations and state-minority
communities relationships: as in the case of the Coptic community in
Egypt, a country with a fragile and polarizing political system, an eco-
nomical sector in deep crises but not a structural sectarianism7.
While attacks by Muslims on Copts have a sectarian element,
confessional differences are not the primary sources of tension.
Egypt's outdated laws and authoritarian institutions have made
Copts a target for social conflict.
Considering the last decades, this paper will analyse the dynam-
ics of sectarian violence in contemporary Egypt from the seventies un-
til the 2011 revolution, taking the specific case of the Egyptian Chris-
tian Copts as a case study. The research will concentrate on the rela-
tionship between the State and minority communities and in particular
on the close and often controversial alliance between the Coptic
Church and the regime. Moreover, this article will try to show how the
Egyptian style top-down sectarianism would eventually backfire, con-
trary to the expectations of using it as a strategy of authoritarian sur-
vival.
In the last years, religious fervour has invaded all groups and
associations in Egypt, inflaming communal feelings while weakening
national bonds and the idea of a “national unity”. Turning against the
remnants of Nasser's socialist entourage, Sadat embraced Islam and
Islamists as a counterweight to the left and opened the door to eco-
nomic liberalization. Setting religion at the centre of the public and
political environment also isolated Copts. The seventies were marked
by the rise of violent social clashes between Muslims and Christians,
as well.
The recurrence of religious strife continued for all the Mubarak
presidency: although he tried to cement the President's image as a pro-
tector of Muslims and non-Muslims with the “national unity” cam-
paign of the early nineties, it was still difficult for Copts to see their
claims fulfilled. But the strong collaboration created between the Pres-
ident and the Pope solidified the Coptic support for the official rhet-
oric of “national dialogue” and “national unity”, the regime tried ap-
parently to break down barriers but it actually created a mechanism to
7 B. Aras, S. Bardakcı, “Egypt's Top-Down Sectarianism”, Pomeas Policy
Brief, 1 (2014), p. 1.
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avoid a nuanced discussion of the challenges concerning relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims.8
2. The Sadat years and the return of the fitna ta’ifiyya
The collapse of the Nasserist ideology led to the dissolution of
nationalistic and socialistic projects, letting in room for radical tenden-
cies, keen on defining themselves only from a religious viewpoint.
Anwar al-Sadat, the President of Egypt from 1970, using Islam
as a tool for a political legitimation, opened the door to Islamic move-
ments, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, for political participation;
this new policy pushed Islam once more to the fore as the common de-
nominator of the majority, thus leaving the Copts out of the political
arena. During the seventies, the religious tension between Muslims
and Copts –which represented, according to a census conducted in
1976, 2.3 million (6.7%) in a population of 38,5 million9– intensified
following a series of clashes. At the beginning of the seventies more
than eleven confessional incidents occurred, the majority of which ori-
ginated in disputes over Church constructions or renovations.
In this period the Church emerged as the Coptic community's
effective political representative and eclipsed the secular elite in con-
sequence of the election of Bishop Shenuda as Patriarch of the Coptic
Orthodox Church in October 1971. The political leadership of Pope
Shenuda III coincided with a growing sense of Coptic nationalism or
ethnic consciousness; Sadat's appeal to religion and support of Islamic
organizations alienated the traditionally quiescent community and pro-
voked several conflicts between the President and the Pope and viol-
ent social clashes between the religious groups. In fact, the election of
Shenuda marked the end of the collaboration with the State started
8 A. El-Shobaki, Ending sectarianism in Egypt, “Egypt Independent”, 14
January 2011. Available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/ending-sectarianism-
egypt/
9 Every analysis and research on the Coptic community in Egypt needs some
thought about the numerical size of the Copts in contemporary Egypt. This represents
a complex problem seen from a historical perspective: it is difficult to obtain reliable
data from government statistics and from those of the community. The government's
will to reduce the relevance of the Coptic community and the fear of the Christians to
declare their faith in public has made the official census inaccurate. For further details
see A. Melcangi, I copti nell'Egitto di Nasser. Tra politica e religione (1952-1970)
(Roma: Carocci, 2017).
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with Nasser and the previous Pope, Cyril VI.10 The Patriarch refused
to pledge his loyalty to the regime; as Sadat revived Islam as a polit-
ical idiom in Egypt, he insisted upon the preservation of Copts' rights.
Within the community, Shenuda consolidated his consensus
thanks to the network of social services created on his initiative in or-
der to help the worshippers, in particular the middle-class, to survive
in the midst of a rapid contraction of economic opportunities and so-
cial mobility.11 The availability of such services has meant that the
public space has become increasingly confessional.
Moreover, the Church denied Coptic laymen a role in both com-
munal and national affairs, and thus drove a wedge between clergy
and laity favouring the process initiated with Nasser which had led the
political activism of the Coptic elite in the early years of twentieth
century to be replaced by the rise of the political role of the Church.
As a consequence of this, “the voice of Shenuda was considered by
Church and State as the only legitimate voice of the Coptic com-
munity in political affairs”.12
Shenuda had the ability to take charge of the Coptic requests
defending them in political terms: the rights of equity, of juridical
autonomy and security, of an appropriate political and administrative
representation and the rights of the free building of places of worship
and the respect of different beliefs represented the main concerns of
the community. The Church's political behaviour represented a reas-
sertion of religious identity which provided the Copts with a mechan-
ism to resist State action.13
Regarding the political sphere, Sadat's rise to power was ac-
companied by an ever-growing trend towards Coptic withdrawal from
Egyptian public life that culminated in their virtually complete ab-
10 For further details see: A. Melcangi, I copti nell'Egitto di Nasser. Tra
politica e religione (1952-1970), cit.
11 S. S. Hasan, Christian versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-
Long Struggle for Coptic Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 111-
112.
12 P. Sedra, “Copts and the Millet Partnership: The Intra-Communal
Dynamics behind Egyptian Sectarianism”, Journal of Law and Religion, 29/ 3 (2014),
p. 497.
13 P. Van Doorn-Harder, “Copts: Fully Egyptian but for a Tattoo?”, in M.
Shatzmiller (ed.), Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies (Québec:
McGill-Queen's University Press-MQUP, 2005), p. 76.
Alessia Melcangi40
sence. Although his governments included two or three Christian cab-
inet ministers, it seemed clear that there was a political discrimination
against Copts: “In 1971 three out of 360 deputies were Copts, while in
the parliamentary election of 1976 not one Copt was elected; in 1979
only four Copts were elected in addition to the usual quota of eight or
ten Christian deputies usually appointed by the President”.14 The
Copts were also under-represented in the higher grades of the civil
service and some sensitive government departments appeared to be
totally closed to them on the grounds that they could be a risk to se-
curity. The government was afraid to provoke a Muslim reaction
against the appointment of a Christian.
In 1977 relationships between Church and State entered a very
difficult phase. Coptic anxieties began to reflect the increasing
strength of the gama’at islamiyya,15 and the Copts felt that Sadat had
given his regime an Islamic stamp.16 Gradually the new policy aban-
doned the nationalist ideology that was inclusive towards Copts as Ar-
abs and Egyptians. This sectarian distinction contributed to an ideolo-
gical fragmentation in the national apparatus injecting hatred and re-
pulsion from both sides leading to a serious sectarian clash in in the
village of Khanka17 in Qalyubiyya Governorate in 1972. Christians
14 A. Melcangi, “The Political Participation of Copts in Egypt: From the
Nasser Years to the Sectarian Strife of the Nineties”, in M. Fois, A. Pes (eds.), Politics
and Minorities in Africa (Roma: Aracne, 2013), p. 231.
15 These Islamic groups started as very popular student organization in a
modern Egyptian university. The group that afterwards took the name of the gama’at
islamiyya was focusing at the time on installing moral and social ethics in the
university based on a series of rules that they consider “Islamic”. It was only later that
the groups started to advocate direct and violent confrontation against the regime, ex-
panding its political activities outside the university and projected the plan to kill
Sadat with the collaboration of the Jihad group. For further details see G. Kepel, Le
Prophète et Pharaon. Les mouvements islamistes dans l'Égypte contemporaine (Paris:
La Découverte, 1984); J. Benin, J. Stork (eds.), Political Islam: Essays from Middle
East Report (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); H. N.
Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptia Politics”, International Journal of Middle
East Studies, 16/ 1, (1984).
16 J. D. Pennington, “The Copts in modern Egypt”, Middle Eastern Studies,
18/2 (1982), p. 171.
17 By November 1972, in an atmosphere charged with sectarianism, an
unauthorized Church in the Delta village of Khanka was set ablaze, and Shenuda sent
a hundred priests and four hundred laymen to pray at the site of the arson. The
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have become more endangered in being viewed as scapegoats for Is-
lamists who are angry against the president.
The increasing polarization of society showed how necessary it
was to restore the reference to the land of belonging, Egypt, as the
main identity that was allowed to be recognized and which was more
important than the religious one. Sadat called for a conference to dis-
cuss national unity on 24 July 1972 and the next month the National
Assembly, during an emergency meeting, passed the law of national
unity which permitted freedom of belief and the respect of freedoms.
In spite of this, the condition of the Copts quickly developed to a true
status of discrimination which led the Church to call for a Christian re-
ligious conference which took place on 17 January 1977. The state-
ment issued highlighted the urgency for government protection of
Christians' culture and their property and stated the inalienability of
some rights such as freedom of belief and worship, the abandonment
of efforts to apply the Islamic law to non-Muslims, as well as the can-
cellation of the restriction to build Churches and greater Coptic repres-
entation in labour unions, professional associations, local and regional
councils, and the parliament.18
During the years 1978-1979 the conflicts between the two reli-
gious groups continued to increase in the Saʿid (Upper Egypt),19 espe-
cially in Minya and Asyut where the presence of the Coptic com-
munity was higher than the national average.
The claims of the community to rediscover the Coptic identity
clashed with the dominant idea of the gama’at islamiyya shared by
many Muslims. The protest is therefore interpreted as a desire to sub-
vert the status of submission to which the Copts are condemned: as
Gilles Kepel states, “giving up their status as dhimmi, which repres-
ents the one and the only admissible method to accept their existence,
albeit subordinate to the Muslim majority, the Christians defy Islam. It
incident exacerbated the realationship between the Patriarch and Sadat. See G. Kepel,
Le Prophète et Pharaon. Les mouvements islamistes dans l'Égypte contemporaine, p. 198.
18 S. E. Ibrahim et al., “The Copts of Egypt”, Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional Report (London: 1996), p. 18.
19 For a list of the various incidents occurred from the seventies to the mid-
eighties, see N. R. Farah, Religious strife in Egypt: crisis and ideological conflict in
the Seventies (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1986); H. Ansari, “Sectarian conflict in
Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion”, Middle East Journal, 38/3, 1984.
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becomes a duty of good Muslims to oppose their destructive ac-
tions”.20 This situation was further aggravated by the ongoing clash
between Patriarch Shenuda and President Sadat.
“To engineer the shift, the ruling elites resorted to certain
policies that triggered a process of significant changes in Muslim-
Coptic relations”.21 This fact was highlighted when the phrase “Islam
is the religion of the State, and Shariʿa is a main source of legisla-
tion”22 was added to the second article of the constitution in 1971,
which was later amended to “Shariʿa is the23 main source of legisla-
tion”24 in 1980.
In the light of the numerous atrocities perpetrated by Islamic
militants, the evident lack of zeal with which the government investig-
ated them and the failure to bring those responsible wrongdoers to
trial had by then made the Copts feel insecure and in danger inside
their nation.
Between the spring of 1980 and the autumn of 1981, the
gama’at islamiyya did not hesitate to fan the flames of sectarian ten-
sions to put the State into trouble. At the scene of the interfaith clash
there were three protagonists: in addition to the two communities,
Christian and Muslim, we could now find the State.
First the government coined the phrase that would become the
slogan of the following regime: national unity, the existence of Egypt
as a nation based on the harmonious co-existence of Copts and
Muslims which must be defended by the fitna taʾifiyya. Sadat, facing
mounting opposition from all political groups, used religious strife as
an excuse and responded with wide arrests in September 1981: in that
difficult period, Shenuda was banished to a convent in Upper Egypt,
and Muslim Brothers and Islamic group leaders were arrested and
jailed.
20 G. Kepel, Le Prophète et Pharaon. Les mouvements islamistes dans
l'Égypte contemporaine, cit., p. 135; K. J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years
(New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 271.
21 N. R. Farah, Religious strife in Egypt: crisis and ideological conflict in the
Seventies, p. 122.
22 H. Dowidar, “Égypte”, in E. Canal-Forgues (ed.), Recueil des constitutions
des pays arabes (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2000), p. 91.
23 Italics mine.
24 H. Dowidar, “Égypte”, cit., p. 92.
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According to D. al-Khawaga a parallel between the political ac-
tion of the Copts and the new Islamic group, in the course of this dec-
ade, is more than evident: “Overall, despite the reticence that each
group displayed towards the other, during the seventies they started to
impose their political visibility, to bring into question the legitimacy
of power, introducing their respective ethics into the Egyptian political
language, mobilizing international allies to gain official recognition as
political actors, and finally cut off all dialogue with the government
which was considered illegitimate”.25 This “Autumn of Fury” cli-
maxed when Islamist militants shot and killed the President at a milit-
ary parade commemorating the 1973 Arab- Israeli War. The end of the
Sadat regime did not lead to a return of interfaith collaboration.
On the contrary, the religious strife continued throughout the
Mubarak regime.
3. Between denial and repression: the politicization of sectarian-
ism and the Coptic question under Mubarak
According to the Egyptian official statistics, despite the escala-
tion of violence and religious attacks of the seventies and the increase
of Copts who decided to leave Egypt as a consequence of them, in
1996 the number of Christians reached 3,5 million, 5.7% out of the
population of 62,5 million,26 raising the number by 5.3% in 2011 with
a population 80 million.27
It was in that years that the presidency of Mubarak -who arose
to power after the assassination of Sadat in 1981— realized what can
be called “the politicization of sectarian tension”. Recurrence of reli-
gious strife marked the whole Mubarak regime (1981-2011): although
he immediately began to keep the Islamic groups at a distance and
25 D. al-Khawaga, La renouveau copte. La communauté comme acteur
politique, Thèse de doctorat sous la direction de R. Leveau (Paris: Institut d'Études
Politiques de Paris, 1993), p. 424.
26 H. Bayoumi, F. Moriconi-Ebrard, Century Census Egypt 1882-1996/Un
Siècle de Recensement (Le Caire: Cedej-Capmas, 2003), p. 126; See also Y.
Courbage, Ph. Fargues, Chrétiens et Juifs dans l'Islam arabe et turc (Paris: Fayard,
1992), pp. 318-319; É. Denis, “Cent ans de localisation de la population chrétienne
égyptienne”, Astrolabe, 2 (2000), pp. 131-134.
27 Pew Research Center, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Global
Christianity. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Christian
Population (2011), p. 65.
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tried to cement the President's image as a protector of Muslims and
Christians with the “national unity” campaign of the early nineties, the
claims of the Christians went unheeded. In this case the ruling elite
did not hesitate to exploit political sectarianism to weaken their en-
emies or mobilize political support: “the integration and the control of
the Islamists considered politically moderated and the support for the
official Islam and elimination of the radical groups”28 delineated the
principle characteristics of the new regime.
A perpetual guarantee remained in the form of shared Egyptian
identity and the social intermingling of Copts and Muslims in a single
social context, a “unique fabric”. Nevertheless official rhetoric of “na-
tional dialogue” and “national unity”, trying apparently to break down
barriers, did not consider the differences and the real problems of the
Christian group.29
Manipulating sectarianism, the government started the ideolo-
gical construction of the “outsider” or “other” with the purpose of
denying a local cause for communal violence and blaming foreign
forces, as a result of the rejection of the sectarianism itself. “Through
constructing an ‘extreme other’, this discourse also established a
‘moderate us’. The former is represented as an aberration from the
norm while authentic Egyptian values are represented as displayed by
the latter. This established differences and distance between the ‘us’
of the authentic Egyptians and the ‘them’ of the outsiders or traitors to
national unity”,30 which became the victim –there was a clear neces-
sity to avoid the representation of the victims as Copts or Muslims.
28 L. Guirguis, Les coptes d'Égypte. Violences communautaires et
transformations politiques (2005-2012) (Paris: Karthala, 2012), p. 39.
29 A. El-Shobaki, Ending sectarianism in Egypt: “In fact, although the
government of Mubarak issued several laws in favour of the Copts such as the
‘relative’ flexibility in the legal procedure for building Churches, the establishment of
Christmas as an official state holiday, the leadership's intervention to sponsor the
development and revival of study centres and revival of cultural artefacts, especially
on the occasion of millennium celebrations, some groups within the community
emphasized that the government's attempts to fight the fundamentalist current led to
its sidelining of Coptic issues and concerns.”
30 E. Iskander, “The ‘mediation’ of Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt: The
strategies and discourses of the official Egyptian press during Mubarak's presidency”,
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 23/1, (2012), p. 39.
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But while the discourse blaming communal violence on foreign
agents remained in evidence, it was overcome by the construction of a
more specific “them” set up to compare an idea of bad Egyptians
against that of good Egyptians, loyal to the national unity and to the
State that protects them.31 The “extreme other” was ultimately identi-
fied in the Muslim Brotherhood and in the Copts of the diaspora
which, living outside the homeland, became traitors to national unity.
“National unity is not a new concept, but it started to have an
increased political significance”:32 now it was used in order to consol-
idate the government rhetoric and bring together the different groups
in support of the regime which set itself up as the only defender of the
national unity.
Mubarak's regime stood under severe Islamist pressure and
compromised with the Islamic “moderates” in order to isolate and
crush the violent extremists. This meant continuing the discriminatory
trends of the status quo. Whenever Copts were being attacked the gov-
ernment remained passive and refrained from intervention or action.
Its decision to avoid confrontation with the Islamists was particularly
acute when, during the early nineties, the gama’at islamiyya had be-
come very powerful and had stepped up its violent activities, which
included targeting the Copts. Radical Islamists were more widespread
through the rural immigrants of Saʿid: the Cairo suburbs of Ayn
Shams and Imbaba witnessed outbreaks of violent clashes from 1990-
1992, typically instigated by routine disputes between Muslim and
Christian neighbours that escalated into large-scale riots with numer-
ous injuries and casualties on both sides.
The wave of radical Islamist terrorist attacks targeting tourists
and foreign businesses beginning in mid-1992 was in particular a
threat to Coptic security. In 1992 alone, thirty-seven anti-Coptic at-
tacks were reported, although national attention was more focused on
31 S. Elsässer, The Coptic Question in the Mubarak Era (Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 202.
32 E. Iskander, “The ‘mediation’ of Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt: The
strategies and discourses of the official Egyptian press during Mubarak's presidency”,
41.
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the threat that Islamist radicals posed to State security rather than ad-
dressing the Coptic issue in particular.33
'Ala al-Aswani, one of the most important critical voices against
the Mubarak regime, affirmed that
the inconsistency of the State policy in the sectarian domain is due to
the regime being afraid of external pressure, its over-reliance on the
repressive State apparatus, and the general prosecutor's office being
under the influence of the justice minister who is appointed and
directed by Mubarak.34
All of these issues have led to the vacillation of the State policy
regarding Copts. Many state officials, security officers and legislators
denied the existence of sectarian violence in Egypt or minimized the
extent of the problem. The army and police have been negligent in
their duty to intervene against this violence, which has further enabled
the spread of sectarian violence.35 The most dangerous way to deal
with the issue of interreligious clashes was based on the conviction
that it was a security problem that required the application of the on-
going state of emergency (he conducted his entire presidency under
emergency law No. 162 of 1958) which legitimized all types of inter-
vention of the State. So the way of treating sectarianism as a local is-
sue led to the “informal reconciliation” according to which the two
parts were invited to find a public agreement at the presence of the re-
ligious representatives and the local notables. Moreover, the govern-
ment deferred to the military tribunals the Islamist militants, whose
crimes often often included attacks against the Copts, avoiding any
equal application of the penal code as in the case of a criminal act.
The repression and the secrets did not imply any type of official
recognition of the violence suffered by Christians. As always, the gov-
ernment position moved toward two main characteristics: denial and
33 A. Ayalon, “Egypt's Coptic Pandora's Box”, O. Bengio, G. Ben-Dor (eds.),
Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1999), p. 62.
34 A. Al-Aswani, On the State of Egypt. What Caused the Revolution, trans. J.
Wright (London: Canongate, 2011), pp. 131-132.
35 M. Tadros, Copts at the Crossroas. The Challenges of Building Inclusive
Democracy in Contemporary Egypt (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press
2013), p. 87.
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repression. “The denial, expressed in an insensitive way, became re-
jection of the existence of tensions, disputes or hate speeches between
the ‘two elements of the nation’ and the denunciation of the ‘foreign
hand’ which sowed trouble at the heart of the peaceful Egyptian na-
tion”.36
The worsening of the economy, infrastructure and security cli-
mate of Egypt37 dragged Copts down along with all other Egyptians
who suffered for a civil society which was marked by permanent gov-
ernment interference and repression.
Under Sadat and his successor, state security agents have been
active participants in the violence rather than inept bystanders, a prac-
tice that with difficulty has changed during the decades, as the facts of
Kosheh38 in 2000 confirmed. Or in other cases the regime fails to pro-
tect Copts, as in the bombing of the Alexandria Church the 1st of Janu-
ary 2011.39 This collaboration —between the State's formal coercive ap-
paratus and its unofficial proxies— has thrived under the aegis of rhet-
orically concerned yet politically detached leaders.
The episodes of violence did not cease after 1997, the beginning
of a fleeting period of pacification, of which the attacks committed in
2004 against a tourist complex in Taba (Sinai) signed the end. The
proliferation of Islamist discourses, combined with the concomitant
formation of a Coptic imaginary and environment centered around
community values, had finally broken the bonds existing between
36 L. Guirguis, Les coptes d'Égypte. Violences communautaires et
transformations politiques (2005-2012), p. 43.
37 J. Brownlee, “Violence Against Copts in Egypt”, The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2013).
38 On January 1-2, 2000, Muslims from nearby towns and villages flocked to
Kosheh, a village in Upper Egypt with a population of 35,000 at that time, the
majority of them Copts, in response to a dispute between two merchants, one Copt,
the other Muslim, the evening of December 31. The assailants vandalized Coptic
stores and homes and attacked the locals. The Ministry Twenty of Interior intervened
after that twenty Copts were killed. See S. E. Ibrahim, “The Road of Thorns From Al-
Khanka 1972 to Al-Kosheh 2000,” Watani, 13 February 2000, trans. Arab West
Report Press Summaries and Media Research for Dialogue. Available at:
http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2000/week-7/21-road-thorns-al-khanka-1972-al-
kosheh-2000.
39 During the New Year's Eve service, a massive explosion at the Coptic
Church of Saint Mark and Pope Peter in Alexandria killed 23 people and injured more
than 70.
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worshippers of both religions. In this climate of social congestion and
segregation, the latent tensions and old resentments fed on different
strife, and the disputes between Christians and Muslims frequently
resulted in attacks and reprisals. In 2008, a report of the Egyptian Ini-
tiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) stated that the violence became
more destructive and deadly than before, extended to areas that had
previously been exempt, and were less frequently involved in the dy-
namics of local conflicts. In addition, the report revealed that seem-
ingly spontaneous actions often turned out to be organized and pre-
meditated.40
A close examination of the conditions of the Copts under
Mubarak reveals a slight opening on the part of the State. However,
although Mubarak's administration was more willing to bring the
Copts into the fold, their political participation remained limited to a
number of appointed MPs and ministers with second-rate portfolios.
Coptic representation in the last cabinet before the recent Egyp-
tian Revolution consisted of two ministers; regarding the number of
Coptic members appointed by the President in the People's Assembly
sessions, since 1964, it has, with one exception, exceeded the number
of Coptic members elected by the people (the exception was in 1987
when six Copts were elected to the Assembly). However, the system
of proportional representation instituted in 1983 in place at the time,
was scrapped by the government shortly thereafter.41
The only way for the community to survive during the eighties
and the nineties was to abandon the method of protest as a political ac-
tion, trying to find a common grounds for reconciliation with the lead-
ership.42 So the Coptic community started to reshape the self-image in
which the Church took an important lead, resulting in continuing the
reformation of the communal identity towards a religious identity and
in the social restructuring of a traditional community which had
already begun in the last years of the Sadat government.
40 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Two Years of Sectarian
Violence: What happened? Where Do We Begin?, p. 8.
41 A. Melcangi, “The Political Participation of Copts in Egypt: From the
Nasser Years to the Sectarian Strife of the Nineties”, p. 235.
42 D. al-Khawaga, La renouveau copte. La communauté comme acteur
politique, p. 426.
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The Church, stifling the divergent opinions inside the com-
munity, imposed itself as the only voice which had the right to define
what it means to be Coptic, underlining the differences and the simil-
arities compared with the other community and defining their way to
be Egyptian: “as a result, there are effectively no challenges to the au-
thority of the Church in the spiritual realm”43 which directly led the
Church to play a more active and defensive role but, above all, to ex-
ercise a high-powered such a mission to minister to all Egyptian
Christians, inside and outside the community. The strategical way of
surviving in the difficult decades of the Mubarak regime was for the
Coptic Church to support the President's policies unconditionally and
state both the sameness of Christians and Muslims, waving the flag of
Egyptianess and equal citizenship within an Egyptian national state,
and the differences, underlining the uniqueness and originality of
Coptic culture and its Christian identity.
The relationship between the Pope and Mubarak was based on a
sort of “tactical agreement”:44 the former “started to adopt a low pro-
file, to cooperate with the regime, to avoid confrontation and embrace
the rhetoric of national unity publicly supporting Mubarak and consol-
idate his power within the Church”.45 The President needed the sup-
port of the Copts more than ever in order to base its anti-terrorism
policy and create a magnificent image of interreligious harmony, al-
lowing Coptic independence in community affairs and recognizing
Shenuda as the voice of the Church in political matters.46
This entente fostered the kind of minoritarian discourse that the
Coptic revival process had created. By recognizing the Patriarch as the
official representative and voice of the Coptic community, the state
endorsed this emerging ethno-religious identity, by which Copts are
43 P. S. Rowe, “The Sheep and the Goats? Christian Groups in Lebanon and
Egypt in Comparative Perspective”, in M. Shatzmiller (ed.), Nationalism and
Minority Identities in Islamic Societies, p. 90.
44 N. A. Al-Fattah (ed.), La situation religieuse en Égypte (Cairo: Al-Ahram
Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 90.
45 P. Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian
Communities in Modern Egyptian Politics”, Islam and Christian-Muslim relations,
10/2, (1999), p. 227. In the presidential election of 2005 Shenuda supported the
candidacy of Mubarak suggesting to the community to do the same.
46 N. van Doorn-Harder, “Betwixt and Between. The Copts of Egypt”,
Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 23/1 (2013), p. 13.
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characterized by religion rather than by citizenship.47 On the other side
the Church supported the celebration of saints and martyrs' life
narratives. They were used not only to build Christian identity but also
to negotiate the minority status. Obviously, the stories about the saints
and martyrs show the importance of the asceticism and sacrifice. Suf-
fering becomes an aspect of the life of Egyptian Copts, the only pos-
sible destiny which relegates the Christians to this marginal and pass-
ive minority status.
It was in the Church's interest to limit the expression of Copts
as individuals, rejecting the idea of founding a Coptic political party;
so the community started to reflect the image of an “exemplary minor-
ity”,48 as Dina al-Khawaga states. This behaviour provoked the severe
reaction of the Coptic elite, made up almost entirely of eminent intel-
lectuals, and young Copts who had repeatedly asked the Patriarch to
operate according to his role, accusing him of penalizing their culture
and practice of full Egyptian citizenship.49
The presidential and parliamentary elections highlighted how
the government had been trying to exploit the Coptic votes by making
all kinds of promises to the Church and the people, but not offering
anything in return after victory. The only chance for average Copts to
improve their lives would have been to take a high-profile position in
the government-backed National Democratic Party (NDP). The offi-
cial regime limits Coptic citizens to a symbolic participation in the
political system which is most evident by the President's appointment
of Coptic representatives in the People's Assembly strengthening the
position of the Church as the main representative of the community
vis-à-vis the State.50
47 M. Tadros, “Vicissitudes in the entente between the Coptic Orthodox
Church and the State in Egypt (1952-2007)”, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, 41/2 (2009), p. 276.
48 D. al-Khawaga, La renouveau copte. La communauté comme acteur
politique, cit., p. 427.
49 B. Nikolov, Care of poor and ecclesiastical government: an ethnography
of the social service of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Cairo (Baltimore-Maryland:
ProQuest UMI Dissertation Publishing, 2008), pp. 17-18.
50 K. Kamal, The NDP's manipulation of Egyptian Copts, “Egypt
Independent”, 19 November 2010.
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Furthermore, they were under represented in a number of fields:
during the Mubarak regime there were hardly any high-ranking Copts
in the military, police force, judiciary or diplomatic corps.
Copts were also drastically under represented in higher univer-
sity posts. They tended to be excluded from the intelligence service
and the presidential staff and were under represented among Egypt's
regional governors. Important state offices were still closed to Egyp-
tian citizens with a Coptic background, and their representation in the
judiciary, the official media, diplomatic missions, the army and the
police did not exceed 2% of the total.51
Only at the end of the 2000s an initial movement of protest star-
ted to make its voice heard: by 2009 different new organizations call-
ing for workers' rights, full judicial independence, and political reform
challenged the regime. One of them was the Egyptian Movement for
Change, and also known by its slogan Kifaya (Enough).
This group, born in 2004, led some Copts who opposed
Mubarak's policies to act politically and challenge the President's part-
nership with Shenuda. It was the rising of a new activism among the
youth within the community: this group put a distance between them-
selves and the Church's support for the regime and started to get in-
volved in politics on their own. Some young Copts, rather than ap-
pealing to the respect of human rights, “concluded that Christians
would only get equal rights within a democratic regime based on the
principle of citizenship for all Egyptians”.52 These movements from
below represented the beginning of a protest march which was able to
break the chains of the national ideal, now too narrow and unbearable,
questioning the power of Mubarak, his solid alliance with the Church
and bringing out all the contradictions of the Egyptian system that
would lead to the revolt of January 25, 2011.
51 A. Gunidy, “Symbolic victim in a socially regressing Egypt: the declining
situation of the Copts”,Middle East Review of International Affairs, 14/1, (2010), p. 85.
52 G. Fahmi, “The Coptic Church and Politics in Egypt”, The Carnegie




The nation-state model, as the dominant form adopted after the
colonial period in North Africa societies, in many cases led to an ob-
sessive and instrumental focus on the role of the centralized political
and administrative powers and gave rise to a new ideal of governance
that divided the traditional communities, generating an internal contra-
diction. One of the attempts carried out by the new governments to
deal with ethnic and religious identity claims, through which com-
munities started to demand forms of official recognition and accom-
modation, was to manage and politicize the sectarianism.
But in doing so, the regimes, risen from the ashes of the colo-
nial power, did not take into account those “identity politics” or “polit-
ics of recognition”. In most cases, the state-building process has
proved instrumental, incomplete and unable to recompose its plural-
istic societies, politicizing identities and fostering fragmentation and
polarization. On the other side the communities, affected by this pro-
cess, implemented different models of accommodation, redefinition or
reinvention of their identities becoming powerful enough to challenge
the identity that the hegemonic national state tried to establish histor-
ically, politically and culturally.
In the case of Egypt, as we have seen, the state model influ-
enced, used and manipulated the sub-state identities in order to secure
the political survival of political elites on the national context. Al-
though sectarianism was denied and repudiated, informally the Egyp-
tian regimes engaged in a systematic attempt to politicize differences
or commonality as a tool of controlling masses and maintaining in
power.53 Accordingly, religion has served to fragment a society split
between rulers and ruled and its intersection with authoritarian control
led to the emerge of numerous sectarian strife in the past forty years.
But the continuous top-down sectarianism failed as a strategy of
authoritarian survival: as the Mubarak era demonstrated, state repres-
sion of Islamists does not necessarily protect Copts. On the contrary,
the absence of an effective legal framework has become an acute
problem that would have maintained hardly the status quo.
53 K. Dalacoura, “The arab uprisings two years on: Ideology, sectarianism
and the changing balance of power in the middle east”, Insight Turkey, 15/1, (2013),
p. 80.
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The ancient “divide et impera” approach has shown itself incap-
able of containing the contradictions within the system, contradictions
that exploded violently at the beginning of the eighties and in 2011.

State- and nation-building processes in the Middle East.
What role for diversity in contemporary Iraq?
Paolo Maggiolini
The process of establishing the institutional scope that ethno-
linguistic, cultural or religious differences have in the state and society
has historically represented one of the most important dynamics in
both politics and culture, implicitly influencing the dialectical rela-
tionship between self and other as well as between seeming and being.
This relational dynamic makes identities, solidarities and conflicts
continuously develop and transform.1 It also contributes to defining
the paths, spheres and limits for associating and dividing as well as
integrating or excluding people and communities dwelling within the
same territory, polity and society.
Outside this dialectic and relation, diversity has never been
politically important per se or in the abstract. It has never performed a
role simply in terms of “quantity” and “demography”. Rather, di-
versity has become meaningful because of its strategic importance to
determining the essence and content of socio-political fabrics. There-
fore, dialectic and relation immediately project the political scope of
diversity, situating its role in the continuum that divides the categories
of hostis (enemy) from inimicus (rival). These attributes make its
management, engagement or denial central for the production of pre-
cise hierarchies of power and domination, establishing the conditions
for self-presenting and dialectically imagining socio-political identit-
ies, roles, presences and destinies. In contemporary politics, the im-
position of the ideal of the nation, imagined as limited and sovereign,
from which derives the principle of its rule over the state as an act of
existence and fulfilment of a given people2 has established the cent-
rality of diversity for modern politics, making its management one of
the fields where modern nation-states' authority, legitimacy and sover-
eignty have been established, tested or contested.
1 A. N. Longva, A. S. Roald (eds.), Religious Minorities in the Middle East:
Domination, Self-empowerment, Accommodation (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 5-8.
2 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1979). S. Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A minority Report
(Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).
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This holds particularly true in regard to the contemporary his-
tory of the Middle East, especially reconsidering the intense change
and transformation occurring over the last century during the trans-
ition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern nation-states. Looking
back into the contemporary history of the region, one finds that today's
Middle Eastern regional system and the foundations of the modern
Arab states have been primarily framed on the reception, insti-
tutionalization or negation of the idea and role of “diversity” in polit-
ics.3 This is not exceptional, but part of a wider history that pertains to
the state- and nation-building process as a world phenomenon.
Nevertheless, in the contemporary Middle East particular his-
torical and geopolitical conditions have contributed to make diversity
a multifaceted political issue with an existential scope. In fact, since
the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the relationship between politics and
diversity has taken the stage, influencing how “state” and “nation”
have been conceived. Massacres, forced migrations, dislocations and
population exchanges as well as the fragile institutionalization of the
status of protected minorities during the Mandates and after the con-
quest of full independence in the post-colonial era have been the many
means through which local elites and colonial powers have tried to
overcome and accommodate Middle Eastern diversity, re-conceptual-
izing it with the aim of imposing the new modern-state principle.
These strategies were employed in the urgency of founding modern
states and societies equally able to include and reunite diversity under
the imposition of unitary homogenous identities.
Looking at today's Middle Eastern politics, this historical dy-
namic shows itself to be still wandering over a very controversial path
where diversity continues to be interpreted as a tool to rule and control
from above or that can be easily manipulated to activate and mobilize
contestation or conformism from below, inevitably politicizing and
polarizing identities in new existential conflicts. Although Middle
Eastern ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious diversity is often rhet-
orically praised as one of the positive resources that has enriched the
region, making its cultures and societies flourish through the centur-
3 G. Ben-Dor, “Minorities in the Middle East: Theory and Practice”, in
Minorities and the State in the Arab World, O. Bengio, G. Ben-Dor (eds.) (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
State-and nation-building processes in the Middle East 57
ies, diversity in the region is more frequently perceived as an insur-
mountable obstacle for the stability and cohesiveness of local societies
and political fields. Its management and accommodation is still one of
the most difficult issues and challenges in regional politics.
Looking at today's regional instability and the imperilling of the
non-Muslim population, one can easily be tempted to endorse either
culturalist approaches or pseudo perennialist-historical perspectives in
order to explain the ongoing Middle Eastern struggles.
In the first, the present state of conflict is thought to have
sprung from an intrinsic cultural bias toward difference that negated to
non-Arabs and non-Muslims the right to be recognized with real equal
status. Accordingly, religious radicalism and intransigence is fre-
quently proposed as the main explanatory paradigm that feeds Middle
Eastern polarization and sectarianism. In the second, and with a num-
ber of different points of contact with the former approach, the ongo-
ing regional struggles are interpreted as the final stage of a process
leading the Middle Eastern regional system into its “political and his-
torical maturity”. Establishing a sort of parallel between the ongoing
regional conflicts and the European wars of religion, this approach im-
plicitly supports the idea that the survival of Middle Eastern diversity
could only be achieved either through the fragmentation of present
modern states into smaller territorial units more ethnically and reli-
giously coherent or by the non-Muslims' emigration outside the re-
gion. Consequently, this position tends to consider Middle Eastern 20th
century nationalism mimetic anomalies and tactical attempts to avoid
an inevitable destiny that now has arrived at its inaudible con-
sequences. At the end of the struggles, this would make the modern-
nation principle become true also within the Middle East, re-establish-
ing stability and peace as had already occurred in Europe many cen-
turies ago.
The following pages will instead take an approach different
from either perspective because considered inaccurate and too
simplistic. In fact, they reiterate the perception that diversity is a polit-
ical challenge per se that needs drastic solutions. Moreover, the reli-
gious radicalism paradigms and the pseudo perennialist-historical ap-
proaches do not capture the root causes and “mechanics” of the ongo-
ing phenomena, limiting themselves to again proposing the idea that
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the Middle East is intrinsically incapable of managing diversity
without crumbling into conflicts and unrest, indirectly supporting the
idea of the need for authoritarian regimes capable of imposing strict
control and rule. In so doing, it is often ignored that the present tur-
moil and sectarianization are in part products of 20th century authorit-
arianism. Furthermore, aside from vague predictions that implicitly
suggest that the final end of today's conflicts will come only from the
exhaustion of the actors involved, they do not provide sufficient and
convincing explanations of why the politicization of diversity became
so intense precisely from the beginning of the 20th century, recently re-
emerging as one of the most significant patterns of present conflicts.
The contemporary history of Middle Eastern states shows that at the
heart of today's instability and turbulence lie multiple political, eco-
nomic and institutional rather than religious and cultural issues, pre-
cisely related to how the modern nation-state idea has been translated
and how authority, sovereignty, legitimacy and hegemony questions
have been dealt with.
Therefore, the focal perspective through which to analyze the
relationship between politics and diversity in the region should be that
of the modern nation-state, as a cultural, historical and institutional
phenomenon. The modern nation-state's vocation and claim to repres-
ent a given community, its identity, traditions and destiny has inevit-
ably had a particular relationship with diversity, questioning its role
and scope. The foundation of the modern nation-state has required re-
imagining diversity in terms of a “majority” —the part naturally asso-
ciated with the nation that rules over the state— and “minorities”, the
fragments only partially connected to the identity discourse embedded
within the state and the “majority-nation”.4 The institutionalization,
marginalization, attempted absorption or negation of diversity have
thus become repercussions of a battle first and foremost pertaining to
the nation's claim to rule the state, imposing its hegemony, authority
and legitimacy. A struggle inevitably interpreted through the categor-
ies of the “authentic” and “original”, where diversity has been fre-
quently considered by nationalists as something fabricated or orches-
trated against and from outside the limits of the state and the nation to
divide and weaken them. Such a condition has not only been imposed
4 S. Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age, pp. 6-9.
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from above. Sometimes it has also been indirectly determined by the
hierarchies and communal representatives. Complying with or strug-
gling against the state's central power, these actors have further con-
tributed to politically emphasizing the distinctiveness and saliency of
diversity, inevitably activating and mobilizing group identities and
ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious specificities.5 The result of this
dynamic has undermined the significance of the concept of citizenship
and of the ambition to include and reunite diversity within a united
polity, subduing it to the will of the regimes in power and imprisoning
individuals within the narrow boundaries of recognized and
institutionalized minorities and majority. At the same time, it has dug
a structural divide between multiple poles of authority and forms of
legitimization, each competing to control the state or access to its re-
sources.
The history of modern Iraq and its Christian presence is particu-
larly significant in reconsidering such dynamics. Although demo-
graphically limited, the Christians of Iraq have been perceived as a
tactical “resource” for the state's power as well as a “challenge”, even
a threat in some periods, to its authority and existence. At the same
time, they reacted differently towards the central state, both opposing
and seeking to mediate with its homogenizing strategies.
This occurred after the foundation of the kingdom between
1920s-1930s and again during the Saddam Hussein era, becoming a
sort of political scapegoat of intra-Muslim competition in the after-
math of the US' invasion in 2003.
First, the paper aims to reconsider the role of diversity in the
contemporary Middle East through the lens of the state- and nation-
building process. Secondly, it focuses on the Iraqi Christians' histor-
ical vicissitudes and their relationship with Iraqi state power, briefly
focusing on the monarchical period and the Saddam era.
Finally, the analysis concentrates on the advent of the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Is-
lamiyya fi ‘Iraq wa al-Sham-Da‘ish) in 2014 and its fierce use of viol-
5 L. Robson, Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2016), pp. 6-9; S. Zubaida, “The Fragments
Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq”, International Journal of Middle East Studies,
34, 2, (May 2002), pp. 206-207.
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ence towards Iraqi minorities, especially the Yezidis and Christians.
Without ignoring the differences between the former two experiences
and the exceptional cruelty of Da‘ish and thus avoiding proposing
simplistic and improbable parallels, the analysis will show a subtle
analogy in their ways of exploiting diversity for political purposes, as-
saulting, fragmenting and recomposing “diversity” according to a spe-
cific idea of the state and “nation” considered functional to their re-
spective rules and forms of socio-political control. In this way, the pa-
per will show how the antibodies for avoiding the exploitation of di-
versity do not lie just in the realm of security, or even in that of reli-
gion or today's de-radicalization paradigm, but in the way of politic-
ally and institutionally interpreting the role of the state and the content
of citizenship both in the West today's Middle Eastern societies.
1. Ethno-linguistic and religious diversity in the contemporary
Middle Eastern state
As briefly mentioned above, the relationship between politics
and diversity in the contemporary Middle East should not be recon-
sidered neither from a mere numeric or quantitative perspective nor
from the idea of irreducible cultural and religious antagonisms. In fact,
this approach risks trapping the analysis in a narrow continuum
defined by two contradicting images of the region and its diverse
population. On the one hand, looking at religious affiliations in abso-
lute terms, one can be tempted to downsize this issue, pointing out that
the Middle East does not really stand out for its religious diversity
compared to the other continents: 93 percent of the population pro-
fesses Islam, 4 percent are Christians and 2 percent Jews.6 Accord-
ingly, the stress placed on religious factors when dealing with the
Middle East risks being easily dismissed as simple Orientalist projec-
tions. Nevertheless, this simple enumeration is far from being able to
capture the complex geography of religious affiliations in the region
and their deep roots. Middle Eastern religious diversity primarily
manifests itself intra-religiously, through distinct denominations and
religious traditions that cut across Islam, Christianity and Judaism. At
the same time, the region is the homeland of some ancient religions
6 P. Connor, C. Hackett, “Middle East's Christian Population in Flux as Pope
Francis Visits Holy Land”, Pew Research Center (May 19, 2014).
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whose adherents still dwell there and are strongly attached to their
faiths, such as the Yezidis, Ahl ul-Haq or Kaka'i, Samaritans or
Zoroastrians. Similarly, from the ethno-linguistic perspective, one can
consider that the most important distinctions between Middle Eastern
populations can be limited to the division between Arabs, Kurds, Per-
sians and Turks, with Jews often included for specific political reas-
ons. However, this approach totally ignores the wide variety of differ-
ent ethnic groups that, although demographically a minority, have act-
ively contributed to the history of this region through the centuries. At
the same time, such an approach tends also to ignore that local polit-
ical systems in the region have always been deeply influenced by
overlapping but distinct religious, ethnics and cultural factors.7 On the
other hand, Middle East's diversity continues to be depicted as ex-
ceptional, in being a complex mosaic of unique sub-national identities
and traditions. As a natural bridge between the West and the East, this
region has represented one of the most important cradles of civiliza-
tion and culture and over the centuries has become the homeland of
different religions and ethnicities. According to such an understand-
ing, diversity does not only exist, but it matters and is one of the major
political and cultural drivers within the region.
Therefore, while the first approach seems to suggest the need to
avoid exaggerating or considering exceptional the impact of diversity
on the contemporary Middle East, the second perspective supports the
exact opposite idea, reiterating the conviction that, given the complex
Middle Eastern mosaic, diversity cannot avoid being a structural issue
and an inevitable challenge in the history of the region. The contradic-
tion between these two visions is problematic and confirms that it is
not productive to deal with such a topic through a mere enumeration
or distribution of the different ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious
factors that are part of this wide region. Similarly, the conviction that
such diversity is structurally doomed to conflict and create instability
imposes a postulate essentially a-historical in its scope. Accordingly, a
more institutional and historical perspective can provide a functional
way out from this ambiguity, moving the focus of the analysis from
that of diversity or its distribution per se to that of how it has been in-
7 A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1947).
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terpreted and re-imagined in the transition from empire to the modern
nation-state.
Before and after the rise of Islam, Middle Eastern political sys-
tems historically developed according to the ideal of the empire, im-
plicitly multi-ethnic and multi-religious in its scope, although this
character did not explicitly take on particular significance in its polit-
ical pattern. After the Arab conquest between the 7th and 8th centuries,
Sunni Islam progressively became the dominant force inspiring the lo-
gics and rationales of political authority and power within the region.
Religion, namely Islam, thus emerged as the predominant factor dis-
tinguishing and dividing people dwelling in this region.8 Ethnicity
played its role in terms of cultural signifier, but without a real political
impact per se. It was thus absorbed within the more salient religious
sphere, remaining stagnant and inactive until the end of the 18th cen-
tury. From a general standpoint, the Islamic state has never structur-
ally perceived the non-Muslim presence as a challenge to get rid of
through direct and forced assimilation or integration. Rather, it man-
aged diversity by developing specific legal mechanisms and strategies
that justified the existence of non-Muslim communities dwelling
within its boundaries and territories. The concept of dhimma granted
“protection” to the people of the recognized revealed religions (Chris-
tians, Jews, Sabeans and later Zoroastrians, Hindus and Buddhists) in
exchange for their acknowledgment of the domination of Islam. This
placed them within a precise hierarchy of power, giving them a
second-class status (as is often pointed out) but one that nevertheless
permitted their existence and the preservation of the multilayered and
intertwined diversity that is often cited as the Middle Eastern essence.
Accordingly, toleration per se was not the parameter that inspired and
explained the functioning of these mechanisms, but rather it was the
outcome that proved the efficacy of such mechanisms in dealing with
religious diversity and in accommodating different religious units and
groups within the same polity and realm.9 At the same time, the inev-
8 U. Furman, “Minorities in Contemporary Islamist Discourse”, Middle
Eastern Studies, 36, 4 (October 2000), pp. 2-3.
9 A. N. Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and
Practice”, in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applica-
tions, N. A. Butenschøn, U. Davis, M. S. Hassassian (eds.) (Syracuse: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
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itable lack of centralization and intrusive power of the empire allowed
wide margins of autonomy, favoring the fragmentation of today's
Middle East into distinct local systems framed according to their lo-
gics, balances and modus vivendi. This remark is necessary in order to
avoid reading Middle Eastern political history only according to the
religious perspective. Micro-history proves that village, town, guild
and tribal solidarities often played far more important roles than those
played by the sole religious affiliation factor.
Moving to the last political empire experience that ruled over
the region before the foundation of the modern Middle Eastern state,
the Ottoman Empire continued to endorse such principles and logics,
designing its specific administrative system (traditionally known as
the millet system) to deal with diversity. Whether or not it had really
existed as a uniform and systemic set of norms and rules before the
19th century, the millet system provided a model for managing reli-
gious diversity on the basis of self-administering communities subject
to the superior power and authority of the Ottoman sultan.10 During
the 19th century the millet system evolved, becoming more integrated
into the Empire's administration and systematized in what would be-
come the modern Ottoman idea of religious communities (ta’ifa din-
iyya) in a state and a society that was later reconfigured according to
the principle of equality thanks to the Hatt-i Humayum of 1856 and
the administrative centralization pursued by the tanzimat reforms.
During this period of reconfiguration of the Ottoman state, the rela-
tionship between politics and diversity began to change, producing
contrasting effects. The legal equalization of Ottoman subjects going
beyond the traditional distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims
should have permitted reforming the Empire, strengthening its author-
ity, legitimacy and central rule over its diverse society and territory.
The reform of non-Muslim status was not an act of justice and tolera-
tion but expressed the desire to build a solid state with stable control
over its society beyond the earlier autonomies and differences. Never-
theless, the combination of external interferences by Western powers
and the distinct ambitions of different Ottoman communities fostered
10 M. H. van den Boogert, “Millets: Past and Present”, in Religious Minorit-
ies in the Middle East: Domination, Self-empowerment, Accommodation, A. N.
Longva, A. S. Roald (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 27-30.
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the rise of multiple secessionist and nationalist movements that pro-
gressively cast religious factors in ethno-national terms.11 The recon-
figuration between politics and diversity did not protect Ottoman sov-
ereignty; rather it progressively produced the desegregation and con-
testation of Istanbul's authority from outside and within. This dynamic
of politically emphasizing and mobilizing the distinctiveness and sali-
ency of group identities and ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious
specificities would soon impact on the first state- and nation-building
processes that would be launched after the fall of the Ottoman Empire
and the Versailles conferences in 1919.12 It also shaped the first mani-
festations of nationalism and sectarianization within the Middle East.
Istanbul's collapse not only represented a major political and military
event in the history of region, but also testified to the failure of its sys-
tem of managing and engaging diversity at the time of the modern na-
tion-state's rising ideal.
During the first post-war decades, the management of diversity
became an important political issue and a contested field within which
local nationalist elites and Western powers contended in order to
guide the state- and nation-building processes within the region.
Through the modern idea of national minority (‘aqalliyat), the
management of diversity emerged as one of the fields in which to
impose authority and power and, at the same time, the issue of
protection for national minorities became one of the raisons d'être of
Western presences through the Mandates. Given its political
importance, nationalist movements sought to de-politicize sub-
national differences, oscillating between the Ottoman millet model,
the ideal of the ethnic nation-state and the ambition to deal with
Middle Eastern diversity in multi-ethnic states united under the
majoritarian principle of Arabism or territorial nationalism.13 It was
11 K. H. Karpat, “Millets And Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of
Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, in Christians And Jews in the Ottoman
Empire, B. Braude, B. Lewis (eds.) (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).
12 P. Sluglett, “From Millet to Minority: Another Look at the Non-Muslim
Communities in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century”, in Minorities and
the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives, L. Robson (ed.) (Syracuse: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 2016).
13 S. Zubaida, “Contested nations: Iraq and the Assyrians”, Nations and Na-
tionalism, 6, 3 (2000), p. 364.
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according to this perspective that both Mandate and nationalist
authorities set the conditions for their specific interpretations of the
twin categories of majority and minority, implementing the concepts
of the territorial state and representational government. In particular,
the religious perspective and the related principle of protecting
‘religious minorities’ were considered suitable by both Mandate
authorities and nationalists to achieve their objectives, while ethnic
diversity was widely ignored or opposed because considered an
unacceptable contradiction for the rising Arab state. The Mandate
Powers saw in it the possibility to revive their traditional claim of
‘protecting’ the Middle East's non-Muslim population, legitimizing
their colonial design under the ideal of the Mandate.14 Moreover,
through the ‘language’ of protecting national minorities, they legitim-
ated their strategy of ruling through divide et impera, categorizing di-
versity as the sum of clear and evident separate human and cultural
clusters reluctant to dissolve into the new proposed polity and society.
On the other hand, nationalists found this schema acceptable as long
as it did not embrace ethno-linguistic factors threatening the ideal of
the unity of the Arab or territorial nation. This dynamic became even
more complex because now the central state had both the ambition
and the capability to impose its authority, power and narrative on all
the diverse communities living within its boundaries. Inevitably, local
potentates rebelled against central state's intrusive power, fearful of
losing their traditional autonomy.15 The entanglement between these
positions and axes of confrontation established the controversial leg-
acy on which later, during the late 1940s and early1950s, the post-co-
lonial states in the Middle East won their independence, complicating
the relationship between politics and diversity within the region. Ac-
cordingly, behind the issue of protecting national minorities and man-
aging diversity lay a far more complex political dynamic produced by
conflicts between the external powers, state authorities and the differ-
ent local political units dwelling within the new “national” territories.
14 H. Müller-Sommerfeld, “The League of Nations, A-Mandates and Minor-
ity Rights during the Mandate Period in Iraq (1920-1932)”, in Modernity, Minority,
and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East, S. R. Goldstein-Sab-
bah, H. L. Murre-van den Berg (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 263-265.
15 S. Zubaida, “Contested nations”, p. 372.
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This brief overview suggests that diversity has never been con-
sidered of strategic importance per se, but has progressively become
politically salient as one of the nodes in the articulation of the modern
Middle Eastern state system. Moreover, ethno-linguistic, cultural and
religious boundaries continued to be of strategic importance, as did
their politicization, because continuously renewed and revived accord-
ing to the mutations in the international and national balances of
power.16
This enduring dynamic of confrontation and contestation struc-
turally undermined Middle Eastern states, caging them within a sort of
inescapable political short circuit. The more the modern state has been
constantly challenged within and from outside its boundaries, showing
a structural lack in terms of hegemony (weak state),17 the more au-
thoritarianism and dictatorship imposed themselves with the promise
of defending the state and the nation from these challenges, bargaining
legitimacy and authority with conformity through the imposition of
fierce rule or clientelism.18 In order to overcome its shortcomings and
limitations, the Middle Eastern state and its agencies reacted against
expressions of dissent or distinction, either repressing and negating or
co-opting and dealing with leaderships of different sectors of society,
granting material benefits in return for loyalty and conformity. This
situation entangled nationalist and community leaderships in a con-
tinuous dynamic of confrontations and political bargaining, enhancing
communalism and fragmentation. “Unity” and “pluralism” remained
principles widely fictitious and rhetorical; extreme poles of a con-
tinuum within which this dynamic developed, and parameters for
judging conformity with the regime in power or that of each com-
munity and group with their respective leaderships. The central au-
thorities reacted against these dynamics, seeking to transcend sec-
tarian and community identities not through inclusion but rather by
their negation, giving form to exclusionary nation-building pro-
16 Ibid., p. 363.
17 J. Migdal, Strong States and Weak Societies: State-Society Relations and
State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
N. N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East
(London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995).
18 N. Hashemi, D. Postel “Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the
Middle East”, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 15, 3 (2017), pp. 3-5.
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cesses.19 At the same time, community elites and hierarchies reacted
against this stance, stressing precisely the status and influence of their
own particular culture and group identity in order to survive and to es-
tablish new deals and bargains with the regime in power.
Such a modus vivendi endured beyond the short nationalist
period between the 1950s and the 1960s. The so-called ‘return of reli-
gion to politics’, with the watershed 1979 Iranian Revolution, did not
bring real transformation to these positions.
Rather, it launched a new phase of activation, manipulation and
politicization of identities, dividing between those who sought to con-
quer the public space by imposing personal understandings of the role
of Islam in politics and those who, being structurally excluded from
this discourse, inevitably found viable strategies for survival with-
drawing within the limits of their communities, stressing their distinct-
iveness, or emigrating. Furthermore, the “return of religion to politics”
did not really mean a process of making polity and society more “reli-
gious”. Rather, overlapping with previous discourses, this dynamic
simply re-oriented the political confrontation, raising the role of reli-
gion as a cultural and identity marker and progressively re-ethnicizing
and re-comunitarizing religious affiliations.20
Therefore, Middle Eastern state-building processes developed
under the pressure of achieving full independence from colonial
powers and resisting various external influences and pressures. On the
one hand, religious and ethno-linguistic diversity had been overshad-
owed by prioritizing the ideal of the “strong state” and “homogenous
nation”. A message that has pervaded and shaped political fields and
public spaces in the region for decades. On the other, diversity had
been institutionalized and politically empowered with religious and
ethnic groups establishing their own parties and competing for polit-
ical power. In both cases, the modern state and its control became
either a political objective to be attained or an enemy from which to
defend and protect. The recurrent reference to defending the unity of
nation, the independence of the state or the autonomy of the com-
19 F. Haddad, “’Marked’” for Exclusion: The Problem of Pluralism, State-
building, and Communal Identities in Iraq and the Arab World”, The Middle East In-
stitute (August 5, 2014), pp. 3-4.
20 S. Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age, pp. 88-102.
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munity progressively became rhetorical, hiding the real purpose of
preserving the existence of authoritarian regimes or defending the
prerogatives of traditional community leaderships.
2. Politics, diversity and the myths of stability: the construction of
power in 20th century Iraq
The history of modern Iraq is often viewed from a precise idea
of what are considered the most relevant ethno-linguistic and religious
factors that, cutting across its society and polity, have always played a
primary role in national politics. This specifically pertains to the Arab-
Kurdish and the Sunni-Shi'a divide. Two different axes and poles of
possible confrontation and political mobilization that have widely
monopolized Iraqi politics, immediately manifesting their potential
from the first decades of the 20th century through different acts of re-
bellion, from those organized by the Kurds in 1923, 1932 and 1943 to
those guided by Arab Shiites in 1920 and 1935.21 These upheavals and
insurrections broke out for different reasons and with distinct scopes.
They were not simply against the Iraqi state. They frequently sought
either to impose alternative visions of the state and the nation or to
assert the distinctiveness of their respective communities or local
balances of power in order to gain access to the new modern state or
influence from below the state- and nation-building processes devel-
oping within the region.22
Accordingly, aside from studies on Eastern Christianity or
minorities in the region, the local Christian presence is rarely counted
as an important perspective from which to rethink to the Iraqi state
and how it was projected and developed during the 20th century. Nev-
ertheless, the historical vicissitude of their integration into the new Ir-
aqi political field offers a privileged perspective. First, being divided
between different denominations and having lived within distinct local
socio-political systems with their own balances of powers and logics,
Christians could not be considered as one solid socio-political unit.
Widely sharing this condition with other communities and groups
residing in the territories that are now Iraq, they approached the state
21 S. Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in the
Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 228.
22 R. Redaelli, A. Plebani, L'Iraq contemporaneo (Roma: Carocci, 2013).
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differently, from negotiation to participation and even physical con-
frontation. This plurality of stances makes it possible to rethink the
political significance of diversity from different perspectives and ac-
cording to different political purposes, pointing out the reasons that
made it emerge as an important issue in the process of fulfilling the
promises of an independent and sovereign nation-state within this re-
gion. Secondly, as a consequence of the post-WWI conferences of
Versailles (1919), Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1924), diversity (or
better, the protection of national minorities) became the crux of a con-
troversial competition between colonial powers and opposing ethno-
nationalist projects. The Christians of Iraq found themselves in the
midst of these confrontations as both a minority community eligible
for special protection and as an aspiring “nation” that claimed its right
to be equally recognized in its cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. As a
result, being caught in the middle of this controversial dynamic and
expressing different views regarding their political destiny, their per-
spective can elucidate the multiple implications and impacts of the Ir-
aqi state and nation-building process on the local socio-political fab-
rics. This makes it possible to go beyond the simple inter-religious
framework of a difficult relationship between a Muslim majority and a
non-Muslim minority to enter that of politics and nationalism. Finally,
the inconsistency between their demographic numbers, not large
enough to compete with the other dominant groups, and their resolute
demands for political recognition and autonomy overexposed their
position and frequently turned the Christians of Iraq into a sort of
political scapegoat. Their political testament shows how violence and
power have been instrumentally employed by Iraqi authorities to im-
pose from above both the state and the nation on all of the country's
diverse elements.23 The history of Iraqi Christians is not just a vicis-
situde of participation, negotiation or exclusion and marginalization,
but also of persecution and repression beyond simple cultural frame-
works. Therefore, it summarizes and covers the full spectrum of polit-
ics, epitomizing the difficult development of a process of founding a
state and a nation in a region strongly stressed by geopolitical
23 S. Donabed, “Rethinking nationalism and an appellative conundrum: his-
toriography and politics in Iraq”, National Identities 14, 2 (2012).
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competitions and cut through by distinct political ambitions and pro-
jects.24
Before entering into the details of some of the most important
events that marked the Iraqi Christian presence during the 20th
century, it is worthwhile to briefly mention some characteristics of
this community. This is important to pointing out some of the
conditions that have affected and influenced their political
involvement in and engagement with Iraqi politics since the post-
Great War period. At the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Christians were
divided between distinct denominations, ethno-linguistic forms of
primary identification and territories, dwelling in areas that span
across today's Iran (Urmia under the authority of Teheran), Iraq
(predominantly in the area of Mosul), north-eastern Syria and south-
eastern Turkey (Diyarbakir, Mardin and Tur Abdin).25 At the end of
the war, this multi-vocality represented a complex challenge because
it inevitably acquired a unique political scope in a period of state- and
nation-building processes that drastically and quickly redesigned the
old traditional Ottoman boundaries and spheres under the pressure of
contrasting forces. On the one hand, Christians were divided between
the Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Chaldean Catholics, the
Church of the East (ecclesiastically also known as the Assyrian
Church of the East), and finally Latin (Roman Catholic) and
Protestant communities that had developed thanks to the presence of
Western missionaries. Syriac and Chaldean ecclesiastical authorities
engaged the British administration at the time of the Mandate and the
Hashemite Monarchy with the intent to be recognized in their specific
religious and church identities according to the Ottoman millet model
and the new ideal of the protection of minorities.26
The Assyrian Church, instead, positioned itself as the pole
around which to unite the local Christian presence in order to manifest
24 K. Girling, “‘To Live within Islam’: The Chaldean Catholic Church in
modern Iraq, 1958-2003”, Studies in Church History, 51 (2015), pp. 373-376.
25 A. O'Mahony, “Eastern Christianity in Modern Iraq”, in Eastern Chris-
tianity. Studies in Modern History, Religion and Politics, A. O'Mahony (ed.) (London:
Melisinde, 2004). S. Rassam, Christianity in Iraq. Its Origins and Development to the
Present Day (Leominster: Gracewing, 2006).
26 A. O'Mahony, “The Chaldean Catholic Church: The Politics of Church-
state Relations in Modern Iraq”, The Heythrop Journal, 45, (2004), p. 463
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a common will to be integrated into the contemporary Middle East as
a distinct nation with its own political dignity and rights. On the other
hand, Christians entered the period of the Iraqi state-building process
with different political legacies and memories. During the Ottoman
era they dwelled within distinct local systems and lifestyles. A large
part of this community was living in the plain of Mosul (predomin-
antly affiliated with the Chaldean Church) and was more integrated
with the rest of the Arab population. Another component had found
refuge within the mountains of Hakkäri through the centuries.27 This
remote area permitted the development of an autonomous tribal sys-
tem, only nominally under the supreme authority of the Sultan, based
on a close intertwining with the ecclesiastical dimension of the Assyr-
ian Church through a hereditary scheme based on episcopal families.
Moreover, this particular ecclesiastical-tribal system had a close rela-
tionship with the Kurdish tribes living in the same territories. The As-
syrian Patriarch was not only the supreme ecclesiastical authority of
its denomination and Church, but also a political leader and a heredit-
ary title.28 This condition not only describes a particular association
between politics and religion, but also explains why at the fall of the
Ottoman Empire Assyrians manifested a strong sense of distinctive-
ness and pride in their traditional autonomy and military power.29
During the 19th century and increasingly through the First
World War period, the Christians of the Hakkäri became the focal
point of the development of a proto-nationalist sentiment that sought
to affirm its uniqueness in terms of both ethno-linguistic and religious
identity with the aim of reuniting all Christians living in this wide strip
of land as members of a united Assyrian nation, thus different from
Arabs and Kurds.
Not all Christians of Syriac tradition embraced such a project.
27 A. J. Arberry, Religion in the Middle East: Three Religions in Concord
and Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 521-530. F. Hellot,
“La Fin d'un Monde: les Assyro-Chaldéens et la Première Guerre Mondiale”, in Chré-
tiens du Monde Arabe. Un Archipel en Terre d'Islam, B. Heyberger (ed.) (Paris:
Autrement, 2003), pp. 127-132.
28 P. Rondot, “Les Tribus montagnardes de l'asie antérieure. Quelques aspects
sociaux des populations kurdes et assyriennes”, Bulletin d'études orientales, 6 (1936),
pp. 20-32.
29 H. Teule, Les Assyro-chaldéens. Chrétiens d'Iran, de Turquie et d'Irak
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2008).
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Nonetheless, in what would become modern Iraq this ideal pro-
gressively developed and gained support. Therefore, even before the
First World War, ancient terms such as “Assyrian” and “Chaldean”
had begun transforming. From being strictly related to church and
liturgical dimensions, they came also to express the existence of a
single “nation”, ethnically distinct and speaking a common language,
namely Syriac. During the first decades of the 20th century, tribalism
and pro-nationalism intertwined and overlapped, widening their scope,
embracing Christians affiliated with other denominations and living in
territories outside the narrow limits of the Hakkäri.
The First World War represented the decisive catalyst, the hot-
bed for the emergence of Assyrian nationalism. A dynamic that was
widely affected by the suffering of a large part of this community,
forced into the condition of refugees and exiled after having dreamt of
winning their right to found an independent state fighting alongside
the Allies. In fact, following Moscow's decision to enlist Ottoman Ar-
menians in its army, the Assyrians of the Hakkäri and those of Urmia
went to war on the side of Russia and Britain.30 This choice almost
immediately had tragic consequences for this community. Already in
1915, the Assyrians were forced to seek refuge in the western
Azerbaijan provinces occupied by the Russians, in Urmia and Salmas.
In 1918, when the Russians withdrew and their Patriarch and political
leader (Mar Shimun) was assassinated by a Kurdish tribal leader, the
Assyrians found themselves alone. Initially, the British seemed ready
to give them support, but their promises only led them to move again
to new refugee camps. They were first invited to head toward Hama-
dan and then to take refuge in the camp of Ba‘quba, from where they
were redirected to Mindan (1920-1921) and finally settled in Dohuk
and Aqrah (1921-1933). During these years, some Assyrians
continued to fight as members of the Levies enlisted by London and
deployed to contain Kurdish forces and enforce law after the end of
the war.31 Afterwards, and having been expulsed from the Hakkäri in
1924, northern Iraq became their new home. Therefore, in the span of
30 J. Yacoub, “La question assyro-chaldéenne, les puissances européennes et
la Société des Nations”, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, n. 151 (1988),
pp. 103-120.
31 S. Rassam, Christianity in Iraq, pp. 141-145.
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a few years, from having waged war against Constantinople, the
Assyrian found themselves refugees in another country that they did
not considered theirs, and permanently banned from a territory that
had been considered their homeland for centuries and where from the
second-half of the 19th century they had been dreaming of founding
their state.32
The years between 1919 and 1932 were a period of a gradual
but inexorable frustration of all the previous projects of giving birth to
an independent Assyrian state. After their expulsion from Turkey and
the settlement between Iraq-Syria-Turkey of Mosul in 1925, it first be-
came clear that a consistent part of the Assyrians would remain within
the new state of Iraq and then that neither a Kurdish nor an Assyrian
state would have ever become feasible in the near future. Therefore,
the short British Mandate period (1921-1935) did not bring the Assyri-
ans any positive solution, ending their dreams of independence, de-
taching them from their original areas of residence and contributing to
worsen their relations with the other Iraqi communities through their
enlistment in special military units (the Levies) for the purpose of sup-
porting the Mandate.
Moreover, this period contributed to further fragmenting the
Christian presence beyond the existing inter-denominational divide
and lifestyles, separating those who were still active in lobbying for
the interest of an Assyrian nation from those who became progress-
ively convinced that it would have been wiser to negotiate with the
new state authorities for specific guarantees as a protected religious
minority and equal citizens, embracing the Hashemite monarchy's and
Arabism's discourse.
Between 1932 and 1933 the situation reached a tragic climax.
London increasingly showed interest in finding a new modus vivendi
for Iraq. The Mandate was considered too burdensome and the possib-
ility of recognizing an independent Arab state under the Hashemite
monarchy came to be seen as the best solution to preserve British as-
cendancy over the country without being excessively involved in its
daily politics. The termination of the Mandate in Iraq (1932) and re-
cognition of the sovereignty of the new state of Iraq triggered a com-
32 F. Hellot, “Les Assyro-Chaldéens de Perse et du Hakkari: des migrations
en exil (1835-1935)”, Études Kurdes, 7 (2005), pp. 84-94.
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plex dynamic of change and adaptation to the new political conditions.
The Iraqi government was called upon to prove its legitimacy and au-
thority by asserting its power and direct rule within the state's bound-
aries. At the same time, a number of local potentates promptly reacted,
understanding that the opening of a new phase in the state- and nation-
building process would inevitably bring their past autonomies and
prerogatives to an end.33 Assyrians were among the first to raise their
voices, trying to advocate for their rights at Western chancelleries. Not
only did recognition of the Iraqi state sound a death-knell for their
political project, but the departure of the British would abandon them
to the new state authorities expressly promoting Arabism, after having
coped with London's enforcing the law and forbidding any
insubordination against the Mandate. Concerns about being black-
mailed as agents of foreign powers would show almost immediately to
be far more than a remote risk.
In 1933, during different episodes of looting in Dohuk and Za-
kho that saw the involvement of Kurdish tribes and the Iraqi army, the
massacre of Assyrians in Simele was the tragic outcome of this short
transitory period.34 An event that is still widely discussed in its mech-
anics in order to establish who fired first between the Assyrians and
the Iraqi army, but which nonetheless left a vivid memory on this
community beyond the issue of the culprit and its root causes. The
Simele massacre forced some of the survivors to seek refuge in Syria,
reducing the demographic balance of a presence already strained by
the war. The massacre also contributed to making the word
“Assyrian” a contested concept, either considered unacceptable and to
be banned by the Iraqi nationalist leaderships or a term describing a
martyred nation subdued and forced to disperse in diaspora.35 The
silence of the international community during these events and the
expulsion of Patriarch Mar Shimun first to Cyprus and then, from
Geneva, Paris, London to finally Chicago where the Church of the
East consolidated, symbolized the drastic end of the post-war dreams
of the Assyrians.36
33 S. Zubaida, “Contested nations”, pp. 364-366.
34 R. Sempill Stafford, The tragedy of the Assyrians (London: Routledge
2009; original 1935).
35 S. Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History, p. 228.
36 S. Rassam, Christianity in Iraq, pp. 145-147.
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Therefore, beyond chronicles and memories of the violence,
Simele soon came to condense multiple political significances clearly
manifesting the intricate competition between opposing psychological
understandings of the events taking place during those years.
With the termination of the Mandate in 1932, the Hashemite
monarchy took responsibility for the state- and nation-building pro-
cess within the country according to a precise idea of its mission and
the conditions under which this task should be fulfilled. The Crown
saw the Iraqi social fabric as “unimaginable masses of human beings,
devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and ab-
surdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to an-
archy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government
whatever”.37 The Iraqi state authorities thus perceived that the founda-
tion of the nation and the state was first and foremost a political and
cultural battle of “order” and “modernity” against “disorder” and
“backwardness”.38 Iraq would be finally created getting rid of this set
of distinct socio-political clusters by including Iraqi diversity either by
force or negotiation, but substantially in both cases negating any polit-
ical role to it. Kurdish or Assyrian nationalist particularisms were con-
sidered unacceptable.
Members of these communities could only be recognized as cit-
izens and juridically equal members of a nation and a state inexorably
Arab in its scope, providing them only with some special guarantees
or limited special treatment. Christians would be protected because of
their different religious identity, while Kurds would receive some sort
of guarantees in consequence of their demographic weight, but
without any public political recognition of their ethnic distinctiveness.
The position adopted was thus quite consequential to such an under-
standing. Simele came to represent one of the public stages on which
to project such an understanding and impose this discourse. Violence
and military power were instrumentally employed to instruct and re-
deem the insubordinate fragments of the Iraqi Arab nation, namely its
“internal enemies”.
37 H. Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of
Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists,
Ba'thists, and Free Officers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 25-26.
38 S. Zubaida, “Contested nations”, p. 366.
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Indeed, the termination of the Mandate triggered two different
psychological urgencies. On the one hand, local potentates and polit-
ical systems that since the end of the 19th century had already begun to
speak the language of nationalism looking at Western powers such
Britain and France, as the Assyrians did, felt betrayed and overcome
by chancelleries and diplomacy, strongly raising their voices to pre-
serve past autonomies and resist integration within the modern cent-
ralized state. On the other, the nationalist leaderships in power felt it
necessary to speed up the state- and nation-building process, resisting
and opposing both external influences and local particularism.39 What
the former perceived as the inalienable battle for self-determination
and self-administration, the latter interpreted as the legitimate defence
of the state and the nation against its internal enemies, the insubordin-
ates intriguing and conspiring with Western powers against the Iraqi
national project. Diversity was not refused per se, but rather became
the focal point of this political battle. Simele thus represented the
“sacrifice” of a demographic minority caught in the middle of this dy-
namic. It became an easy target for the nationalist leadership. The As-
syrian condition was already critical and their military and demo-
graphic weight inconsistent with the central state. They became a pub-
lic example of the triumph of the heroes of the Arab nation.40 This act
of nationalist justice was also possible and did not harm the monarchy
because Christians were substantially abandoned by Western powers
and the international community that accepted the Iraqi authorities'
version that Simele was a case of punishing insubordinates and not of
violating the clauses of the Declaration of Guarantees for the protec-
tion of minorities signed in 1932.41 In order to prove this version, the
Iraqi government confirmed precise guarantees for Christians and
their ecclesiastical institutions. Since their distinct religious identity
did not contradict Arab nationalism and Iraqi discourse, they were
granted reserved seats in both parliament chambers and the Chaldean
Patriarch was allowed to participate in the Senate. The politicization
39 S. Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation”, pp. 205-206.
40 S. Zubaida, “Contested nations”, pp. 366-367.
41 H. Müller-Sommerfeld, “The League of Nations”, pp. 263-264.
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of ethnic divisions was not tolerated. Assyrians could be recognized
and integrated solely as a religious minority.42
Such a modus vivendi and psychological approach toward the
relationship between politics and diversity remained constant during
the rest of the 20th century history of Iraq. In fact, after the military
coup in 1958 by ‘Abd al- Karim Qasim and his second-in-command
Abdul Salam ‘Arif, the solution of minority issues and integration of
diversity remained promises subject to the primary concern of defend-
ing the state and the regime in power.43 Later on, the second conquest
of power by the Ba‘ath party in 1968 did not change this approach to-
ward the multifarious Iraqi society. Quite the contrary, the country
witnessed a new phase of pronounced confrontation between conflict-
ing political projects.
This dynamic was characterized by a twin process.
On the one hand, the Ba‘ath rulers showed an immediate in-
terest in promoting a precise and unquestionable interpretation of what
the Iraqi state, society and nation should be. The Ba‘ath party showed
concrete interest in and a solid will to appropriate the Iraqi past, de-
structuring and reconstructing it according to its own ideal of nation:
Arab and Ba‘athist.44 Diversity was possible within the narrow limits
imposed by the regime, either appeasing and negotiating with it or
militating within the Ba‘ath party, as a considerable component of
Christians did.45 The “fragments” of the nation thus had to accept be-
ing totally de-politicized and relegated to secondary importance within
the public space.46 Those who conformed to this vision obtained di-
vidends and guarantees. For example, the Chaldean Church and the
Ancient Church of the East (separated from the Church of the East in
the early 1960s and more interested in preserving the purity of its ec-
clesiastical traditions than in advocating for the rights of the Assyrian
42 H. Teule, “Christians in Iraq an Analysis of Some Recent Political Devel-
opments”, Der Islam, 88, 1 (2012), pp. 180-181.
43 S. Rassam, Christianity in Iraq, pp. 147-148; S. Donabed, Reforging a
Forgotten History, pp. 148-150.
44 J. Yacoub, “La marginalisation des chrétiens d'Irak”, Confluences Méditerranée,
3 (2008), pp. 89-91.
45 K. Girling, “'To Live within Islam': The Chaldean Catholic Church in
modern Iraq, 1958–2003”, Studies in Church History, 51 (2015), p. 376.
46 S. Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation”, pp. 205-208.
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nations) were able to negotiate their positions and presence with the
regime. Accordingly, although the Chaldean Church was unable to
prevent the nationalization of its schools, in the early 1980s the regime
agreed to abstain from full assimilation of its organizations into the Ir-
aqi administrative system.47 Moreover, the Ba‘ath regime allowed
Christians to build new churches and to develop their ecclesiastical
networks.48 Against this background, diversity was confined to being
an irrelevant parameter within the wider project of achieving Arabiza-
tion and Ba‘athification under the Saddam Hussein personality cult.49
These became the real frameworks in which diversity would be toler-
ated. Substantially, it would be assimilated through acculturation,
political negation and indoctrination. The rhetoric of the unity and in-
divisibility of the state predominated over any group or community.
On the other hand, the Ba‘athist project and modus operandi
triggered fierce reactions. Already in the early 1960s an armed auto-
nomist movement begun to develop in the areas inhabited by Kurds
and Assyrians. The 1970s were a decade of direct confrontation
between the central government and these groups, escalating into a
full military campaign carried out by the regime to clean the northern
borders. At the start of the 1970s, the Assyrians gave birth to the As-
syrian Democratic Movement, inspired by the predominately dia-
spora-based Assyrian Universal Alliance.50 Finally, in the midst of the
Anfal military campaign against autonomist Kurds, the Assyrians and
Chaldeans were directly targeted, again becoming the scapegoats of
the ongoing conflict, the easy target to punish what was perceived as
an unacceptable act of insubordination fed by foreign elements.51
The word Assyrian again became a synonym for political sedi-
tion. While Kurds obtained a certain margin of negotiations because
of their demographic weight and political-military power, Christians
were principally targeted without any possible aperture for their polit-
ical demands as a distinct ethno- linguistic minority and faced political
and socio-economic persecution. They were allowed to live as a reli-
47 A. O'Mahony, “The Chaldean Catholic Church”, pp. 443-444.
48 J. Yacoub, “La marginalization”, pp. 88-89.
49 S. Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History, p. 187.
50 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
51 Ibid., p. 199.
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gious minority and citizens of an Arabic Iraqi state, but never as a re-
cognized national minority, ethno-linguistically distinct.
Therefore, reducing such a history to a unique and unceasing vi-
cissitude of religious persecution or simply of denial of diversity on
the basis of an irreducible cultural bias would be too simplistic. Nego-
tiation, marginalization and confrontation were the results of a far
more complex political dynamic that proceeded in parallel.52 The As-
syrian's experience was one of political “otherization” and “demoniza-
tion” aimed at imposing a monolithic identity of the Iraqi state and na-
tion. Diversity was not assaulted per se or negated in absolute but the
regime proved unwilling to admit its political legitimacy in the public
space, especially if framed according to the language of ethnicity. The
need to promote a precise idea of society and nation was considered
indispensable in consolidating the authority and legitimacy of a state
endemically weak and of regimes that were imposed by force and
through coups d'état. Such an attitude and behavior inevitably pro-
duced counter-reactions. Diversity and distinctiveness became polit-
ical facts, fostering the politicization of identities and sectarianization.
The battle was equally framed on both fronts as one for existence and
survival. Still in the process of being consolidated, the state and its he-
gemony remained weak, while the regime increased its harshness in
order to get rid of any possible obstacles concealing and overlooking
its limits. Demographically minority groups, such as the Assyrians,
were thus easy scapegoats against whom to instrumentally exert viol-
ence and repression with the aim of prevailing in this existential con-
frontation. Some of the features that would characterize post-Saddam
Iraq, such as retribalization and sectarianization, were already in mo-
tion.
3. Religion in the service of politics. The Iraqi crisis and the Or-
ganization of the Islamic State
Today's wave of uprisings and civil wars has again turned the
spotlight on the condition and destiny of diversity within the Middle
East. The vicious circle of violence and polarizations openly call into
question the role of diversity under two apparently contradicting per-
52 E. Davis, Memories of state: Politics, history, and collective identity in
modern Iraq (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005).
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spectives. On the one hand, the present turmoil is addressed and ex-
plained as a crisis of minorities, from the political, economic and soci-
ological to those traditionally defined according to ethno-linguistic,
cultural and religious factors.
These minorities have been considered the main actors of the
revolts, although they have been promptly turned into the victims of
geopolitical and power competitions.
In this framework, weaker demographic minorities are predicted
to progressively disappear from the region or be reduced to even more
irrelevant numbers and marginalities. On the other, religious
radicalism and sectarianization proved that irreducible religious
identities and group solidarities are deemed to be among the most im-
portant factors of present turmoil.
Either as victim or driver, diversity is considered central in the
analysis of today's Middle Eastern politics. As mentioned earlier, this
importance does not derive from the concept itself or its spatial distri-
bution. Rather, this centrality is determined by the progress of a new
phase of pronounced redefinition of how diversity is understood polit-
ically and institutionally. At the core of this dynamic stands the state
both as focus and arena of present competitions. The situation inevit-
ably grew more complex and controversial because uprisings, civil
wars and geopolitical rivalries have stressed the traditional weak-
nesses of the Middle Eastern state, turning them into evident fragilit-
ies, destabilizing the entire social fabric and politically activating di-
versity in public space. This condition is manifest in two political dy-
namics. State boundaries have become open to negotiation, as has the
definition of who is entitled to be part of the “new” demos. Violence
and conflict erupted as a strategic choice to take control of the state or
prevent the Other from achieving this political objective. Accordingly,
since 2003 the history of Iraq shows that these two perspectives need
to be equally accounted for in order to situate and reconsider the role
of diversity in today's Middle East politics.
The post-Saddam era presents a complexity that cannot be eas-
ily assessed by the present work. The ousting of the dictator and his
regime by the US-led military initiative was welcomed by a signific-
ant part of international community, with many hopes and expecta-
tions. However, the post-Saddam state-building process immediately
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encountered difficult challenges, entering the ongoing stalemate. On
the one hand, the contested 2005 constitution sought to achieve a diffi-
cult balance combining a new monolithic interpretation of Iraqi soci-
ety and the state, now enshrined in the supremacy of Islam as a funda-
mental source for legislation and the binding feature of the new Iraqi
demos, with the expansion of guarantees for the distinct ethno-lin-
guistic and religious communities dwelling within the country. On the
other, the fall of the dictator opened the field to competition for con-
trol of the state. Both dynamics have drastically destabilized the coun-
try.53 The Iraqi political momentum has been monopolized by the
confrontation between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, while Christians
have sought new space and positions within this new systematization.
The civil war erupted in 2006, widely sectarian in scope, manifested
all these contradictions. Assyrian, Chaldean and Syriac Christians
severely suffered from the conflict. By the end of 2013, from a popu-
lation of more than a million, the Christians living in Iraq were estim-
ated to be no more than 300.000 to 500.000, with approximately 80
percent of their Churches destroyed or damaged and abandoned.
Although one can consider this situation the inevitable con-
sequence and spillover of the civil war, Christians felt themselves to
be under a concrete existential threat, being targeted both for their reli-
gious identity and in being a national minority increasingly perceived
as marginal to the wider political dynamic. Their condition became
even more insecure than in the past, given the absence or fragility of
the central government, structurally absorbed by the war. Polarizations
prevailed as well as mistrust and uncertainty. New projects for separ-
ating and achieving autonomy on the basis of the Assyrian nationalist
ideal emerged along with Kurd activism, while most of the
community was forced to take refuge abroad or in the north of the
country, far from Baghdad and the territories where Sunnis and Shiites
were fighting.
Therefore, in recent years the re-conceptualization of the role of
diversity within the Iraqi state and its social fabric has developed
within a political context dominated by the clash between new non-
state militant and terrorist actors and opposing centers of power that
53 J. Yacoub, “La marginalization”, pp. 89-90; Saad Salloum, “Minorities in
Iraq: memory, identity and challenges”, Masarat (2013), pp. 11-12.
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have activated and exploited religious identities to pursue their own
political agendas. In this climate of contestation and fragility, Da‘ish
launched its message, manipulating and fomenting mistrusts and divi-
sions to advance its particular interpretation of polity and society
within this region.
Apparently, the Organization of the Islamic State and its rais-
ons d'être seem to go beyond the topics analyzed in this work. The
only point of contact could be considered its cruelty and violence
against minorities and any form of expression that differs from its spe-
cific understanding and interpretation of Islam.
According to this perspective, putting religious factors at the
core of its propaganda and ideology as well as equally addressing all
Muslims whatever their race, language and origins, Da‘ish distanced
itself from 20th century forms of politics, formally presenting as anti-
national. Da‘ish directed its call to join its ranks to the entire umma,
the global Islamic community. Consequently, this organization has
been primarily analyzed under the double framework of global terror-
ism-Islamist militant activism and as one of the most recent manifesta-
tions of religious radicalism. Nonetheless, Da‘ish's performance and pos-
ture showed that religious intolerance and obscurantism is just a spe-
cific character and attribute of an attitude, scope and modus operandi
essentially nationalistic.54
Equally, its global posture is both strategic and tactical,
showing an ambition to expand that does not negate spatiality but
instead confirms it and its necessity to be achieved.
Developing a glocal agenda and exerting direct control over ter-
ritories of high symbolical and geopolitical weight, Da‘ish became not
only a source of inspiration for a wide array of individuals in search of
a new religious mission, but also sought to impose itself as a force that
aims at founding a new state with a distinct and specific identity
centered on an “original” interpretation of Islam. In so doing, Da‘ish
in Iraq undoubtedly showed an ambition to determine the boundaries
and the content of a new polity and society with a precise conceptual-
ization of duties and rights, conditions of “citizenship” and space for
54 E. Hughes, “Nationalism by Another Name: Examining “Religious Radic-
alism” from the Perspective of Iraq's Christians”, The Review of Faith & International
Affairs, 15, 2 (2017), pp. 35-36.
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diversity. Da‘ish could thus be reconsidered as a manifestation of reli-
gious nationalism expressing another possible instrumental re-formu-
lation of the relationship between violence, identity and diversity in
contemporary politics with some points of contact with the dynamics
analyzed before.55
Da‘ish's process of “otherization” is brutal and simplistic in its
stance and purpose. Its enemies are not just non-Muslims and non-
Sunnis, but also any form of diversity and dissent that does not recog-
nize its identity or conform to what the organization proposes.56 Di-
versity per se thus became proof of dissent and insubordination,
against which violence is legitimate and necessary. This very categor-
ical framework makes Da‘ish's enemies the most natural vehicle for
imposing its monopoly of violence within a given territory.
The punishment and elimination of diversity have been con-
sidered essential for the creation of its state or proto-state in order to
set its boundaries and spheres. The violence against diversity, within
and outside Islam, has been employed to create a new order and hier-
archies, pursuing standardization and uniformity within the dominated
geography, selecting who is entitled to dwell under its rule.
Therefore, from June 2014 until July 2017, Da‘ish sought to
impose one of the most radical and deviant visions of the principle of
the modern nation-state.
In order to achieve its political project, Da‘ish deliberately or-
ganizes its propaganda and modus operandi around a sort of scenic
contradiction between the peaceful and harmonious condition of those
who accept its message, becoming members and citizens of its polity,
and the suffering and demonization of those that have refused to “be
redeemed”.
Accordingly, this organization has carefully projected this com-
munication and operative strategy, subduing and exploiting diversity,
making it the enemy and the tool of its political project. At the begin-
ning of its military projection, the decision to focus almost exclusively
55 M. Demichelis, P. Maggiolini, The Struggle to Define a Nation. Rethinking
Religious Nationalism in Contemporary Islamic World (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias
Press, 2017).
56 A. Plebani, P. Maggiolini, “The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadi's
Caliphate”, in Twitter and Jihad: the communication strategy of ISIS, M. Maggioni, P.
Magri (eds.) (Milano: ISPI, 2015).
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on Iraqi Shiites was probably motivated by the will to give substance
to the fight against the Iraqi central state, in view of the so-called ‘lib-
eration’ of the country from oppressive rule.57 Later, after the capture
of Mosul and the assault against Jabal Sinjar, Christians and Yazidis
widely dwelling there became the easiest symbolic targets to generate
significant media coverage and epitomize the vision of Da‘ish's
founding polity and society. Portraying the enemy as an ethical and
ontological threat ensured Da‘ish's ability to focus the battle's object-
ive and provide motivation to its fighters. Moreover, it became central
to fix the state's and society's boundaries, establishing a precise system
of control over its inhabitants. Diversity has been thus engaged and as-
saulted according to the convenience of this organization that only ap-
parently fully endorses Islamic religious prescriptions regarding non-
Muslims living in an Islamic state, namely dhimma. Da‘ish militants
showed this double, instrumental-tactical and strategic stance during
the occupation of Raqqa (February 2014) and Mosul (summer of
2014).58 The policy of exterminating and purging Christians became
the means of imposing itself in both cities. 84 Moreover, the reference
to the dhimma was instrumental in order to present two “constitutions”
(Raqqa-February 2014) and Mosul (July 2014) by means of which
Da‘ish concretely imposed the new political boundaries under its rule.
In fact, in Mosul, the organization gave people only 48 hours to make
the choice between embracing Islam or leaving the city. In a cres-
cendo of cruelty, this terrorist group manipulated the suffering and hu-
miliation of these victims as a clear and unequivocal manifesto of its
military might where its unwavering devotion to the annihilation of
the Other served a clear political project aimed at founding a new
“state”. The decision to mark the property of Christians with the Ar-
abic letter “nun” (nasara –a derogatory word for Christians) and that
of Shiites and Shabaks communities with the Arabic letter “ra” (rafida
–in sum, he who rejects the Sunni orthodoxy) perfectly epitomized its
will to spatialize terror and bewilderment. The same tactic was used
against places of worship, cemeteries and artistic sites that were de-
57 B. Fishman, “After Zarqawi: the dilemmas and future of al Qaeda in Iraq”,
Washington Quarterly 29, 4 (2006).
58 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria (14 November
2014).
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secrated and destroyed. Between July and August 2014, the Yazidi
community of Sinjar suffered an even crueler fate. In this case, Da‘ish
attacked them with special fury.
Therefore, although the religious radicalism framework can be
useful to penetrate and contextualize the essence and vision of groups
like the Islamic State, their modus operandi and projects proved to be
only seemingly explained by religious fervor. Beyond any simplistic
comparison, Da‘ish's approach is not a mere case of replacing secular-
ethnic factors with the religious, preserving a nationalistic framework.
Rather, it has totally transformed religion and belief in secular polit-
ical tools, ethicizing them as categories used to impose a new homo-
geneous and monolithic notion of should-be “nation” and “state”
within which whoever is entitled to live is not simply a Muslim but a
citizen of Da‘ish's “demos”. In doing so, nationalization and sectari-
anization totally overlap, providing a tragic testimony to how diversity
could again be instrumentally reified and employed to pursue specific
political projects.
4. Conclusion
In today's Middle East, Christians perceive their suffering and
peril as the result of systematic persecution that is existentially threat-
ening their survival. Whether this condition is a simple spillover from
a wider turbulence or is the result of an intended act of negation of
their distinctive identities, the root of this psychology needs to be un-
derstood, recounted and known.
Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that their condition sym-
bolizes and epitomizes a far more radical crisis that involves the re-
gion and its inhabitants beyond religious or ethnic factors.
This analysis has sought exactly to provide some elements for
reconsidering the historical trajectory that has incrementally projected
today's Middle East into the present turbulent showdown. Beyond
simplistic parallels and comparisons, the relationship between di-
versity and politics has been analyzed according to the perspective of
the modern nation-state and the development of distinct nationalistic pro-
jects. It is exactly within these fields that the battle for Middle Eastern
diversity is being waged. Although considered defunct, nationalism is
still far from being overcome as the principle metric defining today
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politics and it remains, with its promises of uniformity and homogen-
ization, the parameter for seeking power and therefore control of the
state. In this framework, sectarianization and religious radicalism
should be considered products and consequences of nationalism in-
stead of a revival of perennially pre-modern and sub-national identit-
ies.
They are also new and narrow reconfigurations that confirm its
promises and ambition, instead overcoming and denouncing them.
This condition structurally questions the role and presence of di-
versity, whether religious, ethnic or cultural, in terms of politics and
state, making it a political fact and inevitably a potential tool and re-
source to impose rule and control.
Women in post-islamic Iran. Contrasting State violence through
Islamic feminism and social change
Sara Hejazi
1. Building a modern nation-state. How Iranian women became
“Women”
As Michel Foucault would state in his History of Sexuality1, the
Nineteenth century has been the age of bio-power and top down
political control over people; beyond technological innovation and in-
dustrialization, bio-power was displayed through cultural means such
as human classification, medicalization, designation of “unnatural be-
haviors” and establishment of a scientific language and terminology.
In other words, power and knowledge melted together to construct a
modern nation that would in the Twentieth century be so strong and
appealing to its people, they would be ready to fight and die in the
name of it. Bio-power connected to a specific aim: that of overcoming
religious sense of belonging and replacing it with a national one. As
B. Anderson has argued, nations were born out of a new broad sense
of shared synchronic actions of imagined communities.2
Going back to gender issues, no modern nation could be con-
structed without the attribution of specific gender roles to its citizens,
based on emerging scientific knowledge and industrial progress and
on the net and binary distinction between “men” and “women”.
Gendered nature or gender natures were defined and divulged: hys-
teria was described as a disease affecting women, and especially cer-
tain types of women;3 sexual deviance was unfolded, observed, re-
corded and cured through medicine, psychology or intervention on
genitalia. Deviance comprised any non-heterosexual, non- reproduct-
ive, non-genital human sexual activity. Out of the negative models
based on sexual deviance, or on “typically feminine” characters, mod-
1 M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité. La volonté de savoir (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1984), vol. I.; R. Felski, The Gender of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
2 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the origins and spread
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
3 S. Arnaud, On hysteria. The invention of a medical category, between 1670'
and 1820 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
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ern citizens would imagine their national models as essentially mascu-
line. The Victorian era was thus paving the way to the ideal construc-
tion of modern nation states, made of a universal omni-comprehensive
white, urban, middle class man. As industrialization and progress regu-
lated by bio-power seemed the winning features of the process of
civilization undertook by the West, colonial western nations and cit-
izenships were observed, imitated, longed for in non western parts of
the world, i.e. in Iran.
During the Nineteenth Century, under Qajar rule, Iran was eco-
nomically backward, politically chaotic, and predominantly Shi‘ia. It
was a patriarchal, fragmented society whose rich material resources
were mainly exploited by industrial Europe.4 Qajar kings' main in-
tention was that of balancing their own local power with economic
concessions to French, English and Russians, thus maintaining the
status quo. At a cultural level, however, the Qajars were the most mi-
metic dynasty Iran has had until then. Being legitimized by external
forces, Qajars begun a process of cultural mimesis as “a desire to be
the other”,5 i.e. the European, and which included redesigning gender
roles and re-styling gender imagery with the aim to modernize the na-
tion. In early Qajar art, for instance, beauty was not distinguished by
gender: androgenic young men (amrad) and women (houri) would
both represent sexual attractiveness for male adults. However, con-
stant cultural contact between Iran and Europe progressively ques-
tioned non- heterosexual local tradition. If Persian ancient poetry (or
the miniature art) would traditionally celebrate homo-erotic relations
between male adults and amrads, the Nineteenth century represented
the progressive hiding or cancellation of homoerotic tradition. Why
were the Qajars eager to change Iran's traditional sexual outlook? As
Iranian scholar Afsaneh Najmabadi pointed out,6 homo-eroticism and
same-sex practices came to mark Iran as backward in the eyes of the
Europeans; adult man-amrad love and sexual practices prevalent in
Iran were considered vices in the West. Hetero-normalization of Eros
4 H. Katouzian, State and Society in Iran. The eclipse of the Qajars and the
emergence of the Pahlavis (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).
5 R. Girard, Mimesis & Theory: Essays on Literature and Criticism, 1953-
2005 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
6 A. Najmabadi, Women with mustaches and men without beard. Gender and
sexual anxieties of iranian modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
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and sex which was a process Europe underwent a century before be-
came the “universal” condition of “achieving modernity,” a project
that called for hetero-socialization of public space and a reconfigura-
tion of gender roles in industrial societies. By the end of the Nine-
teenth Century, a highly gender-differentiated portrayal of beauty
emerged, along with a concept of love that assumed heterosexuality as
“natural”. In that time, Iranians became acutely aware of “another
gaze” that entered the scene of sexual desire. This gaze came from
outside national borders and had not only a different cultural belong-
ing: it had a superior therefore crucial cultural belonging. It represent-
ed cultural truth. Iranian men interacting with Europeans in Iran or
abroad became highly sensitized to the idea that their sexual desire
was now under European scrutiny. Homoerotic desire had to be
covered. One marker of modernity became the transformation of
homo-eroticism into masqueraded heterosexuality. Not only turning
beauty into a hetero-normalized object was the accomplishment of
Nineteenth Century Iran under Qajar rule, but also questioning tradi-
tional gender roles became main stream. Cultural backwardness in the
face of European modernity was also attributed to female segregation,
that is to the separation of the sexes in the public sphere.
Iranian men began to imagine alternative or innovative gender
relations and sexual orientations: if only Iranian women were more
like European ones, then gender relations and sexualities could be re-
configured.7 Iranian women's absolute absence from the public scene
was thus considered both the reason and the effect of homo-erotic tra-
ditional relations, the unmistakable sign of cultural backwardness. To
achieve modernity meant to get women out of the private, which
meant, in turn, to question women's public appearance: the veil. The
Nineteenth century marked the beginning of the “question of the veil” in
Iran. Iranian writers, intellectuals, businessmen and travellers abroad
started to tackle the issue as a by product of questioning the cultural
legitimization of European dominance in the country. Mirza Aqa
Khan Kirmani (1853-1896/97) was an Iranian intellectual reformer,
who advocated for political, social, and religious reform, which were
7 M. Tavakoli-Targhi, “Imagining Western Women: Occidentalism and Euro-
eroticism”, Radical America, 24, n. 3 (1993), pp. 73-87.
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typical of the century's thinkers. Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani would
argue that:
Men are naturally inclined toward socializing with and enjoying the
companionship of women. This is so strongly evident that it needs no
explication and proof. If a people is forbidden from this great blessing
and is deprived of this great deliverance, then inevitably the problem
of sexual acts with boys and young male slaves [bachchah'bazi and
ghulam'baragi] is created, because boys without facial hair [pisaran-i
sadah] resemble women and this is one of the errors of nature. It is for
this reason that in the Iranian people/nation this grave condition has
reached saturation. “You lust after men instead of women” can be
witnessed in Iran. And the ground for this situation is the veiling of
women that has become established in Iran. Since men’s natural desire
to see women is frustrated and they are deprived of that blessing, of
necessity and inevitably, they turn to pederasty [bachchah'bazi] and
making love with boys. Sa'di of Shiraz and the obscene and shameful
Qa'ani and other Iranian poets have big collections of poetry that
prove my word and relieve me of further explication.8
Keeping the sexes separated and preserving women from male
contact through hejab, tents, chadors, and so on enhanced homosexu-
ality and cultural backwardness.
Iraj Mirza (1874-1926), one of the most celebrated poets in
Iran, expressed this issue into the well known verses:
Until our tribe is tied up in veil, this very queerness is bound to
prevail. The draping of the girl with her throat divine Will make the
little boy our concubine.9
Where “the draping of the girl” is the chador, or the coverage of
women, which makes them un-accessible and unpleasant, pushing
adult males towards young boys instead. European scrutiny —or the
idea of being scrutinized by Europeans— gave birth to a series of cul-
tural questions that accompanied Iranian thinkers from that moment
on and which are partly unresolved today. In the first place, what were
the plausible gender models for a modern nation?
8 Najmabadi, Women with mustaches and men without beard, p. 56.
9 Ibid., p. 149.
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Was it legitimate to look at farhangi (foreigner) models, even if
the problem emerged by the constant contact with farhangis them-
selves? Were Iranian women supposed to stop veiling? Was unveiling
a sign of modernity? Was Iranian heritage totally at stake in the cul-
tural encounter with the West? Some of these questions took Iran right
through the Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the Twenti-
eth Century. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 represented
a turning point in national history.
Civil rights movements highlighted women's issues and the
very first feminist ideas spread during this socially fertile period of
time. Through the net definition of gender and gender roles of the Qa-
jar period, Iranian women became self-conscious. This process of self-
consciousness implied that there was a public women's issue (ma-
saley-e zan) to confront with, and the very first attempt of confronta-
tion occurred in the years during the riots. More and more women be-
came aware and capable of using specific language and terms in the
foucaultian way, to designate women's issue and to display visions of
the future driven by the innovative idea of “improvement” of women's
condition.
For the first time, despite social and economic differences, be-
longing to female gender meant imagining a common ground or a
common life-experience based on sexuality, which could justify com-
mon, political action. Imagination played a pivotal role in the
mobilization: just like people were “imagining nations”, they could
imagine “gender”. Women's participation to women's issues was a top
down process at the beginning. Princess Taj Saltaneh -Qajar Naser al-
Din Shah's daughter- was one of the first advocate for women's social
improvements. However, later, some of these elitarian ideas spread to
the emerging middle class and were part —together with nationalistic
ideas— of the public discourse of the Constitutional Revolution.
Women were active in organizing street riots, participate in
some fights, join underground activities against foreign forces, and
raise funds for the establishment of the National Bank.
In the course of this national struggle, some enlightened women
realized the potential of women for organized political activities and
used the momentum provided by the revolution as a venue for bring-
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ing women's causes into the open.10 Women's first secret societies
(anjomans) were created, such as Anjomane Azadi-ye Zanan (the Wo-
men's Freedom Society) and Anjoman-e Zanan-e Neqabpush (the So-
ciety of Masked Women). The main topic discussed in the gatherings
was women's right to vote, parallel to what was happening in the
West, however this right was not achieved until 1963 under Shah Pah-
lavi's Reign. Women's next attempt was to file a petition and ask the
Majles11 to officially recognize their anjomans. In 1908, they submit-
ted their request to the Parliament, but their action created an uproar.
A number of conservative ulama and wealthy merchants declared wo-
men's anjomans “anti-Islamic” and “heretical.”
While Iranian society was deeply changing in its economic as-
set, from a rural to an industrial society, religion served as a
conservative reminder that the very last taboo of change from tradition
to modernity was public gender hierarchy. Supporting women, a few
liberals argued that women's organizations had existed throughout
Islamic history and could not be considered un-Islamic. This position
represented the innovative possibility for a different approach to
Islamic history, which, years later, would express itself as the Islamic
feminist perspective. Constant cultural comparison with the West, the
adoption from the West of a public discourse on women, the
adaptation of this general discourse to local specificities, such as the
issue of the veil, the shift from a more flexible, ambiguous sexual
imagery, to a more definite and heterosexual one, were the highlights
of these two centuries. Through this process, women became women
and women's issues became a public domain, adopting a specific
terminology and self-consciousness. This social and cultural transformation
from the Qajar era to the Constitutional Revolution12 gave grounds to
the raise of the “Islamic woman” as a political and ideological
feminist model for the decades to come.
10 M. Mohammadi, “Iranian Women and the Civil Rights Movement in Iran: Fem-
inism Interacted”, Journal of International Women's Studies, 9, 1 (2007), pp. 1-21.
11 Iranian parliament established after the constitutional revolution in 1906-1911.
12 J. Afary, The Iranian constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911. Grassroots of
Democracy, Social democracy and the Origins of feminism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996).
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2. Soldiers of purity. How Fatima became Fatima
The historical events related with the Pahlavi dynasty, from
1925 to 1979, pushed the process of cultural modernization and its im-
pact on Iranian women to a dramatic extent. If during the Qajar era
top-down imposition of gender definition was limited to élites and
artistic or symbolic representations, by the end of the Pahlavi dynasty
cultural ideals on gender became top-down political actions involving
all social classes. In 1936, Rezah Shah had as his greatest ambition
that of transforming Iran into a modern western-like state. He realized
soon that infrastructures, railways, state schools, police, the army, etc.
were not enough to serve for his purpose. There was another, perhaps
more important level on which to operate and make real changes: the
cultural one. To his opinion, Iranian people were supposed to adopt a
“modern way of being”: i.e. dressing the European way- with hats and
coats for men- and stop wearing the veil for women. Rezah Shah did
not “come out of the blue” all of a sudden; as said earlier, discussions
on veiling and unveiling started before the Constitutional Revolution
and were divulged through the first printed women's journals in the
years before World War I.
One of these journals was zaban-e-zanan (the language of wo-
men) started by the first Iranian feminist of modern history: Sadigheh
Dowlatabadi (1884-1962). Dowlatabadi was the daughter of a
renowned ulama who hired tutors to educate her at home, since there
were no schools for girls at that time. After studying in France, she
was hired by Reza Shah to work in the ministry of education and
stopped wearing the veil in public already nine years before the Shah's
ban on the veil, being the only woman in Tehran walking on the
streets with a simple hat. Mrs. Dowlatabadi anticipated historical
events: state unveiling was carried out on January 7, 1936 through the
intervention of the police against women in the streets. On the same
day, the Shah would celebrate the end of Iranian backwardness or “the
day of the emancipation of women” in a ceremony in which women
guests participated with their heads uncovered.
If the Shah's state actions and repressive politics had largely
destroyed the incipient Iranian feminism of the years of the Constitu-
tional Revolution on one side, on the other side the monarch worked
to replace independent women's movement with “state feminism”, to
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which actions of forced unveiling were strongly related. State femin-
ism was carried out through the Kanun-e Banovan (Ladies Center) or-
gan, composed primarily of privileged women of the élites. This was
an organ of cultural promotion of new western values for Iranian wo-
men and which was —in turn— controlled directly by the Shah.
Meanwhile, the Shah opened some modern sectors of the economy for
women, offering jobs as teachers with the task to form new aware cit-
izens of the modern nation state; one of the main concepts related to
women's public presence in those years was that of vatan (homeland).
Women became responsible of transmitting to their children state loy-
alty and love for homeland, which was supposed to be superior to the
more traditional love for religion. Public and non-sex segregated
schools were established, family laws were modified, but families
were still suspicious in sending their daughters in promiscuous
schools. The concept of namus (honor) was still strongly related to
women's sexual behaviour, while that of vatan (the homeland) could
not replace its importance. Forced emancipation of women was not
only a reflection of modernization and state-building, it was also an at-
tempt to disempower the clerics whose social, cultural and political
power on women and gender relations was still very strong.
Through the kanun-e- banovan, the king stripped much of cler-
ical power from controlling women's labour and sexuality. Clerics
would in fact play a pivotal role in everyday life of Iranian women,
giving advices on crucial matters such as family relations, sexual be-
haviour, work-life balance etc.
As Hamideh Sedeghi argues:
By so doing, his [the Shah's] Westernization schemes came full circle:
women's emancipation meant state exploitation of gender as a
measure to combat and contain religious forces and their bazaar
supporters. The emancipation of women as a public policy instrument
provided the state with a new form of power: the ability to use gender
to emasculate religious authorities and transfer patriarchal power from
the domain of the clergy to the realm of the state, and further, to
utilize gender to accomplish its Europeanization policies. This was
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manifested in the gradual entrance of women to the labor force and
educational spheres. 13
This revolutionary aspect of opening the labour market to wo-
men was implemented during Mohammad Rezah Shah Pahlavi's reign
(1941-1979). In 1960's the nation was integrated in the world market
and pursuing an economic growth based on rising oil revenues; this
generated a mass migration from the rural to the urban areas and a
growing need for women workers in the industry. As it happened in
the West, the shift from a rural to an industrial economy was accom-
panied by the reset of gender relations. Anthropologist Marvin Har-
ris14 explained why urbanization brought about fewer children in
American families and more women going off to work, in a time when
the labour market had a growing need of under-payed and more flex-
ible workers, roles filled by women.
Cities were not only offering under-payed labour to rural wo-
men: they also represented an opportunity for cultural encounter and
circulation of ideas that had a political impact. During the 1960s and
1970s, more women became literate in Iran and sensitive to the polit-
ical ideologies which were secretly spreading in urban milieus. On the
one hand, new life styles and possibilities of consumerism of market
goods opened up to certain social classes, like the emerging middle
class; on the other hand, social mobility was practically non-existent
and the perceived modernization of the country did not apply to real
life. Discontent was common, while political control displayed
through cruel torturing practices of the Shah's police- the Savak. Right
before the 1979 revolution, people had the perception that walls had
“eyes and ears”,15 and that Iran was an unofficial colony of the West.
In the two decades prior to the revolution, a political ideology
emerged and spread illegally through society, having at its core
13 H. Sadeghi, Women and politics in Iran. Veiling, unveiling and reveiling
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 91.
14 M. Harris, America now. The anthropology of a changing culture (New
York: Simon & Shuster, 1981).
15 S. A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown. The Islamic revolution in Iran
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); see also P. Avery, G. Hambly, Ch. Melville
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), vol. 7.
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concept the idea of “purity”, which comprised cultural, political, eco-
nomic, religious purity and which was deeply rooted in Shi'a Islam. At
its center, there was the issue of sexuality and women. As we have ar-
gued earlier, the modernization of Iranian nation was deeply involved
with a top-down redefinition of sexuality and gender roles. Again, the
Pahlavi dynasty had as its main action that of radical change of sexual
relations in order to fit new economic and political assets and needs.
This top-down reassessment of gender and sexualities generated
an important counter ideology that clang to religion in an innovative
way. Religion became a cultural framework, which was at once do-
mestic, familiar, innovative and future-oriented. Not Islam in general,
but Shi'a Islam, could include cultural authenticity against external
domination, political utopia and the promise of social justice against
the tyranny of the Shah, all in one. Shi'ism served as a weltanshauung
to coherently interpret contemporary reality through familiar categor-
ies such as that of martyrdom and suffering for a greater cause. Most
of all, this religious ideology provided a new female model in a time
when traditional gender roles were deeply questioned. The ideal of
purity was in fact in the hands of women.
Being women's bodies the center of political and cultural dis-
course of Iran's paths to modernity, the concept of purity emerged to
contain all recent changes society went through in a familiar cultural
framework with a revolutionary intent: that of overthrowing the mon-
archy and keeping the nation together. Ali Shariati, one of the most
important theorist of Shi'a Islam as a mean for social justice, wrote in
1971:16 In the midst of this disruptive thought which has been imposed
upon us and will continue to impose itself upon us, what can we do?
Who is that who can take up the mandate? The one who has do
something and in saving us play an active role, is not the traditional
woman who is asleep in her quiet, tame, ancient mould, nor is the new
woman who is a modern doll that has assumed the mould of enemy
and in the process has become full and saturated. Rather, one who can
choose the new human characteristics, who can break the fastenings of
16 A. Shariati, Fatemeh is Fatemeh (Teheran: The Shariati Foundation, 1971);
for works on Ali Shariati see E. Abrahamian, Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian
Revolution, in E. Burke, I. Lapidus (eds.), Islam, Politics, and Social Movements (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); A. Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian. A
Political Biography of Ali Shari'ati (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).
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old traditions which were presented in the name of religion, but in fact
were national and tribal traditions ruling over the spirit (p. 149).
In his works, A. Shariati —who studied with academic Orientalist
as L. Massignon in Paris, and was influenced by western philosophy
such as that of Herbert Marcuse and the school of Frankfurt— reinter-
preted the local knowledge of Shi'a religion through political and re-
volutionary lens. His idea was that Iran suffered not only of
Westoxication17 but also of a blind “westernism”, that was a reduction
of the West to a simple and poor stereotype. In Fatemeh is Fatemeh,
he asks why in Iran everybody knows about Jaqueline Kennedy and
top model Twiggy, but nothing is known about excellent female sci-
entists, such as Marie Curie, M. me de La Vida and other female
scholars who, from the West, contributed to science and knowledge
even on Islam and Iranian history and archaeology. The new Shi'a fe-
male model was supposed to be inspired by these western women, the
“authentic” feminists, Shariati argued.
In a way, these remarkable western women, were the different
expressions of Fatemeh. Fatemeh the daughter of the prophet, was not
only a saint, but was most of all a woman with full intellectual capab-
ilities and broad academic knowledge. She was, therefore, transna-
tional, global, pure, essential: she could be born anywhere, in the East,
in the West; she could be any woman, but not any woman could be
Fatemeh. Only those capable of critical thinking on contemporary
world could be Fatemeh. Shari‘ati constructed a version of Shi'ism
and Shi‘a women that focused on its utopian and insurrectionary qual-
ities. Positive and negative models of women were progressively and
publicly discussed during the years prior to the revolution, based on
the writings of Ali Shariati, combined with western feminist literature.
No anti-imperialist discourse, nor liberation ideology was dis-
junct from the search of a righteous representation of women and wo-
men's bodies. Imperialism was incarnated by the image of westernized
women in their miniskirts smoking cigarettes on the streets of Te-
heran. Anti-imperialism was incarnated by veiled women studying at
the university and praying in the Mosque. Exalting Fatemeh, the
Prophet's daughter and the wife of his successor, Emam Ali, meant to
17 J. Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague From the West (Berkeley: Mizan
Press, 1984).
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create a convincing and modern model of the real Muslim woman.
This remained one of the core concepts of political Islam in Iran. Still
today, after almost fourty years from the revolution, Fatemeh's birth-
day is celebrated as the Woman's Day. She is commemorated as the
paragon of motherhood and wifely virtues, above all, a heroine who
was an authentic and devout Muslim, devoid of anything impure, for-
eign, and alien to Islam.
Shi‘a Islam played as an ideological framework that provided
some unifying concepts which influenced women's life experience to a
point that social mobilization could be reached.18
The 1979 Revolution introduced a new chapter into women's
history. It represented veiled women as powerful revolutionaries, and
it devalued secular women as Westernized, monarchical (Taquti), and
indecent. This had strong effects in society: where social positions and
jobs were opened for religious revolutionary women, secularized wo-
men were progressively excluded from their previous workplace, as
Nobel price lawyer Shirin Ebadi pointed out.19
It became more evident that the meaning of women's sexuality,
be it publicly displayed or disguised, assumed prominence for the
state and soon became the inner and outer expression of the Islamic
Republic's identity. From outside iranian borders, the black chador be-
came the symbol of Khomeini's revolution; from the inside, it repres-
ented the defeat of a certain part of the country's population and the
victory of another. From the early twentieth-century on, controlling
women's sexuality remained at the core of the power struggle between
rival groups of the revolution and the clerical establishment.20 At its
inception, the revolution brought up an ideal woman who was a pious
Muslim and a militant fighter; for some aspects, she resembled the pre-
Qajar houri (virgin) which was androgenic. She was masculinized, de-
sexualized or de-womenized. Her black chador would entitle her to
carry out in the public sphere many tasks precluded to women in the
past. Vatan (homeland) and purity were her basic ideals, and the sacri-
fice of her own life was contemplated for the sake of namus (honour),
18 D. Kandyoti, Women, Islam and the State (Philadelphia: Temple Univer-
sity Press, 1991).
19 S. Ebadi, Il mio Iran (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 2006).
20 Sadeghi, Women and politics in Iran, p. 135.
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which wasn't just a personal, family namus as in the past, but that of
the entire nation. Nine years of Iran-Iraqi war contributed to empower
this revolutionary female ideal model of cultural resistance, Shi‘a mil-
itance and spirit of sacrifice. This is the overall cultural scenario of the
raise of contemporary Iranian Islamic feminism.
3. Changing the “fiqh”. The Islamic Republic becomes post-mod-
ern
Iranian Islamic feminism was not only a national phenomenon,
given that in other parts of the Middle East, women were gaining ac-
cess to education and to the job market as well: this general situation
marked the birth of a broad, “global” Islamic feminism in the frame of
political Islam.21 The emergence of Islamic feminism coincided also
with the spread of a new form of information technology.22
In pure discussion of secular and Islamic feminism, scholar M.
Badran historicized the terms “religious” and “secular”, pointing out
that “secular” feminism arose in a largely “religious era”, while Is-
lamic feminism surfaced in a “secular era”. This meant that secular
feminism emerged in a context in which religion, state, and society
were highly enmeshed, while Islamic feminism appeared at a moment
when the notion of secular state and society had taken hold. Electronic
technology circulated information and ideas freely and rapidly through
cyberspace, creating an unprecedented simultaneity of local and
global production. Moreover, the era of mass migrations from Muslim
countries to the West enhanced cultural mimesis, hybridation, con-
frontation and constant redefinition of gender models, more massively
than in colonial era. There are multiple points from which feminisms
radiated outward. The West has not been the only patrimonial home of
feminisms from which all feminisms derived and, most of all, against
which they must always be measured.
However, as said earlier in this paper, a specific language defin-
ing women's issues was born in the West during the Victorian era.
21 L. Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the
Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
22 M. Badran, “Between Secular And Islamic Feminism/s. Reflections on the
Middle East and Beyond”, Journal of Middle East Women's Studies, 1, 1 (2005), pp.
6-28.
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This some way represented the input for a specific and local discourse
on women's issues, which spread in non-western societies as well,
once the ideal economic and social conditions were achieved:
urbanization, circulation of ideas, printing of dedicated journals,
cultural encounters, introduction of technological innovation.
When tackling Islamic feminism, one has to keep in mind the
power hierarchy that western and secular feminists entail with Muslim
women23. Liberating women from religions seemed, from a western
perspective, the ground from which any feminist movement should
take place. The privatization of religion has been one of the main ten-
ets of feminism, seen as a prerequisite for the development of a femin-
ist consciousness and a movement. However, Islamic feminism stands
on the exact opposite side: only religion or its true message can re-dig-
nify the status of women in society.
As J. Casanova would argue24 the process of de-privatization of
religion has become a relatively global trend, while simultaneously
other kinds of feminisms did emerge. Secular feminists tried with little
success to reform Muslim personal status codes or family law in Iran,
but the attempt did not work because it was perceived (and narrated)
as a further form of cultural dominance and colonialism.25 Cultural
authenticity was a powerful counter-narrative, which was searched for
in familiar or domestic roots and was deeply tied with concepts such
as homeland and nationality against “cultural invasion”. On the con-
trary, Islamic feminism provided a new edge for reform, offering new
thinking and new tools while looking familiar, making religious dis-
course its paramount discourse, grounding its assertions in readings of
the Qur’an, insisting upon the practice of social justice meanwhile cir-
culating globally with unprecedented speed and with the freedom that
cyberspace offers. If Islamic feminism surfaced when Islamism was
ascendant in the Middle East, this same Islamic feminism also sprang
23 N. Tohidi, “Gender and Islamic Fundamentalism: Feminist Politics in
Iran”, in Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, Ch. Talpady Mohanty, A.
Russo, L. Torres (eds.), (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 251-267.
24 J. Casanova, Religion, Politics and gender equality. Public Religions re-
visited Program paper, UNRISD Comparative Research Project on Religion, Politics,
and Gender Equality, April 2009, Open docs.
25 M. Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph
of Nativism (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996).
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from fertile home soil of a well-established tradition of Middle East-
ern secular feminism, even if there was a substantial difference
between the first and the second type of women's movement.
Middle Eastern secular feminism was mostly made up of
middle-upper class women, a very small percentage of the society. Is-
lamic feminism, on the contrary, was transversal to different social
classes, but its large basis was made up of women of middle-lower
classes, whose education was recent and an innovative item to their
families. This is the main reason why in Iran, Islamic feminism did
not dismiss the Islamic Republic but critiqued it and demanded a dif-
ferent reading of religion: Islamic feminists were the representatives of
the social classes directly involved in the revolution and supporting
the clergy. They were those, that is, who overthrew the Shah. While
women were, in the aftermath of the revolution, massively pushed in
the public sphere and in the education system, gender-based social in-
equalities were at the core of the Islamic State in the name of the post-
revolutionary re-instatement of Shar‘ia Law.
Tapping into popular demands for social justice, the ‘Return to
Shari‘a’ led to regressive gender policies, with devastating consequences
for women: compulsory dress codes, gender segregation, and the re-
vival of cruel punishments and outdated patriarchal and tribal models
of social relations.26
The years of Iran-Iraqi war were so hard and centered on more
imminent emergencies, that real battles to reform Shar‘ia were not un-
dertaken by Islamic feminists. However, those were the years of great
social change: during the war, all Iranian men were mobilized and this
created some employment opportunities for educated women in the
public sector, particularly in health, education, and (to a lesser extent)
public administration.27 It was only by the end of the war with Iraq in
1988 and the period of reconstruction from 1989 to 1997 that an op-
portunity for the demands of the emergent civil society arrived. By the
26 Z. Mir Hoseini, “Beyond ‘Islam’ vs. ‘Feminism’”, IDS Bulletin, 42, 1
(2011), pp. 67-77; “Women and Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran: Divorce, Veiling and
Emerging Feminist Voices”, in H. Afshar (ed.), Women and Politics in the Third
World (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 149-169.
27 V. Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and its Discontents: Toward a Resolu-
tion of the Debate' Signs”, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 27, 4 (2002), pp.
1153-1171.
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start of the 90's it was becoming increasingly apparent that women
were re/visioning a new feminism through their fresh readings of the
Qur’an. Following the war, the government reversed its opposition to
family planning and embarked on a vigorous campaign to stabilize
population growth through the widespread distribution of contracept-
ives to married women. The modern iranian family ideal was already
changing under the scrutiny of modernity and urban life, where nu-
merous family were depicted as “outdated” even by the clergy.
So the objective conditions for Islamic feminism to consolidate
was the opening of public jobs on one side, and the top-down family
planning through the promotion of contraceptive and a small family
ideal on the other.
In the 1990's a combination of a number of factors served to un-
dermine several of the most egregious policies of the Islamic Republic
and reverse its program on women, family, and gender relations. The
changes occurred after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini,28 during the
presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and in the context of a
program for economic liberalization, integration into the global eco-
nomy and the establishment of capitalist society. Under Rafsanjani's
presidency (1989-1997), Iran was vehemently pushed toward the
global economy, but its legal and cultural asset was framed by state
religion; this created what philosopher Daryush Shayegan called cul-
tural schizophrenia,29 a constant mental feeling of clash or need to ne-
gotiate between different systems of meanings: new promises of capit-
alism and consumerism on one side, memories of war and hardship,
and religion as a political utopia on the other side. Islamic feminism
represented a path out of cultural schizophrenia, because it made the
effort to unify the different complex aspects of a modern Islamic Re-
public in a globalized world.
From a theological perspective, the basis of islamic feminism
was made of a distinction between religion as a system of belief based
on sacred texts, and religious knowledge, that is the access to religious
sources through human interpretation. The first, religion, was fixed
28 A. Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London:
Routledge, 1995).
29 D. Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the
West (London: Saqi Books, 1992).
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once it was revealed. The second, interpretation and religious know-
ledge was always dependent on historical contingencies and human
evolution through events.
Abdolkarim Soroush, religious philosopher and thinker argued:
Our understanding of revealed texts is contingent upon the knowledge
already set around us; that is to say that forces external to Revelation
drag our interpretation and understanding of it in various directions.
[...] Believers generally conceive of religion as something holy or
sacred, something constant. You cannot talk about change or
evolution of religious knowledge. They stick to the idea of fixity. But
as I have demonstrated in my work, we have to make a distinction
between religion on the one side and religious interpretation on the
other. By religion here I mean not faith, which is the subjective part of
religion, but the objective side, which is the revealed text. This is
constant, whereas our interpretations of that text are subject to
evolution. The idea is not that religious texts can be changed but
rather over time interpretations will change. We are always immersed
in an ocean of interpretations. The text does not speak to you. You
have to make it speak by asking questions of it.30
Ijtihad, the act of religious interpretation is depicted as an al-
ways mobile, flexible act, and it can be pursued by any religious ex-
pert. The theological grounds for islamic feminism were legitimated
through ijtihad, even though –as anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hoseini
stated Islamic feminism was the “unwanted child” of political Islam:
It did not emerge because the Islamists offered an egalitarian vision of
gender relations. They did not. Rather, their agenda of ‘return to the
Shari‘a' and their attempt to translate into policy the patriarchal gender
notions inherent in classical jurisprudence, provoked women to
increase criticism of these notions and spurred greater activism among
secular feminists, who were now internationalised and had the
legitimacy of human rights on their side. The Islamists' defence of
patriarchal rulings as ‘God's Law’ and as promoting an authentic and
‘Islamic’ way of life, brought the classical jurisprudential texts out of
the closet. A growing number of women came to question whether
30 Interview with Abdolkarim Soroush, Q-News International (British Muslim
weekly), no. 220-221, 14-27 June 1996.
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there was an inherent link between Islamic ideals and patriarchy; they
saw no contradiction between their faith and their aspiration for
gender equality. Political Islam gave them the language to sustain a
critique of the gender biases of Muslim family laws in ways that were
previously impossible, which opened a space, an arena, for an internal
critique of patriarchal readings of the Shari‘a that was unprecedented
in Muslim history.31
Cultural, economic and social grounds were thus solid for Is-
lamic feminism to spread in Iran and have a broader impact on civil
society than what secular feminism did. However, today's movement
is strongly different from what it has been during the years of Shariati
and in the aftermath of the Revolution.
Gheissari and Nasr32 argue that by the late 1990s, Iranians
placed demands on the political system that the Islamic Republic
could not accommodate. The Iranian people changed significantly in
the decade leading up to the 1997 elections as immense gains in liter-
acy, women's participation in the economy, and urbanization of popu-
lation occurred. This, and other factors, account for the voter turnout
in 1997 which led to the election of the reformist president Seyed
Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005).
Political reformism was directly connected to Iranian Islamic
feminism through well-known women who were politicians or directly
related to the parliament or simply impacted politics through editorial
activities such as Zahra Rahnavard,33 Shahla Sherkat,34 Faezeh
Hashemi Rafsanjani,35 Jamileh Kadivar36 to name but a few in Zanan
magazine, intellectuals and experts of religions were asked to com-
31 Mir Hoseini, “Beyond ‘Islam’ vs. ‘Feminism’”, p. 72.
32 A. Gheissari, S. R. Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest
for Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
33 Wife of Mir-Hosein Mousavi, reformist candidate of the 2009 presidential
elections and later symbol of the green movement Rahesabz.
34 Editor of well known islamic feminist women magazine Zanan.
35 Former President's Rafsanjani's daughter, served the iranian parliament
from 1996 to 2000.
36 Sister of the well known muslim scholar Mohsen Kadivar, in an interview I
had with Ms. Kadivar in 2010, she explained one of the fundamentals of present day
iranian islamic feminism: changing the velayat-e faquih, the government of the jurist
theorized and created by Imam Khomeini, into a velayat-e- fuquha, a government of
many jurists, including women jurists.
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ment and re-interpret some of the misogynist aspects of Shar‘ia law,
such as the impossibility for women to run for presidency.37
In this scenario, big legal changes have emerged in recent years
led by Islamic feminists: for instance the old law allowed for girls who
have not reached the age of consent, 14 years of age, to be married to
a man with the consent of her father. However, the reformed law
states that girls under the age of 14 have to receive permission from a
civil court before getting married.38 Other areas in which Islamic
feminism and women's movement impacted the law include issues
involving mehr (bride price), allowing women to work as research
judges in universities, indigenous women's NGOs (non-governmental
organizations), divorce law, and child custody law.39
Although Islamic shari‘a does not explicitly prevent women
from being leaders of prayers, women have not traditionally and offi-
cially been able to follow other women in their prayers. The employ-
ment of women as leaders of congregation prayers and the head of
other women during prayers held at schools constitutes a major devel-
opment in this sense. Iranian reformists introduce the change in reli-
gious practices as a victory for women's movements in Iran where wo-
men challenge the traditional male privileges in politics and in the
clergy.
Furthermore, it is especially on marriage matters and contracts
that women have mobilized.
Mehr was traditionally the bride's price, due to the woman in
case of divorce or second marriage by her spouse. The demand for
mehr gave the wife some protection against the inequities of the con-
tract she entered.
Legal disadvantages in wedding conditions were discussed and
questioned by women. This led to deep transformation of the mehr.
Nowadays, mehr is due immediately upon marriage, but its payment is
deferred at a wife's pleasure.
37 In 2013 presidential elections, for instance, there were 30 women re-
gistered as candidates, but the guardian council ruled out the participation of women.
38 E. Povey, “Feminist Contestations of Institutional Domains in Iran”, Fem-
inist Review, 69 (2001), pp. 42-72.
39 Ibid.
Sara Hejazi106
Because mehr is a substantial sum, its payment can sometimes
be onerous for the husband.
In the last decade, many young men were detained in jail be-
cause they could not pay the mehr when their wives asked them to.
This led to a substantial growing difficulty for young couples to get
married, because contract conditions represent a disadvantage, espe-
cially for men. In an economic scenario were unemployment rates are
high and economic conditions under international sanctions are harsh,
young Iranian males cannot afford a mehr, nor can they afford to be
the full supporters of modern families, even if their wives go off to
work.
For the Iranian legal system, in fact, wives are not entitled to
contribute to the economic well-being of the family, so if they work
outside the home, like many Iranian women do, their earnings can be
kept for themselves. Paradoxically therefore, Iranian weddings repres-
ent a social and economic advantage for most of the middle-upper
class women and a disadvantage for same-class men, while discrimin-
atory marriage traits are still heavy upon rural, traditional women.
Before 1992, divorce could be pursued my men without any
previous notice, upon will, and by women only in restricted cases. In
the 1992 revision of the law of marriage and divorce, the Majles expli-
citly reversed post-revolutionary measures. All divorces now required
court approval, rather than allowing private divorce by consent with
no formal process other than registration with a notary, a form that
had always held the possibility for coercion of the wife.
All divorcing couples must now go through a process of arbitra-
tion. Courts were directed to withhold divorce certification until the
husband paid the wife all that was due her, including the mehr. In
1994, the post-revolutionary Special Civil Courts were abolished and
family issues, including divorce, support, and child custody arrange-
ments were integrated with other civil matters in a court of unitary jur-
isdiction.40
The Majles mandated that the new courts have exclusive juris-
diction over these family law matters. Every such court was required
40 L. Halper, “Law And Women's Agency In Post-Revolutionary Iran”, Har-
vard Journal of Law & Gender, 28 (2005), pp. 85-142.
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to have a woman judge, to counsel the court on these questions, and to
weigh in on their resolution.
From a theoretical perspective, Islamic feminism has now integ-
rated post-modern ideas drawing upon secular discourses and
methodologies to strengthen and extend its claims. Islamic feminists
use a postmodern discussion of language and power. Multiple truths,
multiple roles and multiple realities are part of postmodern feminist's
focus. Moreover, its discourse is extended not only to secular women
but also to clerical scholars41 In the Masjed Jameh of Isfahan (Friday
Mosque), since 2016 a team of young Mullahs sit in the madrasa's
courtyard are available for foreigners, women and any other believer
to answer theological questions42 in a simple matter.
Most of these mullahs speak English, so they discuss about reli-
gion with both westerners and locals. In one meeting, a young Iranian
woman, surrounded by a group of German tourists asked about the is-
sue of music. “Why can't a woman sing in public?” The mullah ex-
plained that music is not prohibited in Islam, as long as it does not en-
hance the “loss of control”.
“How can we measure this loss?” asked the woman.
“It depends on our personal critical thinking.” Answered the
mullah referring to ijtihad and leaving thus a free interpretation of the
matter.
Formally, women cannot sing in public in Iran, but still, they do
sing at parties and private concerts and public ones as long as it is only
for female audience. The issue of women playing music in the context
of political, religious, and cultural constraints, highlights the agency of
female musicians and vocal performers as women's struggles for self-
expression and voicing their presence in public spaces on the national
stage. There are many young girls taking music classes all over Iran
and the Internet sets stages for them that overcome the prohibition of
exhibition in the public sphere.
Not only Islamic feminism is changing society, of course, but
the substantial demographical changes in contemporary Iran are
framed by an Islamic ideal of modern woman. Today, 70% of Iranian
41 F. Ahmadi, “Islamic feminism in Iran. Feminism in a new Islamic con-
text”, Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 22, 2 (2006), pp. 33-53.
42 Personal observation, December 2017, Esfahan,Meydan Imam,Masjed Jameh.
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population is urban; the literacy rate for girls aged six and over is
82%; the average number of children per woman is two; and the num-
ber of female students in institutes of higher education is two million,
or 62% of the student population. Girls' massive access to instruction
in post-revolutionary Iran has led to a rise in the average age of first
marriage for women (now 23) and has also increased the proportion of
marriages that are based on the free choice of one's spouse.43 Indi-
vidualism and western life-styles are common in urban areas, an as-
pects which has a crucial impact on marriage and family patterns. Is-
lam, state religion, resists as a cultural frontier that women consider in
their everyday negotiation with the state, patriarchal system and mod-
ern transformations. Being an Islamic feminist doesn't necessarily
mean to have a strong ideology today: rather, it looks like being
Muslim and extremely modern is a perfect combination for women to
survive in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
43 M. Poya, Women, Work and Islamism: Ideology and Resistance in Iran,
(London: Zed books, 2005); M. Maghazei, “Voicing their presence: Postrevolution
Iranian female vocalists in context”, The International Journal of Media and Culture,
15 (2017), pp. 233-247.
An ecological perspective for understanding radicalization pro-
cesses. Insights from the French case
Giulia Mezzetti, Fabio Introini
1. A French exceptionalism?
In the most recent analyses of the contemporary developments
of jihadism, scholars and researchers have shown a specific interest in
the case of France and of Francophone countries, which came under
particular scrutiny due to the string of both large- and small-scale ji-
hadist attacks that hit them since 2012.1 Indeed, France has suffered
the deadliest episodes of jihadist terrorism between 2015 and 2016.
Moreover, France is the European country that has witnessed the
highest number (in absolute terms) of young people leaving for Syria
to become foreign fighters: according to the estimates of the Soufan
Group,2 approximately 1.700 people have left France to become
“foreign fighters” in the so-called Islamic State. The figures appear all
the more striking in the case of Belgium: with its roughly 500 foreign
fighters, it is one of the countries with the highest ratio of jihadists,
relative to population. If we take into account the data concerning for-
eign fighters' countries of origin, it is possible to notice that Tunisia
has represented thus far the first “supplier” of manpower to Daesh,
1 By killing three children, a Rabbi and three soldiers in Toulouse and
Montauban (11-22 March 2012), Mohammed Merah “inaugurated” a “new wave” of
jihadist attacks targeting Western countries. With reference to France and Belgium,
his murders were followed by the assault at the Jewish Museum in Brussels (24 May
2014), the massacre in the Parisian satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the taking
of hostages in a kosher supermarket in Paris (7-9 January 2015), the assault near a gas
production plant near Lyon, with the macabre decapitation of a victim (26 June 2015),
the failed attack on a Thalys train connecting Amsterdam to Paris (21 August 2015),
the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015, the suicide bombing at the Brussels Zaventem
airport (22 March 2016), the stabbing of a police officer and of his wife in Magnan-
ville (13 June 2016), the attack carried out on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (14
July 2016), the knife killing of a priest who was celebrating the Mass in Saint-
Etienne-du-Rouvray (26 July 2016), the machete assault on two policewomen in
Charleroi, Belgium (6 August 2016), the stabbing of three police officers in Brussels
(5 October 2016), the attack on the Champs-Élysées (20 April 2017), the stabbing of
two girls in Marseille (29 September 2017). This list could be much longer, if it was
not for the numerous foiled and failed attacks, both in France and Belgium.
2 The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters. An updated assessment of the flow of
foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq, 2015.
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with 6.000 Tunisian nationals (7.000 according to non-official counts)
having become soldiers of the “Caliphate”. Tunisia, too, recently ex-
perienced jihadist attacks3 on its soil. Morocco and Lebanon as well
rank among the top providers of foreign fighters: between 1.200 and
1.500 Moroccans and roughly 900 Lebanese nationals are presumed to
have joined Daesh.4
This picture might suggest that Francophone countries-France
and some of its former colonies, as well as Belgium-are specifically
concerned by jihadism, more than other countries. In their study of
global jihadism, McCants and Meserole5 compare figures on foreign
fighters' countries of origin and, for each country, calculate its foreign
fighters as a percentage of its overall Muslim population. By asking
the question “how many foreign fighters per Muslim resident originate
from a given country?”, they find that the “top predictor” of jihadist
radicalization is whether the country has-or had-French as a national
language. Thus, they discover, for instance, that “per Muslim resident
Belgium produces far more foreign fighters than either the United
Kingdom or Saudi Arabia”.6 Of course, they do not consider language
per se as a driver of radicalization; rather, they suppose that it
represents a proxy of what they call the “French political culture”. In
other words, in their view France and other countries that undergo its
influence are affected by jihadist radicalization more than other na-
tions, due to some features that are peculiar the French social, cultural
and political landscape –specifically and most importantly, its treat-
ment of its Muslim minority and its view of secularism and religion.
Furthermore, they identify strong correlations between this “Franco-
phone effect”, the rate of youth unemployment and the level of urban-
ization of a country: according to their model, there would be more
3 The Bardo National Museum attack, in Tunisi (18 March 2015) and the
mass shooting occurred at a tourist resort close to the city of Sousse (26 June 2015).
4 In absolute terms, the five top foreign fighters nationalities are the Tunisian
(6.000-7.000), the Saudi Arabian (2.500), the Russian (2.400), the Turkish (2.000-
2.200) and the Jordanian (2.000) ones, according to The Soufan Group's estimates
(The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters. An updated assessment of the flow of foreign
fighters into Syria and Iraq, 2015).
5 W. McCants, Ch. Meserole, “The French connection. Explaining Sunni
militancy around the world”, Foreign Affairs, 24 March 2016.
6 W. McCants, Ch. Meserole, “The French connection. Explaining Sunni
militancy around the world”, Foreign Affairs, 24 March 2016.
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probabilities of embracing jihadism when these three variables are
considered together. In sum, they argue that large numbers of unem-
ployed youths, living in large cities, appear more exposed or prone to
the lure of radical ideas-especially when these cities are in Franco-
phone countries, which espouse an approach to secularism that is
more aggressive than anywhere else:
there's broad anecdotal support for this idea-consider the rampant
radicalization in Molenbeek, in the Paris banlieues, in Ben Gardane.
Each of these contexts have produced a massively disproportionate
share of foreign fighters, and each are also urban pockets with high
youth unemployment.7
This thesis sparked a heated debate and was harshly criticized.8
Indeed, it is true that it may sound quite vague or simplistic. For
instance, in McCants and Meserole's view, “French political culture”
is to be blamed, but they do not define exactly what this political
culture would consist in and, according to one critic, this would actu-
ally be impossible because such a homogeneous political culture does
not simply exist, given “the diversity of the Francophone world”.9 It
would be as hard as defining an “English political culture that would
encompass, say, the United States, the Palau Islands, and Robert
Mugabe's Zimbabwe”.10 For sure, what can be stated about France
does not necessarily apply to Tunisia or Morocco (especially concern-
ing religion in the public sphere) –and even Belgium differs from
France in a number of aspects.11 Moreover, it fails to explain other
7 W. McCants, Ch. Meserole, “The French connection. Explaining Sunni militancy
around the world”, Foreign Affairs, 24 March 2016.
8 It must be highlighted anyway that theirs was a first, tentative presentation
of their results, which they had obtained from a still on-going analysis (at least at the
time), which appeared in a short article published on the magazine “Foreign Affairs”
and not a peer reviewed journal. See the corresponding reference in the “References”
section.
9 O. Decottignies, “The French disconnection. Francophone countries and
radicalization”, Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2016.
10 O. Decottignies, “The French disconnection. Francophone countries and
radicalization”, Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2016.
11 Even if, according to Kepel & Rougier, “North African jihadism is per-
meated with a specific anti-French dimension. In this context, the French language is
seen as the conveyor of the religious skepticism of Voltaire and the secularism
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noteworthy features of contemporary jihadism, i.e. the remarkable and
conspicuous presence, in the ranks of ISIS and similar groups, of both
converts to Islam and individuals who are educated and/or that do not
come from poor marginalized areas.
Nevertheless, however reductive, their argument raised the is-
sue of what appears as an over-representation of individuals from
Francophone countries among the current global “jihadist population”
–ultimately, the issue of a French “specificity” or “exceptionalism”.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the most recent academic and public
debate on contemporary jihadism at the global level was spurred by
the controversy arisen between two French experts on jihadism –G.
Kepel and O. Roy. We will focus on this debate later in the present
chapter, after having considered the main arguments of McCants and
Meserole's thesis. Firstly, we will examine the point they make about
urban marginality and poverty as predictors of radicalization in the
Francophone-French context, by briefly analysing the conditions of
socio-economic disadvantage of the French banlieues and presenting
the positions of other experts on the matter. Secondly, we will analyse
their main argument concerning France's approach to secularism and
France's relationship with its Muslims citizens and their religion.
Building on this, we will then assess the present state of play within
academia and public opinion, by reflecting on the Roy-Kepel contro-
versy, in the light of the interpretative perspective of radicalization
processes that we will illustrate in the conclusion of the this Chapter –
what we define an “ecological perspective” for understanding such
phenomena from the sociological point of view. We will restrict our
focus to France, as the situation in other Francophone countries is too
different to be encompassed in the present analysis –indeed, not ac-
knowledging this diversity is one of the main pitfalls of McCants and
Meserole's approach, as we have already pointed out above (in fact,
embodied by the principle of laïcité, whereas English is perceived as a ‘neutral’
universal language and used indifferently by Islamists from the Arab world and the
Indian subcontinent” (see G. Kepel, B. Rougier, Addressing Terrorism. European
Research in Social Sciences and the Humanities in support to Plicies for Inclusion
and Security. A Policy Review, European Commission–Directorate General for
Research and Innovation, 2016). See Section 3 of the present Chapter for more on
laïcité and secularism.
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they too end up referring their argument essentially to the French
case).
2. Banlieues and socio-economic disadvantage
McCants and Meserole are not the only ones to point at poverty,
urban marginalization and relative deprivation as crucial factors caus-
ing jihadist radicalization. This is actually one of the most recurring
explanations of jihadism in public debates: following the dramatic ji-
hadist attacks that occurred between 2015 and 2017 on the French
soil, policy-makers and the media immediately connected the origins
of radicalization with the situation of the banlieues12, i.e. the urban
outskirts of main French cities, characterized by a vast socio-eco-
nomic disadvantage, high levels of segregation and large concentra-
tions of young French citizens of North African, Turkish and African
origin, where Islam has gained a peculiar salience and visibility. Ten
years after the most violent and widespread uprisings of recent French
history, that had taken place in these areas, les banlieues were back in
the spotlight and depicted as “the culprit”.
The harsh life conditions of banlieues are well known and have
been amply documented. Studies on this issue identify two separate
dynamics, which, precisely in the contexts of banlieues, intertwine
and reinforce each other: on the one hand, mass unemployment, that
has been spreading among the immigrant population since the second
half of the 1970s due to de-industrialization processes; on the other
hand, the concentration and segregation of unemployment in specific,
circumscribed areas. These two phenomena created a cycle of perpetu-
ation and reproduction, the one resulting from the other.13
12 With reference to the Charlie Hebdo January 2015 attacks, the then-French
Prime Minister Manuel Valls spoke of the existence of a “territorial, social and ethnic
apartheid” regarding the immigrant population, “victim of discrimination”, “relegated
in peripheral areas”, dominated by “social misery” which risks creating new
“ghettoes”. Cf. “Valls évoque ‘un apartheid territorial, social, ethnique en France’”,
Le Monde, 20.01.2015. Similarly, the French Socialist party deputy Malek Boutih,
who suggested that so-called “sensitive neighbourhoods” (as the more problematic
and deprived urban areas are called in the French administrative and political slang)
be “put under special administration” in order to avoid their transformation into “fer-
tile ground” for the spread of radicalisation phenomena; cf. “Malek Boutih plaide
pour la mise sous tutelle de quartiers sensibles”, Le Monde, 20.01.2015.
13 C. Avenel, Sociologie des quartiers sensibles (Paris: Armand Colin, 2010).
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The immigrant population that was massively employed in
large French industries in the post-war period and had settled in the
vast social housing districts at the periphery of industrial cities near
production plants, was left jobless following the colossal de-
industrialization and economic crisis that ensued the Oil Shock of
1973. In the following decades, unemployment became endemic in
those areas where the immigrant population was concentrated. The
physical and social distance of residents from work opportunities in
the city, the significant levels of discrimination both at school and in
the job market towards youths with an Africa or North-African
background and, lastly, the development of a parallel economy (based
on drug dealing) all contribute to explain this dynamic of
reproduction,14 which has even led to an increase in the levels of
segregation.15 Thus, spatial relegation soon became social relegation,
in a vicious cycle that has become difficult to break and has been
affecting children and grandchildren of first immigrants for a long
time.16 In these areas, the opportunities for social mobility are
significantly lower, to the extent that it is possible to speak of “social
determinism” with respect to the conditioning exerted by segregation
on banlieues' inhabitants.17
Much literature has been devoted to the repeated failures of the
so-called Politique de la Ville –i.e. the various policies adopted by dif-
ferent French governments aimed at improving the life conditions in
these areas, for instance in the domains of housing and education.
14 Ibid.
15 J.-L. Pan Ké Shon, Residential Segregation of Immigrants in France: an
Overview, INED-“Population and Societies”, n. 477, April 2011.
16 In the so-called “Zones Urbaines Sensibles” (ZUS) the proportion of large
families and people with a foreign nationality is significantly higher (up to three
times) compared to the national average. While the French national unemployment
rate is of approximately 10%, in the ZUS it reaches 23%, and up to 42% for young
people aged 15 to 24, compared to 23% in the rest of the country (ONZUS-Obser-
vatoire National des Zones Urbaines Sensibles, Rapport 2014). This is particularly
significant if we consider that the most represented age range in these areas is that of
under-25s. School dropout is extremely high and students of immigrant origin who
reside in these areas are significantly higher probabilities to be channelled towards
VET and less qualified educational tracks.
17 G. Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société, politique et religion à
Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
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For a number of reasons, these policy interventions have not
reached the hoped-for objectives18 and the socio-economic situation of
the banlieues remains appalling.
The empirical studies focusing on the banlieues' children of im-
migrants demonstrate that the lives of these youths, often so turbulent
and precarious, present recurrent traits, such as the impossibility of
finding a job, the perception of education as useless, a day-to-day ex-
istence, often conducive to petty delinquency. In particular, these stud-
ies emphasize the galère experienced by these youths19 -i.e., the daily
presence of violence, of difficult family relations, of clashes with the
symbols of the State, embodied in policemen or teachers, perceived as
“racists”.20 Indeed, a dominant theme in these studies is precisely how
discrimination and racism persist in many patent or subtle forms and
are still largely responsible for unemployment and educational diffi-
culties.21
Still, although the marginalization and the exclusion experi-
enced in these areas are unquestionable, establishing a cause-effect re-
lationship between the segregation of immigrants and their descend-
ants and jihadist radicalization seems reductive and problematic, in
light of the complexity of contemporary jihadism and of its evolu-
tions. More generally, the numerous studies that have explored the
possible links between socio-economic deprivation and various mani-
18 C. Avenel, Sociologie des quartiers sensibles (Paris: Armand Colin, 2010);
R. Epstein, La rénovation urbaine. Démolition-reconstruction de l'état (Paris: Presses
de Sciences Po, 2013); G. Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société, politique et
religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
19 F. Dubet, La galère. Jeunes en survie (Paris: Fayard, 1987).
20 F. Khosrokhavar, L'islam des jeunes (Paris: Flammarion, 1997); M. Shirali,
Entre islam et démocratie. Parcours de jeunes français d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Armand
Colin, 2007); L. Mucchielli, “Autumn 2005: a Review of the Most Important Riot in
the History of French Contemporary Society”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 35, 5 (2009), pp. 731-751.
21 R. Silberman, R. Alba, I. Fournier, “Segmented Assimilation in France?
Discrimination in the Labor Market against the Second Generation”, Ethnic and Ra-
cial Studies, 30, 1 (2007), pp. 1-27; D. Meurs, B. Lhommeau, M. Okba, Emplois,
salaires et mobilité intergénérationnelle, INED Documents de travail, n. 182, 2012; J.
Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France. Discourse, Public Identity and the Politics
of Citizenship (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014); D. Meurs, “The role of
discrimination in immigrant unemployment”, in INED-Population & Societies, n. 546,
July/August 2017.
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festations of terrorism –including the jihadist one-refute the existence
of a clear-cut, linear relationship between poverty and political viol-
ence. Actually, it has often been found that large sectors of the jihadist
population are composed by educated and highly-educated individuals
and that similar forms of Islamist extremism have significant probabil-
ities to be withheld by the well-educated, both in Western and non-
Western countries.22 The fact that Muslims in USA and Canada enjoy
a far better socio-economic condition that in European countries did
not make USA and Canada immune to the surge in home-grown ji-
hadism militancy on their territories. It is true that, at least in the case
of France, many of the youths who have embraced jihadism and have
either attempted to carry out an attack on the French soil or have
joined jihadist groups like ISIS or the Al-Nusra front were economic
under-performers. In numerous cases, they fit into the stereotype of
the banlieusard, with a turbulent life, “sans père ni repère” (“without
father nor reference points”), of the young person who is off the rails,
without a life project, who has accumulated failures, who feels he or
she is the object of stigma and disdain as an “Arab” or a “Muslim”,
who has been the victim and/or the perpetrator of violence, who has
been a gang member and was involved in petty crime, psychologically
fragile and angry at an “unjust” society.23
Nonetheless, at the same time, a consistent fraction of
homegrown French jihadists is made up of middle-class individuals or
converts. These simple observations can suffice to undermine the lin-
earity of the argument that posits a nexus between poverty and jihadist
radicalization, even for the French case. Therefore, the social-eco-
nomic disadvantage affecting the banlieues, alone, cannot account for
the motives behind the “success” of the jihadist militancy and narrat-
ive. If this were the case, then all of the millions of French (and
22 For a brief analysis of these analyses, see L. Vidino, F. Marone, E. Enten-
mann, Fear Thy Neighbor. Jihadist Attacks in the West (Milano: Ledizioni Ledipub-
lishing, 2017).
23 F. Khosrokhavar, Radicalisation (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences
de l'homme, 2014); F. Khosrokhavar, “Les trajectoires jihadistes des jeunes français”,
Études, n. 6 (2015), pp. 33-44; D. Thomson, Les Français jihadistes (Paris: Les
Arènes, 2014).
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European) Muslims, who suffer form the same profound marginalization,24
would espouse jihadism, while only a statistically insignificant minor-
ity of them does. This question remains unanswered by the approaches
that connect radicalization and political violence with poverty. It
seems misleading, then, to concentrate only on social-economic
deprivation as the one driver of radicalization. At best, it might be one
among a series of factors, working in conjunction with them, and that
banlieues might act as catalysts or accelerators within the intricate dy-
namics of radicalization processes-as we shall see later. Incidentally,
the policy implication of this remark is that even an ambitious social
policy agenda, aimed at improving the conditions of degraded and se-
gregated neighbourhoods-albeit necessary and desirable-would not be
sufficient as the only action for preventing radicalization, as other is-
sues seem to be at stake.
3. Muslims and banlieues as Otherness
Why, then, did the French public debate in the aftermath of ji-
hadist attacks concentrate on banlieues? Because banlieues have be-
come the symbol of a perceived inherent “Alterity” condensing all
possible “dangers” and “threats”: poverty, delinquency, migration and,
above all, Islam. The concentration of immigrant workers in industrial
peripheral neighbourhoods and especially the progressive impoverishment
experienced by these areas, together with the emergence of large-scale
violence and deviance phenomena, have forged the image of “Other-
ness”, already historically associated with the banlieue, considered the
threatening “dark side” of modern “civilised” cities, since their ori-
gin.25 At the same time, as the degradation of these neighbourhoods
grew, the emergence of the first conflicts connected with the building
of mosques and of the so-called affaires du foulard made the presence
24 R. Alba, N. Foner, Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of
Integration in North America and Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University
Press: Princeton, 2015).
25 Although there exists some positive development, specifically concerning
schooling-see L. Arslan, Enfants d'Islam et de Marianne. Des banlieues à l’Université
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010) -and housing careers-see J.-L. Pan Ké
Shon, “Residential Segregation of Immigrants in France: an Overview”, INED, Popu-
lation and Societies, n. 477 (April 2011). Tellingly, the public discourse systematically
overlooks such developments, thus reinforcing the myth of an irremediable “illness”
of banlieues.
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and rootedness of Islam in these areas gradually more visible and
evident. As various scholars have pointed out, this is when the public
discourse started adopting an explanation of the problems of the ban-
lieues based on the cultural and religious variables.26 The concept of
banlieue has come to be equated with that of Islam, which, in turn, has
morphed into a category of collective representation with a strongly
negative connotation,27 assigning an a priori derogatory identity to
Muslims, who are considered radically “different”, problematic and
“non-integrable”. According to this narrative, Islam is to be blamed
for their alleged refusal to integrate and for their presumed desire to
live “parallel lives”, separate from and in opposition to the rest of so-
ciety, in territories-the banlieues-which are “lost” to the République.28
This leads us to consider the other point made by McCants and
Meserole in their argument concerning the treatment of Muslim
minorities in the framework of what they call “the French political
culture”. Indeed, European countries in general, and France in particu-
lar, have developed a terribly fraught relationship with Islam and
Muslim migrants over the past decades. According to Foner and Alba,
this is due to two main reasons:
Muslim immigrants confront, on the one hand, majority populations
that are mainly secular and therefore suspicious of claims based on
religion and its requirements and, on the other, societal institutions
and national identities that remain anchored to an important extent in
Christianity and do not make equal room for Islam.29
This distrustful attitude towards the practice of Islam is exem-
plified by the controversies that have emerged and recurrently emerge
across Europe over the “visibility” of Islamic symbols and over reli-
26 G. Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société, politique et religion à
Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
27 C. Avenel, Sociologie des quartiers sensibles (Paris: Armand Colin, 2010);
R. Epstein, La rénovation urbaine. Démolition-reconstruction de l'état (Paris: Presses
de Sciences Po, 2013).
28 E. Préteceille, “La ségrégation ethno-raciale a-t-elle augmenté dans la
metropole parisienne?”, Revue française de sociologie, 50, 3 (2009), pp. 489-519.
29 N. Foner, R. Alba, “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe:
Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?”, International Migration Review, 42, 2 (2008), pp.
360-392.
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gion-based demands: conflicts over mosques have taken place in al-
most every European immigration country –Italy, Germany, the UK;30
the first harsh disputes on headscarves date back to the late '80s with
the polemics generated by the affaire du foulard in France, then
reached a peak when France introduced a ban on the wearing of hijab
in its public schools in 2004, were revived by the ban on full veils ad-
opted by both France and Belgium between 2010 and 2011 and finally
erupted again in 2016 when some French municipalities prohibited
wearing the burkini in public. While conflicts over mosques have to
do with an acceptance of the visibility of the increasing diversification
of the cultural and religious landscape of Western societies (e.g. the
2009 referendum held in Switzerland against “minarets”), headscarf-
related controversies alternatively assume different tones: they either
portray the veil as a sign of women's oppression in a backward reli-
gious community (the Muslim one), or depict it as a bold defiance of
the purported principle of neutrality of the State towards religions (es-
pecially in France). Either way, at the core of these disputes is the al-
leged threat that Muslims, with their “outrageous” demands, would
represent for Western democratic values, heralded as morally super-
ior.31 This negative depiction of Muslims could not but be reinforced
following the 9/11 attacks, the killing of Theo Van Gogh, the
Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in Denmark and
elsewhere.
These events contributed to the “success” of the Huntingtonian
thesis regarding the existence of a “clash of civilizations” between Is-
lam and the West, which gained currency in most public debates at the
global level.
While these portrayals of Islam as a “public enemy” are com-
mon to Western societies, there is indeed something specific to
France, where the crystallisation of the public discourse on the
compatibility of Islam with claimed Republican “values” and laïcité
has led to a representation of the integration of Muslim immigrants as
30 S. Allievi (ed.), Mosques in Europe: Why a solution has become a prob-
lem- NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, 2010.
31 J. Bowen, “How the French State Justifies Controlling Muslim Bodies:
From Harm-based to Values-based Reasoning”, Social Research, 78, 2 (2008), pp. 1-
24.
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“failed”.32 Indeed, France is characterized by a marked secularism. At
the institutional level, this is the result of a century-old history of
bitter confrontation between the French State and religious powers,
through which the political power sought independence from and
control over religious authorities. At the societal level, France was
arguably more affected than other countries by the secularist
tendencies that transformed Western societies in the second half of the
20th century. From the institutional point of view, this secularist
approach, on which State-church relations are based, translated into a
principle of absolute neutrality towards manifestations of religion in
the public sphere. Moreover, France's political tradition has
historically been wary of the development of communitarian
allegiances and identities, which postulates that there should be no
intermediaries between the République and the citizen, who is
depicted in universalistic terms, deprived of any cultural or religious
affiliation or belonging. Thus, the citizen's religion has no room or
legitimation within the political arena: it is to be strictly confined to
his or her private sphere and should not form the basis for
communitarian claims, which are perceived as particularistic, contrary
to the universality and equality of rights. As Roy puts it, laïcité, from
being a simple juridical principle of neutrality and equality, has been
gradually transformed into a “principle of exclusion of religion from
the public sphere”, becoming “nothing but the most ideological and
explicit form of secularization”.33 From the societal point of view, this
tendency took the form of a fierce aversion to any manifestation of
religion, perceived as regressive and obscurantist —particularly Islam,
which has come to be automatically associated with pre-modern
attitudes and practices.
In light of this, J. Césari concludes that Islam has not been gran-
ted “symbolic integration” into French society.34 By symbolic integra-
tion, we may refer to the definition of integration as the process of be-
32 J. Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France. Discourse, Public Identity
and the Politics of Citizenship (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014).
33 O. Roy, Le djihad et la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016), p. 115 –our translation.
34 J. Césari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal
Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
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coming an accepted part of society, provided by Penninx.35 For Césari,
the lack of symbolic integration “means that Islam as a religion has
been outcast from the main public secular cultures of Europe, as well
as securitized”36 with a public discourse growing more and more
hostile towards Islam, and more and more reluctant to include Islam
within the national narrative. This, in turn, leads many young Muslims
to feel deep sentiments of humiliation and frustration in relation to
their origins, religion and identity.
4. Banlieues, re-Islamisation and Salafism
Of course, such a cultural struggle against Islam generates sig-
nificant consequences. As demonstrated by numerous studies, the dis-
crimination and the exclusion faced by many French youths with a mi-
grant background ultimately translates into a strong sense of injustice:
they feel they are as perpetually condemned to positions of inferior-
ity.37 This causes a reaction of refusal of the French mainstream soci-
ety, which often results in a turn to Islam as a source of identity, as a
way to “reverse the stigma” and to claim dignity. Indeed, children of
Muslim immigrants show an increased religious consciousness –a
tendency that has been termed “re-Islamization”.38 It is precisely this
“othering” process that pushes young second-generation Muslims to
interrogate themselves about their belonging, their religion and their
35 Rinus Penninx European Cities and their Migrant Integration Policies. A
State-of-the-Art study for the Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING) Project,
King Project Overview Paper n.5/July 2014.
36 J. Césari, The Lack of Symbolic Integration of Islam in Europe, as Illus-
trated by the Charlie Hebdo Attacks, Reviews & Critical Commentary–Council of
European Studies, 2015, http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/the-lack-of-
symbolic-integration-of-islam-in-europe-as-illustrated-by-the-charlie-hebdo-attacks-2/
(last accessed: 9 January 2018).
37 L. Mucchielli, Autumn 2005: a Review of the Most Important Riot in the
History of French Contemporary Society, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
35, 5, (2009), pp. 731-751; L. Arslan, Enfants d'Islam et de Marianne. Des banlieues
à l'Université (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010); Y. Brinbaum, M. Safi,
P. Simon, Les discriminations en France: entre perception et expérience, INED
Documents de travail, n. 183, 2012; G. Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société,
politique et religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
38 N. Foner, R. Alba, “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe:
Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?”, International Migration Review, 42, 2 (2008), pp.
360-392; G. Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société, politique et religion à Clichy-
sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
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religiosity. For many, such a questioning results in a re-evaluation of
their religious affiliation or in a discovery of religion, followed by a
firm adhesion to its tenets. This gained particular visibility precisely in
the banlieues of major French cities, simply by virtue of the mere
presence and concentration of immigrants and their descendants in
these areas. However, the “banlieue effect” has remarkable symbolic
consequences, because the isolation and the socio-spatial segregation
of the banlieues causes stigmatization and racism to be perceived as
collective experiences, which are interpreted in light of a conflictual
dynamic between a “periphery”, and a “centre” (represented by the
French cultural and political elites). The “centre”, by considering im-
migrants' religion incompatible and irreducibly “other” (in the terms
described above), is seen as denying these young people the
opportunity to grow a positive identity –hence, the turn to Islam,
which can even culminate in the development of an oppositional iden-
tity. Naturally, this “opposition” is not intrinsic to the practice of
Islam per se, but is constructed as a reaction to a constructed negative
image of Islam and banlieues. Over and beyond material social
conditions, what seems to be essential is precisely this tense
relationship with mainstream French society.
Thus, this cultural struggle or symbolic battle has started being
fought also on the “Muslim side”, and this has gradually become more
evident with the diffusion of Salafism. Re-Islamisation is a multifa-
ceted phenomenon and has assumed many different forms39 –one of
them is Salafism. As documented by several scholars,40 this puritan
and intransigent form of Islam has been slowly on the rise during the
past ten-fifteen years in Europe and especially in France. Although it
is practiced by a very tiny fraction of French Muslims, it spread across
the country and gained more and more visibility, in particular in its
39 O. Roy, L'Islam mondialisé (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004); N. Foner, R.
Alba, “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to In-
clusion?”, International Migration Review, 42, 2, (2008), pp. 360-392.
40 G. Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société, politique et religion à
Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012); G. Kepel (with the collab-
oration of A. Jardin), Terreur dans l'Hexagone. Genèse du djihad français (Paris: Gal-
limard, 2015); M. Ali Adraoui, Du golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013).
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most impoverished and deprived areas.41 Salafism represents a strong
form of cultural and identity rupture in contemporary Western societ-
ies, as the adhesion to its tenets implies a refusal of modern Western
society as “unholy”, “impure” and “depraved” –terms borrowed from
the religious language that Salafists employ to describe their conflic-
tual relationship with society. Salafism can be characterized as an ant-
agonist “counter-culture”, founded on uncompromising, ultra Ortho-
dox and ultra-conservative religious norms, which disavow main-
stream Western societies' values and codes of behaviour.42
As such, it constitutes an extreme and “radical” choice: even if
it concerns only a very small proportion of French Muslims, it repres-
ents a powerful source of identitarian cleavages. For a part of disen-
franchised youths, who feel refused by a hostile society, this repres-
ents a way to reverse the stigma.43 By professing the separation of
every single aspect of everyday life between what is “pure” and “im-
pure”, seeking to avoid any kind of contact with all non-Muslims, the
“Salafist thinking” promotes a binary vision of the world, as if it was
divided between “the good” and “the bad”. To the perceived discrim-
ination and humiliation, a fraction of Muslims have slowly started re-
41 G. Kepel, Quatre-ving-treize (Paris: Gallimard, 2012); G. Kepel (with the
collaboration of Antoine Jardin), Terreur dans l'Hexagone. Genèse du djihad français
(Paris: Gallimard, 2015).
42 M. Ali Adraoui, Du golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2013).
43 Another major driver of the success of Salafism is the process that Olivier
Roy defines as the “deculturation of religion”, i.e. the disconnection between culture
and the Islam in contexts of emigration (2004; 2008). Among many second-
generation Muslims, such a disconnection fosters a quest for a “purified” Islam,
deprived of any cultural reference: this entails “going back to the sources” to learn
what the “real”, “pure” Islam is through a literal reading of the Scriptures. In this
framework, Salafism gains followers precisely because it claims to adhere to the pure
“Islam of the origins” practiced by the “companions of the Prophet” (according to the
etymology of the name of the movement) and to be grounded in an absolutely literal
reading of the Quran and of the hadiths: thus, Salafists can easily depict themselves as
the “custodians” of the correct religious norm. It is out of the scope of the present
Chapter to illustrate the complex dynamics of “deculturation” and their consequences,
but understanding them is key to the to the comprehension of today's jihadism. See O.
Roy, L'Islam mondialisé (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004) and O. Roy, La sainte
ignorance (Paris: Seuil, 2008) for a detailed account, or G. Mezzetti, Contemporary
jihadism; a generational phenomenon, ISMU Working Papers-July, 2017 for a more
succinct explanation.
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sponding by adopting the Salafist oppositional habitus, purporting a
vision of society according to which “the West” is “bad” and incom-
patible with Muslim (Salafist) values and behaviours –indeed, such a
Manichean vision ends up being just as paranoiac as the one that con-
siders Muslims as “unintegrable”.
5. Is there continuity between Salafism and jihadism? The Roy-
Kepel controversy
In light of this, the aftermath of the jihadist attacks experienced
by France has been dominated by heated debates which focused on the
possible role of the practice of Islamic religion in radicalisation –this
was no coincidence, given the above-described French context of
“fear” and rejection of religion. Attention was particularly drawn to
the potential responsibility of Salafism, based on the assumption that
Salafism and jihadism share commonalities and that the “separatist”
attitude endorsed by Salafists may be conducive to jihadist violence.
In particular, the public debate has polarized around the two opposite
positions of O. Roy and G. Kepel. As we will attempt to demonstrate
by adopting an ecological perspective, neither Roy or Kepel is “right”
or “wrong”: each of the two sheds light on an important part of the
story, and their points of view can actually appear complementary.
On one hand, based of his study of banlieues, Salafism and Is-
lamic actors and movements in France, Kepel argues that the analysis
of jihadism should be centred on the drivers of the success of
Salafism, studying how Salafism is engaging in a strife to impose its
hegemony over the Muslim community, suggesting a continuity
between Salafism and Jihadism,44 also because the two movements
share a common orthopraxy.45 On the other hand, Roy maintains that
we are not confronted with a “radicalization of Islam”: rather, an op-
posite dynamic is at work, i.e. that of an “Islamicisation of radicalism”
44 G. Kepel (with the collaboration of A. Jardin), Terreur dans l'Hexagone.
Genèse du djihad français (Paris: Gallimard, 2015); G. Kepel, B. Rougier, Addressing
Terrorism. European Research in Social Sciences and the Humanities in support to
Plicies for Inclusion and Security. A Policy Review, European Commission–Director-
ate General for Research and Innovation, 2016.
45 See O. Roy, Le djihad et la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016) for a critique of the
common argument that Salafists' orthopraxy is similar to the jihadist one.
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through jihadism.46 Roy-who is anyhow not completely dismissive of
the role of Salafism-challenges Kepel's depiction of Salafism as a dir-
ect “conveyor belt” of jihadism based on research evidence. Taking a
closer look at the knowledge of religion and the degree of religiosity
of those implicated in today's jihadism, it appears that most of them
were not religious at all, prior to their “radicalization”.47 In other
words, before joining the “jihadist cause”, these persons did not show
any interest for Islam or actual knowledge of the Scriptures. Indeed,
they were not “pious”: their religiosity was recent and very fragile,
and it often seems to be the effect, or the result, of their adhesion to ji-
hadism, and not the cause. As some point out, a stable and consolid-
ated religious identity shields from violent radicalization.48 In ji-
hadists' first-person accounts, it appears that those who join a Salafi
community-a quietist one-immediately leave it, motivating this choice
with the fact that “they are too quiet, they do not speak about jihad”.49
In other accounts, the pre-eminent violence of these persons emerges
in their clarity. It appears that the sincere and genuine practice of reli-
gion –even when it takes the form of Salafism –does not seem to drive
to political violence or violent extremism.
Indeed, while it is true that Salafism rejects the rest of the soci-
ety living apart from it-Salafists do live in their closed-off Salafi com-
munities -it is important to bear in mind that distancing from society
does not automatically mean aiming at destabilizing or attacking soci-
ety. According to most observers, the overwhelming majority of
French Salafists are quietist and are not at all interested in politics,
claiming that no political or violent action should be taken against
“misbelievers”.50 Actually, there is a fundamental difference between
46 O. Roy, “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste”, Le
Monde, 24.11.2015; O. Roy, Le djihad et la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016).
47 O. Roy, Le djihad et la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016); F. Introini, G. Mezzetti,
“Storie di jihadismo. Il processo di radicalizzazione e la sua plausibilità”, in
Fondazione ISMU-XXII Rapporto sulle Migrazioni 2016 (Milano: FrancoAngeli,
2017), pp. 293-318.
48 F. Khosrokhavar, Radicalisation (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences
de l'homme, 2014).
49 D. Thomson, Les Français jihadistes (Paris: Les Arènes, 2014).
50 There exist other streams within Salafism, especially in Egypt, which ad-
vocate for political militancy and justify the creation of political parties but they rep-
resent a minority within Salafist communities residing in Western countries. See M.
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Salafists and jihadists: the first escape from a society, which they per-
ceive as hostile and distrustful, seeking refuge in an exacerbated prac-
tice of religion; the second express their refusal of society through the
practice of violence under the label of “jihadism”.
We are thus confronted with the spread of Salafism, on the one
hand, and the spread of jihadism, on the other. As we have just seen,
one should not look at Salafists' sincere religiosity as the driver of vi-
olent radicalization. How could jihadism be explained, then? In an
ecological perspective, we suggest that the forms of identity rupture
caused both by the spread of Salafism on the one hand and the treat-
ment of the Muslim minority on the other constitute “fertile ground”
for the diffusion of jihadism, which could grow precisely grafting onto
the fragmentation along identitarian cleavages that is underway within
European societies. Kepel has been severely criticized because, by
putting religion at the centre of his analysis, his approach appears cul-
turalist, as if jihadism was intrinsic to Islam and represent the quint-
essence of the practice of Islam.51 It is true that Kepel's account
presents this serious risk, which should not be underestimated: his
view should be “handled with care”. However, his analysis undeniably
draws attention to the existence of growing identitarian cleavages
within French society, of which Salafism is an evident manifestation.
While his limit is to focus primarily on Salafism, without paying the
due attention to the “other side” of the present cultural struggle
(French mainstream societies and elites), at the same time his em-
phasis on the success of Salafism is helpful in tracing the contexts in
which jihadism developed. Thus, to many youths, jihadism appears as
the only “ideology”, or “movement”, that makes sense and appears
plausible within today's “ideological offer”, because of the enabling
environment it is surrounded by. In ecological perspective, jihadism
could grow and gain success thanks to the aggravation of identitarian
cleavages represented on the one hand by Salafism, on the other hand
Ali Adraoui, Du golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 2013).
51 V. Geisser, “Éduquer à la laïcité, rééduquer au ‘bon islam’? Limites et
dangers des réponses culturalistes et misérabilisties au terrorisme”, Migrations So-
ciété, XXVII, 157 (Janvier-Février 2015), pp. 3-14; O. Roy, “Le djihadisme est une
révolte générationnelle et nihiliste”, Le Monde, 24.11.2015; O. Roy, Le djihad et la
mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016).
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by the growing hostility towards Muslims shown by majority societ-
ies.52
Therefore, as Roy emphasizes,53 while the quest for the practice
of violence seems to be the main “detonator” for the adhesion to
jihadism, an ecological perspective helps us understand that such a
quest for violence could not take this “jihadist form” without the pres-
ence and the diffusion of Salafism in the first place, highlighted by
Kepel.54 Indeed, Salafism “bears its responsibility”: jihadists choose a
fanatic, violent and extremist form of Islam as it currently represents
the only available and plausible form of antagonism. This form of Is-
lam embodies the most radical, efficacious and “frightening” expres-
sion of Alterity that “the market” can currently offer-but the “market”
is shaped also by the presence, in ecological terms, of actors express-
ing similar forms of antagonism, i.e. Salafist communities. In other
words, the mere presence of Salafist habits and practices in the sur-
rounding “environment” contributes to increase the gradient of reality
of the jihadist worldview. Without suggesting that there is a direct
continuity between quietist Salafism and jihadism (indeed, there is not
such a continuity), it may be said that, for a young person who already
has a “need to be radical” and seeks a channel for venting this need,
joining jihadism can seem more plausible and “natural” than joining
other expressions of political violence, precisely because the choice of
embracing jihadism occurs in a context characterised by the spread of
identity fractures similar to jihadism, such as those embodied by
Salafism. With its rejection of and isolation from mainstream society
and the Manichean worldview it offers, Salafism contributed to con-
52 French troubled colonial past and legacy also play a significant role in the
process of “Othering” and inferiorization of North-African migrants and their des-
cendants –ultimately contributing to today's radicalization processes. This is why,
among both French jihadists and French Salafists, there are high proportions of per-
sons with an Algerian migratory background. For second-generation Algerians, the
process of “deculturation” reached its peak due to the lack of homogenous national
culture in the country of origin; moreover, the wounds inflicted by colonial rule and
the tormented colonial past that binds France and Algeria caused serious identitarian
conflicts on Algerian migrants and their descendants. See G. Kepel, Quatre-ving-
treize (Paris: Gallimard, 2012); O. Roy, Le djihad et la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016).
53 O. Roy, Le djihad et la mort (Paris: Seuil, 2016).
54 G. Kepel (with the collaboration of A. Jardin), Terreur dans l'Hexagone.
Genèse du djihad français (Paris: Gallimard, 2015).
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vey the plausibility of the jihadist option-even if jihadists are not inter-
ested in Salafists' rigorous and strict religious practice. To conclude,
both perspectives-Kepel's and Roy's-are necessary to understand cur-
rent radicalization phenomena: they are actually complementary.
6. An ecological perspective to understand jihadist radicalization
As we have just seen, an ecological perspective enables the re-
conciliation of two apparent opposed conceptualizations of jihadism.
But what do we exactly mean by “ecological perspective”? These con-
clusive reflections seek to illustrate what constitutes an ecological ap-
proach and why it can be fruitful to apply such an approach to the
study of jihadism, by appraising the teachings of the “French case”.
The present analysis of the dynamics of jihadist radicalization
in France shows how this phenomenon is strictly tied to some very
specific elements rooted in the history and the socio-political structure
of this country and its culture. However, it is important to bear in
mind that contemporary jihadism has proved to be also a global phe-
nomenon: home-grown terrorists and foreign fighters represent a
threat with a genuine global reach concerning the West in general, and
not just Europe.55 At the same time, underlining the global dimension
of radicalization and jihadism without paying due attention to national
and local factors could lead to other kinds of reductionisms and inter-
pretative mistakes. Global jihadism, just as globalization tout-court,
should not be understood as an autonomous domain, imposing itself,
as a huge macro and homogeneous force pushing local and national
contexts in the same direction and producing the same effects every-
where. Moreover, emphasizing the “globality” of jihadism very often
means attributing a pivotal role to the media, and to the internet in par-
ticular, which, in turn, can lead to other kinds of misinterpretations of
the whole phenomenon and of the functioning of the media sphere it-
self. Of course the media do play a fundamental part in radicalization
processes; nevertheless, if we focus solely on their role, we might run
the very dangerous risk of transforming them into a causal force,
55 Looking beyond Europe, the recent wave of jihadist attacks has concerned
the USA (with the Boston marathon bombing in 2013, the San Bernardino and the
Pulse mass shooting in 2015 and 2016 respectively, the attack in New York city in
2017) and Australia (with the hostage crisis in Sydney in 2014).
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whose effect is a deterministic coercion upon subjects. This leads, in
turn, to a simplistic (but common) representation, which assigns
agency only to the media and depicts radicalized people as completely
passive brainwashed individuals.
This is also the reason why radicalization processes are often
conceptualized in psychological —if not psychiatric— terms, with
medicalizing effects, which become clearly visible in the way in
which de-radicalization is sometimes conceived and practiced. This
way of addressing contemporary jihadism is, after all, particularly
congruent with the cultural grounds of contemporary Western culture
and its “devotion” to secularization56 -another consequence of mod-
ernization and globalization-which overlooks the role of religion and
prevents us from attributing to religion any status of effectiveness in
social processes. Therefore, according to this dominant view, when re-
ligion “seems” to matter, it is just because, in a top-down perspective,
other forces and actors exploit it for other purposes -namely, political
purposes-so that those who claim to act in the name of religion cannot
be but “manipulated”.
Nevertheless, if there is a convergence point between the two
giants of the contemporary debate on jihadism, Roy and Kepel, it is
just the fact that both share the methodological assumption of “trust-
ing the believer”. In other words, there can be authentic commitment
—hence agency too— in people who decide to adhere to a radical per-
spective. Thus, conceptualized in a Bergerian way,57 jihadism may
have its plausibility, even in the acceptance of its extreme con-
sequences. But plausibility and its strength is function of the way in
which the social world and its structures are able to support the ideas
we believe in. Otherwise stated, an idea, be it political, religious or
philosophical, has to find around itself a social world which is congru-
ent with it and that can make this very idea reasonable and spendable
inside it. However, according to the perspective that we adopt, this
congruence is not a question of mere correspondence between ideas,
on one side, and the structures of the world, on the other. It is, more
56 On secularization and its consequences on the sociological understanding
of radicalization and jihadism, see F. Introini, Religione e radicalizzazione. Un nesso
che sfida l'occidente, ISMU Working Papers-April 2017.
57 P. L. Berger, L'Imperativo eretico: possibilità contemporanee di affer-
mazione religiosa (Torino: Edizioni Elledici, 1987).
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precisely, the result or the consequence of a process of construction
according to which ideas make their way in the world by constructing
the world able to host them or make room for them.
To put it more concretely: what does it take for an idea to be-
come grounded in a world? It takes a heterogeneous network of actors
and elements which mobilize around this very idea, and progressively
establish a strong and stable alliance between them. The wider and
more heterogeneous is the network, the tightest are the ties among its
elements, the more it becomes “real”, concrete, consolidated. This
perspective entails, in other words, a gradual ontology according to
which reality is a trajectory out of “virtuality” or “potentiality”, so that
it becomes fully real only at the end of a non-linear process of
associations among different elements whose relationships have
become, step-by-step, stable and black-boxed.
This perspective is an ecological interpretation of Latour's
Actor-Network Theory.58 Through such an “ecological perspective”,
we highlight two main points: 1) anything, be it an object, a scientific
law, an institution, is the result of and is built through a network pro-
cess such as the one briefly described above; 2) inside such networks,
there is a strong and inextricable relation between ideal elements, ma-
terial elements and human subjects. This means adopting a perspective
in which agency is re-distributed among different actors and in which
it is impossible to draw a clear-cut line separating ideas, materialities
and human agency. The strength of an ideology and its capability “to
win hearts and minds” is not the result of a pure, cognitive process;
rather, it is the consequence of the width and the intensity of its circu-
lation, enabled by the human and material network supporting and
making possible this same circulation.
It is important to notice that the materiality of the network,
which enables this circulation, is not just instrumental to the diffusion
of immaterial ideas: actually, it represents the same reason why ideas
become more attractive, because they can appear as a part of a con-
crete whole, a “real world” making a life inspired by and consistent
with them concretely possible and meaningful. At the same time,
every new alliance gained by this network enhances its power because
58 B. Latour, Reassembling the social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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adds to its “gradient of reality”.59 Ideas build the networks, giving
them plausibility; this very plausibility, in turn, gives ideas more
power to expand the networks of their circulation.
Applying this perspective to our object of study means ob-
serving that, the more jihadism expands its “structures”, the “thicker”
its reality and the stronger its capability to enroll new allies; these alli-
ances, increase its “gradient of reality” and so on, in a sort of autocata-
lytic process. Pantucci60 claims that radicalization is the emerging
outcome of three factors: ideology, networking e grievances. Rabasa
and Benard61 underline that mosques are not pivotal just as “ideolo-
gical” loudspeakers, but as hubs of relation and networking.
Vidino, Marone and Entenmann62 highlight the importance of
what they call “hubs of radicalization”. The way in which Horgan and
Altier63 and other research groups inspired by their perspective64 con-
ceive the difference between “de-radicalization” and “disengagement”
teaches us that it is not so easy to understand if people get involved in
radicalized groups because they share their radical ideas or, on the
contrary, if they share these ideas because they want to join them in
the first place.65 These interpretations share a common understanding
of radicalization processes; what we want to emphasize, by means of
Actor-Network theory, is that ideas and networks are not separable or,
in other words, that the network is not merely instrumental to the cir-
59 B. Latour, Science in action. How to follow scientists and engineers
through society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
60 R. Pantucci, We Love Death as You Love Life. Britain's Suburban Terror-
ists (London: Hurst&Company, 2015).
61 A. Rabasa, Ch. Benard, Eurojihad. Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and
Terrorism in Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
62 L. Vidino, F. Marone, E. Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbor. Jihadist Attacks
in the West (Milano: Ledizioni Ledipublishing, 2017).
63 J. Horgan, M.-B. Altier, “The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Pro-
grams”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 13, 2 (2012), pp. 83-90.
64 RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network), Preventing Radicalization to
Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Approaches and Practices, European Commission
–Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2016; ISD (Institute for Stra-
tegic Dialogue), De-radicalisation, PPN Working paper, 2010.
65 Y. Dandurand (2014), “Social Inclusion Programmes for Youth and the
Prevention of Violent Extremism”, M. Lombardi, E. Ragab, V. Chin, Y. Dandurand,
V. de Divitiis, A. Burato, Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism Among
Youth to Prevent Terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, Amsterdam, 2014).
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culation of ideas, but is fundamental in building their plausibility. To
use a metaphor, cars and trains would not exist without railway sys-
tems and roads.
What are the advantages we can gain applying a perspective in-
spired by Actor-Network Theory to the analysis of jihadism and radic-
alization? First of all, as Latour66 clarifies, Actor-Network Theory'
major power is its anti-essentialist way of reasoning. In this view,
anti-essentialism means an approach that does not assume any
aprioristic category or theoretical construct to produce its analyses –
such as “banlieue”, “Salafism” or “Islam” in our case. According to
Latour, sociology should disregard all of the concepts it has been
adopting in its history as explanans (starting from the very concept of
“society”). According to Latour, the explanans must be considered as
the explanandum. This means also that the researcher cannot assume
in advance any kind of distinction between what is a cause and what is
an effect and about the way different elements are linked between
each other. This is why he suggests substituting the word “sociology”
with the word “socio-logics”.67 Hence the researcher has to follow the
ways-the (socio)-logics-in which actors compose the world they live
in or, in a more anthropological fashion, their “Cosmograms”, without
starting from the conviction that there exists just one, true, master lo-
gic against a multitude of deceptive ones. In a constructivist perspect-
ive, as Actor-Network Theory is, there is not a “rear world”,68 i.e. an
objective structure authorizing and legitimizing this distinction. We
just have to follow the connections and to be open to every possible-
and frequently astonishing-results. With reference to our object of
study, we cannot start by assuming that we are in front of either a reli-
gious or a political phenomenon: in such a view, politics and religion
would be essences or explanans aprioristically assumed. This also
means discarding every other “essence” frequently referred to in the
debate about radicalization and jihadism, such as “ummah”, as if it
was an essence with a direct causal power able to “radicalize” people.
66 B. Latour, “On recalling ANT”, J. Law, J. Hassard (eds.), Actor-Network-
Theory and After (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 15-25.
67 B. Latour, Science in action. How to follow scientists and engineers
through society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
68 B. Latour, Reassembling the social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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On the contrary, our approach requires to ask which actors, in which
ways, on which targets, by which means-both material and immater-
ial-produce as a result the widespread (mis)conception that “ummah”
plays a pivotal role in the processes of radicalization.
This is also true for other constructs, a fortiori those that have
become “naturalized”, such as banlieue. The banlieue69 is not a ho-
mogeneous context, expressing, in a “durkheimian” fashion, a mono-
causal force. According to an ecological perspective, the banlieue as a
global whole must be deconstructed into the discourses, the actors, the
material dimensions, the social representations which have led us to
perceive it in this fashion, i.e. as a heterotopia. As we tried to explain,
the image of the banlieues and of Islam as the “Other” is the result of
a discursive construction –peculiar to the French context. Thus, far
from being a monodimensional “force”, it is a network of heterogen-
eous elements and players, whose agency is contextual. In our per-
spective the banlieue has to be conceived of as a peculiar ecology,
which favours the construction of a world in which jihadist radicaliza-
tion become plausible, because the banlieue condenses in a relatively
confined material and figurative space a series of elements and players
that can build a particular “structure of plausibility” of jihadism. So, just
as banlieues' socio-economic disadvantage, alone, cannot account for the
complexity of radicalization dynamics, Salafism, alone, per se, does
not absolutely work as a mechanic, deterministic precursor or a direct
“conveyor belt” of jihadism. Concerning Salafism in particular, the
French case demonstrates that it is a contextual factor, which contrib-
utes to shape the plausibility of jihadism only in very specific, segreg-
ated and stigmatized contexts. Thus, the material living conditions of
the banlieues, their spatial and social segregation, and most of all,
their representation as a “threatening heterotopia” all function as cata-
lysts, transforming banlieues into possible accelerators of the process
of radicalization, where the spread of Salafism contributes to forge the
“plausibility” of the appeal of jihadism in that it represents an identit-
arian rupture that shapes a favourable “environment” for jihadism.
69 F. Introini, G. Mezzetti, “Storie di jihadismo. Il processo di radicalizza-
zione e la sua plausibilità”, Fondazione ISMU-XXII Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2016
(Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2017), pp. 293-318.
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An ecological perspective also means adopting a gaze that looks
beyond “micro” and “macro”, “local” and “global”: according to this
standpoint, things and phenomena become global or local, as a con-
sequence of the network of alliances they establish.70 Hence, with ref-
erence to jihadism, we can trace both global and local factors. As we
stated above, global spheres and phenomena are not “a given”: rather,
they are constructed by different actors who are always concretely
located somewhere. To quote Latour, every network, albeit “global”,
is local in each of its points.71 This means that in the study of jihadism
we have to pay a very careful attention to local or national factors
(even personal factors of course), without falling into the pitfalls of a
“methodological nationalism”. On the contrary, we should espouse the
sort of “methodological cosmopolitanism” suggested by Beck with his
transnational approach to contemporary society.72
Perhaps an ecological perspective may look like an approach
that takes into account too many things and too many factors, giving
the impression that “if anything matters”, then nothing really matters
in the end. We can surely agree that an ecological standpoint repres-
ents an invitation to multidimensional analyses, but, as we tried to cla-
rify in these conclusions, the authentic impact of such an approach is a
plea to change the questions that must be posed in the face of phenom-
ena like jihadist radicalization. If the question is “how much the ji-
hadist world is (or, better, has become) real for a wannabe jihadist?”
or, in other words, “to what extent has jihadism become plausible?”,
this means that the research task must be, first of all, that of following
and tracing the way(s) in which this world is “becoming real” and of
reconstructing the extent to which this reality can be produce concrete
effects and bring about changes. Adopting such research questions and
criteria changes the whole approach to the elements involved. Study-
ing radicalization does not mean observing a person's trajectory as a
kind of “journey into folly”. Of course, individual trajectories and psy-
chological factors are at stake, but we should also attentively consider
70 B. Latour, Reassembling the social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
71 B. Latour, Nous n'avons jamais été modernes: Essai d'anthropologie
symétrique (Paris: La Découverte, 1991).
72 U. Beck, N. Sznaider, “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences:
a research agenda”, The British Journal of Sociology, 61, 1 (2010), pp. 381-403.
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the way in which a world, around radicalized subjects, acquires its
reality and gains momentum. Thresholds and limits can be more easily
overcome when people do not think they are “the exception”, but fell
rather in tune with a whole system, that proves consistent with and
supportive of their choices and decisions.73
Thus, in an ecological perspective, and recalling McCants and
Meserole's thesis, we can conclude that the presence of Salafism, in a stig-
matized context like that of the banlieue, surrounded by the distrustful atti-
tude of French mainstream society, all contribute to make in the jihadist
“option” less and less “exotic” or “absurd”. In sum, these might be con-
sidered the most salient traits of the French situation that constitute an
enabling environment, susceptible of fostering jihadism.
73 This perspective generates important changes concerning how the role of
the media is approached. They maintain their pivotal role, but it is possible to explain
it in a very different way. They are not manipulators or “hidden persuaders” (at least
not only), but a fundamental actor in the construction of such a world. As a digital
network, they are part of those networks which, intertwining with each other, give
reality to it. Media have to be considered for their capability to give presence and
livability to the jihadist world and not as brainwashing machines.

Ius soli, between human rights and
terrorism prevention. The Italian case
Viviana Premazzi
1. Introduction
According to the survey “Gli italiani e le migrazioni: percezione
vs realtà Terza Rilevazione ISPI –RaiNews– IPSOS”,1 a small
minority of Italians (2%) consider immigration as a resource for the
country while 67% of respondents think that migration represents a
threat to Italian security, of what 38% believe that it may even in-
crease the risk of terrorist infiltration. Less than 30% of the same re-
spondents believe instead that immigration is an inevitable phe-
nomenon that does not directly threaten Italy and should only be at
best managed. This perception of immigration is certainly motivated
also by the increasing number of terrorist attacks in Europe, some per-
petrated by migrants of first or second generation claiming allegiance
to Islamic fundamentalist groups and by the significant arrivals of mi-
grants and refugees who have challenged the EU's internal cohesion.
But this perception is, above all, instigated by the media and their
alarmist and emergency tones “with four titles/news out of 10 with an
anxiety potential”, as shown by the fifth report on the representation
of migration, realized by the association Carta di Roma in 2017.2 They
have been instrumentally used by populist and nationalist movements
to raise public concerns. Governments' counter-terrorism and security
response in almost all countries risks to generate a decrease in civil
liberties and rights whilst already existing individual and group
grievances can be boosted by these strategies.
Moreover, the fact that governments protect the safe and secur-
ity of the whole population are responsible for violating rights of some
stigmatised communities risks to spread a narrative that makes the
message of violent extremist organisations even more attractive.3
1 ISPI-RaiNews-IPSOS, Gli italiani e le migrazioni: percezione vs realtà.
Terza Rilevazione (Milano: ISPI, 2015).
2 P. Barretta, G. Milazzo, Notizie da Paura, Quinto Rapporto Carta di Roma
2017, Osservatorio di Pavia, Carta di Roma, 2017.
3 G. I Vila Luca, Building a bridge: engaging civil society in preventing all
forms of violent extremism (08 Euromed Survey, IEMed, 2017), pp. 40ff.
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In particular, this approach to civil liberties and rights in some
countries has affected naturalisation and the right of migrants' children
to citizenship being reflected in proposals to withdraw or deny citizen-
ship to suspects of terrorism (and occasionally to their families). This
was particularly true for the reform of the citizenship law in Italy that
is still under discussion after a first approval in 2015 at the Chamber
of Deputies. In the last years, the debate about the reform of citizen-
ship in fact has been often ideologically polarized in slogans and
hashtags (#yesiussoli or #noiussoli), generating confusion and increas-
ing xenophobia on one side and resentment on the other, in particular
among the second generations.
On the other side, “luckily”, in Italy, a home-grown jihadist
scene has only recently emerged in the country and it is still unstruc-
tured and relatively small in size, especially in comparison with other
Western European countries. But, according to Marone,4 one of the
most renowned experts on jihadism and foreign fighters in Italy, ji-
hadist militants are usually second-generation children of Muslim im-
migrants, in addition to converts and it cannot be ruled out that Italy's
strict naturalisation laws can have the effect of exacerbating feelings
of resentment in some individuals of immigrant origin, indirectly fa-
cilitating potential radicalisation processes.
Could, therefore, Islamic radicalization transform in the answer
to second generation frustration? Could jihadism channel their anger?
As again Marone highlights: “one of the reasons why Italy has
been still untouched from terrorist attacks, according to security and
intelligence sources, seems to depend on the use of counter-terrorism
measures and, in particular, on the extensive use made of expulsions
and deportation orders, associated with restrictive citizenship law. Ob-
viously, the measure of administrative deportation is not exempt from
risks and shortcomings, like human rights violations and the undesir-
able effect of intensifying the feelings of frustration and anger and
even the sense of revenge, at the individual level due to a double
standard, reinforcing the narrative of victimhood and persecution, so
4 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from the
Italian Case (The Hague: ICCT, 2017).
Ius soli 139
recurrent in the propaganda of jihadist groups, and facilitating the ter-
rorist recruitment of other people”.5
The chapter will therefore discuss the reform of citizenship in
Italy in comparison with other European countries and the debate
around it considering a national security perspective and the import-
ance of social inclusion to prevent radicalism and to foster counter-ter-
rorism policies.
2. The reform of the citizenship law
The current law on citizenship, n. 91/1992, penalizes young
children of immigrants not allowing them to enjoy full recognition of
civil and political rights and keeping them in the legal status of “Itali-
ans with a residence permit”, risking, as already mentioned, to feed
disappointments and forms of resentment.6 The right to be citizens and
the rights guaranteed by being citizens, in fact, are of fundamental
importance for the second generation and young people of foreign ori-
gin, forced for years, once they turn 18, to renew their residence permit
given by the condition of “non-immigrant foreigners” in which they find
themselves.
Organized through the Network G2-Seconde Generazioni,7 the
second generations have advanced, over the years, different requests
for the reform of the law in addition to the request for changes to the
regulations so that they contain clear and explicit criteria regarding the
methods of obtaining the citizenship, eliminating or at least reducing
the high level of discretion of the public administration officers. As
evidenced by the work of the Network G2 Seconde Generazioni,
moreover, besides the enjoyment of rights, the citizenship is also an
important channel of participation: a way to be recognized as equal, to
be creators of their own destiny and to give an active contribution to
the community. The participation guaranteed by citizenship consists in
the “right to have rights”, as Hannah Arendt8 claimed, to have a voice,
an important possibility to state their opinion, an instrument that
5 Ibid.
6 E. Colombo, L. Domaneschi, C. Marchetti, Nuovi italiani e trasformazioni
della cittadinanza (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009).
7 http://www.secondegenerazioni.it
8 H. Arendt, Le Origini del Totalitarismo (Milano: Edizioni di Comunità,
1996), p. 413.
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supports personal empowerment and the ability to participate without
undergoing discretionary discrimination.9 Being able to express, as
citizens, their opinion means having the opportunity to be known, to
defend against improper accusations or stereotyped and negative
representations and to build, on a par, interactions with Italians as a
new mixed political, social and cultural community.10
Young people of foreign origin who have lived in the country
the whole path of socialization from infancy to adulthood, remain ex-
cluded, however, from the granting of citizenship as this is not auto-
matically conferred, but is subject to the possession of certain require-
ments. The law on citizenship in Italy is, in fact, articulated around the
principle of ius sanguinis, the “right of blood” that allows children of
Italians to obtain citizenship only directly from their parents, “inherit-
ing” from them. The children of immigrants who are born on the
Italian territory in order for obtaining the citizenship must stay in Italy
uninterruptedly until the age of eighteen, and from that moment they
have only one year to present the application for the acquisition of cit-
izenship in their municipality of residence. After this year, if the ap-
plication for citizenship has not been submitted, the second genera-
tions must follow the same procedure as their parents, i.e. stay in Italy
with a residence permit for study, work or family reasons, or other-
wise, they have to leave the country.11 The 1992 Citizenship Law has
been the subject of debates and reform proposals for several years.
In 2012, the G2 Network, with the support of the Soros Founda-
tion, drew up the Dossier “G2 Chiama Italia: Cittadinanza,
rispondi!”, within the G2 Parlamenta project, which, through various
awareness-raising activities, addressed to Members of the Italian Par-
liament, going from the distribution of dossiers and documentation, to
9 E. Colombo, L. Domaneschi, C. Marchetti, Una nuova generazione di
italiani: L'idea di cittadinanza tra i giovani figli di immigrati (Milano: Franco Angeli,
2009), pp. 24-25.
10 V. Premazzi, “Una nuova generazione “diversamente” italiana”, F. Cappè
(ed.), Generazione Erasmus. L'Italia dalle nuove idee (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011),
pp. 101-108.
11V. Premazzi, “Secolarizzazione e nuove forme di protagonismo e religiosità
della seconda generazione musulmana in Italia”, G. Salmeri G., M. Díez (eds.),
Troppa religione o troppo poca?: Cristiani e musulmani alla prova della secolarizza-
zione (Padova: Marsilio, 2016), pp. 106-116.
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the creation of videos and other communication materials, was aimed
at providing an updated picture on the current status of the children of
immigrants in Italy. Moreover, two national petitions submitted by the
G2 Network (along with 21 other organizations12) to the Chamber of
Deputies in the context of the Campaign “L'Italia sono anch'io”, a na-
tional campaign for the rights of citizenship, on the 150th anniversary
of the Italian unification. In addition to the two bills it is important to
report the awareness and information campaign “18 anni
in…Comune”, carried out by the G2 Network in collaboration with
ANCI and Save the children, for the new adults born in Italy and en-
titled to citizenship. The initiative aimed to urge the Municipalities to
promptly inform children born in Italy from foreign parents of this op-
portunity when they come of age. Following the campaign “18 anni
in…Comune”, a handbook was also made available free of charge in
all the Municipalities and on ANCI website, Save the children and G2
network, with all the new regulations concerning the acquisition of
Italian citizenship for the second generations. Furthermore, the ex-
planations introduced by the implementation of the Law n. 98/2013
also known as “Decreto del fare” has institutionalized the objectives
of the Campaign. Then, through the application of the rules contained
in the Law, several municipalities have also facilitated the preliminary
phase of the request for citizenship. Article 4, paragraph 2, of the law
n. 91/92 provides, in fact, that “the foreigner born in Italy, who has
resided legally without interruption until reaching the age of majority,
becomes a citizen if he/she declares that he/she wants to acquire
Italian citizenship within a year of the said date”.
The implementation of the Law n. 98/2013, art. 33 “Semplificazione
del procedimento per l'acquisto della cittadinanza per lo straniero nato
in Italia”, states, at paragraph 1, that, “for the purposes of the acquisition of
Italian citizenship by the foreigner born in Italy and residing there
uninterruptedly for eighteen years, any breaches attributable to the
parents or to the offices of the public administration are not attribut-
12 Acli, Arci, Asgi-Associazione studi giuridici sull'immigrazione, Caritas
Italiana, Centro Astalli, Cgil, Cnca-Coordinamento nazionale delle comunità d'ac-
coglienza, Comitato 1° Marzo, Coordinamento nazionale degli enti locali per la pace e
i diritti umani, Emmaus Italia, Fcei –Federazione Chiese Evangeliche In Italia,
Fondazione Migrantes, Libera, Lunaria, Il Razzismo Brutta Storia, Rete G2– Seconde
Generazioni, Sei Ugl, Tavola della Pace, Terra del Fuoco.
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able to the interested applicant” and that he/she can demonstrate pos-
session of the requirements with any other appropriate documenta-
tion.13
The extensive interpretation of article 4 of Law n. 91/92 was ac-
cording to Mohamed Tailmoun,14 spokesperson of the G2 Network, an
important result because it authorizes the offices of the public ad-
ministration to also consider as evidence of the uninterrupted presence
in Italy other documents in addition to registration, such as school at-
tendance, certificates obtained or certificates of attendance of courses,
or registration from the pediatrician/doctor, interpreting the article in
favour of the applicant. Another important result of the campaign “18
anni in … Comune” was an improved relation between many mayors
(and administrations) and second-generation young people and the de-
velopment of information offices dedicated to the second generation,
as in Milan, in 2013, the creation of the G. Lab, laboratory of urban
citizenship, an information desk about citizenship, work and study for
young people, families, teachers and cultural operators. All these cam-
paigns and awareness activities led in the summer of 2015 to the ap-
proval by the Constitutional Affairs Commission of the Chamber of
Deputies of the unified text of citizenship reform. The text collected
the 24 bills of law on the amendment of the law n. 91/92, introducing
the principle of ius soli temperato: citizenship to those born in Italy
from parents legally residing for at least 5 years, and the ius culturae
for kids who arrive in Italy before the age of 12.
The proposal of reform was approved by the Chamber of Depu-
ties, in October 2015 and the 15 of June 2017 the proposal arrived in
the Senate, where it caused chaos initiated by the Northern League
party senators that following this episode submitted new proposals for
amendments —reaching the number of 48,408 requests of changes.
Since then, the debate has always been postponed and then periodic-
ally considered in the summer or before Christmas, on the eve of the
closing of parliamentary debates. This was, according to the leaders of
13 V. Premazzi, “Seconde generazioni e identità religiosa alla prova della cit-
tadinanza”, A. Ferrari (ed.), Libertà religiosa e cittadinanza. Percorsi nella società
plurale (Padova: Marsilio, 2017), pp. 24-36.
14 Interview by the author, 21 July 2015.
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the G2 Network, a sign of the little attention given to the topic,15 but at
the same time it was also a sign of the strategic importance of the
issue also for electoral purposes and consensus.
According to G. Zincone,16 the ideological false contrast
between citizenship conceived mainly as an instrument of integration
(typical of the left) and citizenship conceived as a reward for accom-
plished integration (typical of the right) is still prominent in Italian
political discourse, as well as in that of European countries: “it is evid-
ent that, on one hand, nationality legislation has always required some
signs of either potential (ius soli, long residence) or actual integration
(observance of the law, knowledge of the language of communication)
and that, on the other hand, a generous citizenship regime conveys a
public message of acceptance of immigrants as a welcome part of the
population and can consequently help integration, though it is in no
way definitive”.17
This is what expressed by Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, in-
terviewed by the newspaper La Repubblica, in June 2017, stating that
“granting citizenship to children born in Italy from immigrant parents
is the right thing to do and will make Italy safer”. The Prime Minister
also replied to those who “agitate the spectre of a threat to our security
in a wholly unjustified way” that counter-terrorism experience teaches
that the only way to root out and prevent radicalism is social inclu-
sion, not marginalization and discrimination, “to those who stoke such
fears, we must say extending citizenship to these children. It is not just
a matter of conscience and civil rights, but also one of security”.
But Italy was not the only place in Europe to face the citizen-
ship issue: the recent significant migration waves in some parts of the
world have in fact forced many affected countries to discuss and rene-
gotiate their citizenship policies. These have included moves to more
restrictive as well as to more generous policies for granting citizenship
to immigrants.
15 Interview by the author, 21 July 2015.
16 G. Zincone, Citizenship Policy Making in Mediterranean EU States: Italy,
EUDO Citizenship Observatory (Firenze: EUI, 2010).
17 Ibid., p. 27.
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In Germany,18 for example, the change came into force in 2000,
for the first time introducing ius soli. Citizenship was formerly based
on ius sanguinis and naturalisation with strict conditions. In Portugal19
in 2006 ius soli (which had been radically restricted in the 1970s, prior
to which pure ius soli applied to all born on any Portuguese territory)
was reintroduced in forms of double ius soli and facilitated
naturalisation, based on parental residence of five years and four years
of the child's schooling. Luxembourg introduced double ius soli in
2009 (including for those under eighteen in 2009), and, as dual
nationality was admitted at the same time, this constituted a signific-
ant change with an almost immediate effect.20 The Greek parliament
on March 11 2010 passed the legislation that grants ius soli citizenship
at birth on the basis of parental residence, double ius soli (provided
parents are resident) and provides for declaration when they come of
age (also on the basis of conditions of parental residence and the
child's education in Greece).21 In 1999 Austria introduced a form of
ius soli citizenship for the first time by offering facilitated naturalisa-
tion at age eighteen.22 In 2002 Slovenia introduced facilitated natural-
isation at age of eighteen by form for children resident since birth. In
2003 Finland introduced an option at majority.23
3. Muslims in Europe perception vs reality, guests or citizens?
Even if media and politicians in Europe and, in particular in
Italy, stress sometimes the risk of Islamization and Islamic terrorism,
especially after the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State in 2014
and the attacks carried out by ISIS supporters in Europe, it is incorrect
18 K. Hailbronner, European Immigration and Asylum Law. A Commentary
(Oxford: Beck/Hart, 2010), pp. 7ff, 16ff.
19 I. Honohan, The Theory and Politics of Ius soli. EUDO Citizenship Ob-
servatory (Firenze: EUI, 2010).
20 See D. Scuto, Luxembourg: Country Report. EUDO Citizenship Obser-
vatory (Firenze: EUI, 2010) and D. Scuto, Luxembourg Publishes Statistics on the
2009 Nationality Law. EUDO Citizenship Observatory (Firenze: EUI, 2010).
21 D. Christopoulos, Greece: Comprehensive Citizenship Reform Passed in
Parliament on 11 March. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, (Firenze: EUI, 2010).
22 D. Çinar, Austria: Country Report. EUDO Citizenship Observatory
(Firenze: EUI, 2010).
23 I. Honohan, The Theory and Politics of Ius soli, EUDO Citizenship Ob-
servatory (Firenze: EUI, 2010).
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to speak of an ‘Islamic invasion’: according to an updated survey at
the end of 2017 of the Pew Research Center, in fact, there are about
25.7 million Muslims registered in Europe: 4.9% of a population of
over 740 million people, with highest percentage in France (5.7 mil-
lion, 8.8% of the population) and Germany (about 4.9 million, 5.5% of
residents). Between 2010 and 2016 there was a growth of about one
percentage point, from 3.8% to 4.9% (from 19.5 million to 25.8 mil-
lion). The numbers could double by 2050, however, reaching a max-
imum of 11.2 percent. In other words, an average of an Islamic EU
citizen every 10, just above the current standards of the French popu-
lation.
In Italy, according to data estimates by IDOS,24 Christians con-
stitute 53.8% of the immigrant population, Muslims 32.2%, the 4% of
the whole Italian population. In 2017 among immigrants, Muslims
were over 1.5 million while the majority were Orthodox Christians to
whom we need to add up another million of Catholics.25
Given these data, however, the perception is totally different as
showed by an Ipsos Mori survey26 that measured the gap between
public perception and reality in 40 countries in 2016 and found that in
Italy actual Muslim population was 3.7% while the perception was
20%. But this was not only the case for Italy, the average French es-
timate was that 31% of the population was Muslim –almost one in
three residents while they were 7.5%. And also German and Belgian
respondents all guessed that more than a fifth of the resident popula-
tion was Muslim, while in reality the figure ranges from 5% in Ger-
many to 7% in Belgium.
As we said citizenship means not only rights but also political
participation. This was truly especially for immigrants in Italy and for
religious immigrant groups. In this regard, it is interesting to see the
differences between the first and second generation of Muslims and
their forms of political participation and active citizenship. For the
parents' generation, the cognitive frame within which the relationship
with the institutions is placed is that of immigration, which relies on
the dialectics within a community that put its cultural-value roots in a
24 IDOS, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione (Roma: IDOS, 2015).
25 IDOS, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione (Roma: IDOS, 2017).
26 Ipsos Mori, Perils of perception 2016.
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place that has a plurality of origins but a single religious reference and
sometimes adverse context.
For the children, the reference to immigration and diversity
must be abandoned: the relationship is between (almost) citizens,
among residents who are committed to the common good of the com-
munity and the city where they live.
However, it is not only the type of relationship with the Italian
context that distinguishes the way in which parents and children show
and live their religious belonging and their social and political parti-
cipation: young Muslims do not see Islam as the reproduction of the
religious practices of the country of origin of their parents in a new
context.27 As the research entitled “Young Muslims in Italy. Parma
and Verona” by Della Porta and Bosi28 shows, the Islam of the second
generations is shaped more as a way of life resulting from a choice
that helps them to understand themselves and feel to be part of a com-
munity.
Very often identification with Islam is felt more sharply than
identification with a particular ethnic or national group. The Giovani
Musulmani d'Italia (GMI) association is an example: it is a nationally
based association, but Italy is the reference, and is a religious
organization, made up of young second generations whose parents
have different national origins. Among them, in fact, there are Moroc-
cans, Egyptians, Tunisians, as well as Somalis and Pakistanis.
The association's goal is not just to claim rights for their own
group, but actively to participate in the society. After having defined
‘who they are’, the association tries to answer the question ‘what they
can do in and for the society where they live’.29
Moreover, Internet and the social networks, in particular, have
been an important channel of participation for these young people, es-
pecially due to their excellent level of Italian language and civic skills
27 V. Premazzi, R. Ricucci, “Between national mass media and the local di-
mension: Muslims and Islamophobia in Italy”, Forum for Arab and International
Relations (ed.), Islamophobia (Doha, 2017), pp. 63ff.
28 D. della Porta, L. Bosi, Young Muslims in Italy Parma and Verona (Den-
mark: The Denmark School, CIR, Aarhus University, 2010).
29 V. Premazzi, R. Ricucci, “Between national mass media and the local di-
mension: Muslims and Islamophobia in Italy”, Forum for Arab and International
Relations (ed.), Islamophobia (Doha: 2017), pp. 63ff.
Ius soli 147
their. These young people (or now young adults) are turning more into
representatives, trying to outline the birth of an Italian Islam free from
the constraints of tradition and the contexts and the influence of their
parents' countries of origin.30
Some Italian cities, such as Milan and Turin, have developed in
their policies specific attention to the second generations, considering
them important players in building and strengthening social cohesion
processes. This, as R. Ricucci31 has shown, has taken place “[…] es-
pecially in areas where interactions between natives and immigrants
may be more difficult and where controversies on cultural and reli-
gious diversity happen year after year, stimulated by increased visibil-
ity, an increase in the number of citizenship grants, the increase of stu-
dents in schools and the demands of Muslim associations”.
This choice results in supporting the associations and their lead-
ership, with a view to the promotion and growth of the idea of active
citizenship, while also finding a space for the religious dimension.
At local level the main objectives of first-generation Muslims
regarded basic needs such as the allocation of spaces devoted to places
of worship and some form of cultural recognition and rights. The
Muslim associations were therefore dedicated to essential requests for
observance of Islamic practices (e.g. authorization for the opening of
halal butchers, the allocation of building land for the construction of
mosques and places of worship, areas dedicated to the burial of
Muslim dead, Halal food in public canteens, religious assistance in
hospitals, army and prisons etc.). In this process, the associations were
an important reference for both the community and for the local insti-
tutions.32
30 V. Premazzi, R. Ricucci, “Religious belonging in the Facebook era:
Muslims on line, young people off line”, D. Enstdet, G. Larsson, V. Pace (eds.), Reli-
gion and Internet. Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion (Leiden: Brill, 2015),
vol. 6, pp. 147ff.
31 R. Ricucci, Cittadini senza cittadinanza. Immigrati, seconde e altre gen-
erazioni: pratiche quotidiane tra inclusione ed estraneità (Torino: Edizioni SEB27,
2015), p. 56.
32 V. Premazzi, “Secolarizzazione e nuove forme di protagonismo e religios-
ità della seconda generazione musulmana in Italia”, G. Salmeri, M. Díez (eds.),
Troppa religione o troppo poca?: Cristiani e musulmani alla prova della secolarizza-
zione (Padova: Marsilio, 2015).
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Compared with the first generations, for the younger, second
generations, the relationship with the public institutions moves to-
wards participation: they are more prepared both linguistically and
with regard to civic skills acquired about the role and functions of
public administrations and they aim to be recognized as partners and
representatives. They want to be present and active in the city's social
and cultural events, to participate wherever possible in the decision-
making process, too, especially with regard to young people of
Muslim faith, to strengthen the view that Islam is compatible with cit-
izens' activism marked by pluralism and democracy. As yet, Ricucci33
highlights: “The purpose has not been so much the recognition tout
court of their specificities, but their right to diversity and the promo-
tion of intercultural policies where religious difference is one of the
elements of the city and not a reason of conflict”.
A number of studies have also shown that the local community,
more than the national one, is a strong identity reference for immig-
rants and, in particular, for Muslim immigrants in Europe. A study on
the Muslim community in Waltham Forest, one of the London 2012
Olympic districts, for example, revealed an attachment to their neigh-
bourhood stronger than that felt towards the UK. On the opposite,
non-Muslims of the same neighbourhood showed greater loyalty to
the UK.34
In Europe, and in Italy in particular, Muslim organizations are
highly evolved at the local level, thanks to the vast possibilities
offered by legislation on associations, whereas it is much more diffi-
cult for Muslim organizations to manage relationships at the national
level with the central institutions of the State, because the lack of a na-
tional agreement (Intesa) with the State and of the internal fragmenta-
tion of the Muslim community in Italy, often generating fierce com-
petition dynamics and preventing the expression of a stable and reli-
able unified representation.35
33 Ibid., p. 76.
34 J. Cesari, Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration Coun-
tries. INTERACT Research Report 2013/01, p. 5.
35 A. Pacini, “I Musulmani in Italia”, paper presented at the University of
Padua's Political Sciences Faculty during the seminar on Islam in Europe and in the
World, organized by GRIM, 2001, p. 7.
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4. A national pact with the Muslim communities
It is in this context that the reference to the second generations
contained in the “Patto Nazionale per un Islam Italiano” (National
Pact for an Italian Islam) of February 2017 should also be considered.
This document too is part of the strategy to promote security
against the Islamic terrorism, but seeking also to meet the need of the
Muslim communities that signed the pact (11 associations),36 to obtain
official recognition, a signing of commitment from both parts, the
government and the Islamic community, towards the long-awaited
agreement (Intesa). The prevention of the terrorist threat and the fight
against Islamophobia (or, rather, to the culture of the suspect that gen-
erates it) were, therefore, the ground on which the agreement was
built, an agreement that, for the first time and unlike previous initiat-
ives,37 envisages not only a commitment requested to the communit-
ies, but also of the Ministry itself.
The pact is thus configured as a mutual recognition of values
and activities already established by the Islamic communities. As S.
Allievi,38 one of the members of the Council for Relations with Islam
who contributed to the drafting of the document, states: “we must not
think, in fact, that the agreement forces the Islamic communities to
come out. Many of the points-if not all-contained in the Pact have
already been accomplished by the associations/communities living in
Italy. This signature means guaranteeing it on both sides and ratifying
their commitment with an institutional signature, which safeguards the
security of all Italians- Christians and Muslims-and which guarantees
the recognition and full integration of those who are Muslims and
Italians at the same time”.
In the final part of the pact, then, an explicit reference is made
to the planning of “one or more meetings of national and public im-
36 Unione delle comunità islamiche italiane (UCOII), Confederazione Islam-
ica Italiana (CII), Centro Culturale Islamico d'Italia (CICI), Comunità Religiosa Is-
lamica (COREIS), Unione degli Albanesi Musulmani d'Italia (UAMI), Associazione
Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, Associazione Madri e Bimbi somali, Associazione italiana
imam e guide religiose, Moschea di Palermo, Admi, Associazione italo-pakistana
Muhammadiah.
37 For example, the Carta dei Valori della Cittadinanza e dell'Integrazione
(Chart of Citizenship Values and Integration).
38 See also R. Catalano, “Un Patto per L'islam italiano”, Città nuova. Cultura
e informazione, 2017.
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portance between the institutions and the young Muslims” recognizing
the importance of these youngsters for the future of the Italian Islam.
As already highlighted in a previous commentary on this issue39 a
greater relevance could have been dedicated to it and to the import-
ance of intergenerational dynamics, also in relation to the different
ways in which the fathers will place themselves towards the “Islam of
the children”: destined to be confined in associations of “eternally
young”, co-optated to influence the guidelines or entitled to be recog-
nized as a “third way” able to express authority, prestige and repres-
entation (given the skills related to the Italian context and to the con-
text of origin) “for an Italian Islam”. For P. Naso,40 coordinator of the
Council for relations with Islam, in fact, young people will be “essen-
tial actors in every policy of integration and intercultural dialogue
today, and especially tomorrow”.
The pact, however, also brings with it the risk for Muslims to
feel they are under surveillance and to have to prove each time to be
true believers and good citizens, as already noted by Brahim Baya, the
spokesperson of the Associazione Islamica delle Alpi (Islamic Associ-
ation of the Alps) and Taiba Mosque, among the promoters and
signatories of the Pact of sharing values of the city of Turin, following
Minister of Interior's statement after the meeting of the Committee
with representatives of the main Islamic communities and associations
and the Council for relations with Italian Islam in the summer of
2016.41
If one of the objectives, repeatedly called by the Minister of In-
terior Minniti, was to dissociate immigration and terrorism without,
however, underestimating the link between lack of integration and ter-
rorism, the same term “lack of integration” risks of being perceived by
many already stabilized Muslim residents on the territory-and in some
cases Italian citizens-as a treatment for “second-class citizens”, who
find themselves, once again, to receive an exceptional and unique
treatment waiting to sign the agreement with the Italian State, a consti-
39 V. Premazzi, Il Patto Nazionale per un Islam italiano: passi avanti e passi
indietro nel dialogo con l'Islam (Torino: FIERI, 2017).
40 See also Agenzia NEV, “Firmato al Viminale il “Patto” con l'islam itali-
ano”, NEV.it Notizie Evangeliche, 2017.
41 V. Premazzi, Il Patto Nazionale per un Islam italiano: passi avanti e passi
indietro nel dialogo con l'Islam (Torino: FIERI, 2017).
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tutional instrument to be used in relations with religious organizations
that would provide them with full legal and social recognition in the
country. The feeling of being “treated unequally” also emerges from
the comments on the paragraph in the pact dedicated to mandatory ac-
cessibility and guaranteed by the Ministry of the Interior of the places
of worship to non-believer visitors. If this commitment arises from the
need to counteract Islamophobia through knowledge, responding to
the concerns of Italian society towards a religion that continues to be
considered and perceived as mysterious, incomprehensible by lan-
guage and threatening for the use made by terrorists and propaganda
of the Islamic State, on the other hand it is experienced by the
Muslims themselves as a condition of “protection but also surveil-
lance” and of subordination: to face the feeling of mistrust and stig-
matization, the risk is to trigger reactions of ethnic and religious iden-
tification. Already in 2015, in an analysis carried out as part of the
project “Conoscere il meticciato. Governare il cambiamento” of the
Oasis Foundation in Milan, the Muslim citizens interviewed expressed
the desire to be judged for what they really had been doing in their
everyday life and not on the basis of potential risks of radicalization
and terrorism or unfounded suspicions.42
Lastly, as we have already seen above, the media contribute in
the “creation of the Other”, of perception vs reality, where a Muslim
identity is reified and they can be considered as eternal guests or a
threat to security without being recognized as citizens and members of
Italian society.43 The second generation appeared to have helped to
break down the wall of mistrust erected against Muslims after 9/11.
One of the effects of the New York attacks was in fact the building of
an ideal of “we”, as opposed to “they”, the Muslims.44 In recent years,
thanks to all the work done by Muslim second-generation associations,
the border seems to have moved to include the second generation in
42 See also S. Coglievina, V. Premazzi, “L'Islam in Italia di fronte al fonda-
mentalismo violento”, M. Diez, A. Plebani (eds.), La galassia fondamentalista tra ji-
had armato e partecipazione politica (Padova: Marsilio, 2015), pp. 126ff.
43 R. Salih, “The Backward and the New: National, Transnational and Post-
national Islam in Europe”, Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 30, 5 (2004), p. 1001.
44 A. Pogliano, V. Premazzi, “Il giornalismo e le seconde generazioni di mi-
granti. Un'analisi critica dei rituali dei media”, Sociologia Italiana–AIS Journal of So-
ciology (2014), p. 92.
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the “community of us” through, however, the almost total exclusion of
the first generation and the creation of a new line of separation
between the first and second generations.45 This “selection ritual” re-
inforces the typical selectivity of journalistic narratives, marking the
boundary between those who can be included and who is excluded,
showing the values of youth, of beauty, of assimilation to Western
fashion, of individual courage that is expressed in resisting the tradi-
tion to embrace some forms of “Italian values” to cross the symbolic
border and become part of “our community”. It is produced, however,
through the inscription of these events in the macro-frame of the
“clash of civilizations”,46 proposing as a way to integration a media-
oriented version of cultural assimilation. The media are fundamental,
therefore, not only as a vehicle, but as the places where a ritual pro-
cess that separates the excluded ones from the included is building.
But this border has been again called into question by the recent ISIS
attacks in Europe and the departure of foreign fighters, some of them
also second and third generations, from Europe to Syria and Iraq,
threatening to include the second generation in that “they” whose reli-
gion has been perceived as dangerous and incompatible with “our”
culture and society.
5. The Italian foreign fighters
Italian authorities begin to monitor home-grown jihadists in the
late 2000s and early 2010s, but their numbers are still relatively small.
This is due to a negligible presence of pre-Syrian conflict militant
Salafist groups such as Sharia4Belgium in Belgium or al-Muhajiroun
in the UK. When one looks to recent estimates for other large
European countries, such as France (at least 1,700 fighters), Germany
(940), the United Kingdom (around 850); and even when compared to
less populous countries such as Belgium (470), Austria (300) and
Sweden (300),47 finds out that Italy has a jihadist scene substantially
45 Ibid.
46 S. Hungtington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
47 Cf. A. P. Schmid, J. Tinnes, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A
European Perspective, Research Paper (The International Centre for Counter-Terror-
ism–The Hague (ICCT), December 2015); B. Van Ginkel, E. Entenmann (eds.), The
Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies,
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smaller in size.48 The largest national contingent in the West is the
French one: in December 2017, the French authorities declared that
about 1,700 French foreign fighters left for Syria and Iraq since 2013,
approximately 400-450 were killed, 250 returned to France, 500 are
still in the conflict zone. There are therefore around 500 individuals,
whose traces have in fact been lost. On the other side, according to
data released by the Italian Ministry of Interior in August 2017, only
125 individuals with ties with Italy (only a minority of whom are full-
fledged Italian citizens) left the country to join various jihadist groups
(mostly the Islamic State) in Syria, Iraq and other Middle Eastern con-
flict zones. From this contingent, 37 individuals died and 22 returned
to Europe.49
Some of the jihadists are “second generation immigrants” albeit
only a few of those possess Italian citizenship based on available data,
most, on the contrary, are still first-generation migrants. Moreover, the
use of the term “second generations” has also its own implications, as
very few cases can be defined as second generations in the strict sense
because they have not completed their socialization path in Italy, even
sometimes only the last years of compulsory schooling if arrived after
the 14 years and therefore they cannot even be considered generation
1.25 according to the classification adopted by Rumbaut.50
Experts51 explain this situation with a demographic factor: un-
like other Western European countries, large-scale Muslim immigra-
tion to Italy began only in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and there-
fore the first wave of “second-generation Muslims” has only recently
entered adulthood. Needless to say, radicals represent only a tiny
Research Paper (The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism–The Hague (ICCT),
April 2016); D. H. Heinke, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The Updated
Data and Its Implications”, CTC Sentinel, 10, 3, (2017), pp. 17ff; R. Barrett, Beyond
the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees (The Soufan Center, Oc-
tober 2017).
48 L. Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Rad-
icalization Dynamics (Milan: ISPI and European Foundation for Democracy, 2014).
49 Dossier Viminale-Ferragosto 2017 (Rome, Ministry of the Interior, 15
August 2017), p. 9.
50 See R. G. Rumbaut, “Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: De-
composing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States”, Inter-
national Migration Review, 38, 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 1160ff.
51 L. Vidino, F. Marone, E. Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization
and Jihadist Attacks in the West (Milan: ISPI/PoE-GWU/ICCT-The Hague, 2017).
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minority of the Muslim presence within the country and the issues
cannot only be considered from a demographic/generational point of
view but to the fact that becoming adults they are more aware of the
inefficiencies, discrimination and denied rights they have to face daily
with the risk that those frustrations could produce reactive identities.
This is also complicated by the fact highlighted above that the
idea of them being included in the community of “us” is then opposed
by a reality of rights and of a society that exclude them.
The contingent of Italian foreign fighters is also ethnically di-
verse, with cases encompassing individuals from North Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Counter intuitively, a significant number of Italian jihadists do
not reside in large metropolitan areas and big cities, but in small cities
and rural areas throughout the country. This can also be linked to the
fact that in the big cities integration projects are developed and sup-
ported by municipalities while these are less popular in the small
towns or in the countryside. While some Italian jihadists had troubled
backgrounds with extensive criminal records or histories of mental ill-
ness, others came from stable families and appeared to be well-integ-
rated.
Regarding the present and the future of European jihadism, one
of the big issues the European States and that also Italy will soon have
to face is the returnee phenomenon. In relation to the entire European
continent, according to estimates in 2017, in fact, 30% of the foreign
fighters had already returned from the conflict area. In Italy, at
present, eleven foreign fighters have returned from the war territories
and are currently being monitored by the intelligence also because
Italy represents an important symbolic target for jihadist groups. The
city of Rome, in particular, has great iconic value, as the cradle of
Christianity and a major symbol of Western civilization.52
Rome in fact has been frequently mentioned as a target in ji-
hadist propaganda. Moreover, the Italian government has played an
active role in various Middle Eastern conflicts, deploying troops to
Afghanistan and Iraq (both during the 2003 invasion and currently as
52 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from
the Italian Case (The Hague: ICCT, 2017).
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part of the anti-ISIS coalition) as well as substantial intelligence and
soldiers in the Libyan strife.
Lorenzo Vidino, Director of the Program on Extremism at
George Washington University's Centre for Cyber & Homeland
Security, suggests that radicalisation is a highly complex and
individualised process and identifies structural (root causes) and
individual motivations (personal factors) that sometimes interact with
each other: political tensions and cultural cleavages, the shock of a
life-changing event and the influence of a mentor.53 As shown by
Vidino, motivations “range from a search for identity to anger over
discrimination and relative economic deprivation”.54 Today more than
ever, the socio-economic motivation, the gap between natives and
immigrants, in terms of employment and education opportunities, is
not enough: other reasons are also emerging more related to moral
values and purpose for life as well as exclusion and lack of rights,
terrorism prevention should be discussed and considered for effective
programmes of counter-radicalization.55
The French anthropologist Dounia Bouzar confirms: “Radical-
ization used to be limited to the poor and the uneducated. But the situ-
ation has changed today”.56 Some European foreign fighters, in fact,
hold college degrees and do not come from deprived neighbourhoods
or face a precarious socio-economic and professional situation.
Among the second generations, there are those who feel as if they
have no future and are disappointed for not being recognised and ac-
53 L. Vidino,Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Radicalization
Dynamics (European Foundation for Democracy and ISPI, 2014).
54 L. Vidino,Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Radicalization
Dynamics (European Foundation for Democracy and ISPI, 2014), p. 28; A. Dalgaard-
Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not
Know”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33, 9 (2010), pp. 797ff; R. Borum, “Radical-
ization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories”, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 4, 4 (2011), pp. 7ff.
55 F. Marone, “The Italian Way of Counterterrorism: From a Consolidated
Experience to an Integrated Approach”, S. N. Romaniuk et al. (eds.), The Palgrave
Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017),
pp. 479ff; L. Vidino, L'Italia e il terrorismo in casa: che fare? (Milano: Epoké-ISPI,
2016); V. Premazzi, “Oltre la motivazione socio-economica, il fascino del Califfato
tra i giovani figli di immigrati in Europa”, A. Pin, C. Pellegrino (eds.), Europa e Islam
attualità di una relazione (Padova: Marsilio, 2016), pp. 66ff.
56 D. Bouzar, La vie après Daech (Paris: Editions de l'Atelier, 2015), p. 34.
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cepted as equal citizens. However, the foreign fighter phenomenon is
more than a signal of failure of integration polices. As Roy highlights,
those who joined ISIS shared “the youth culture of their generation,
they probably drank alcohol, smoked pot, towed girls and then, one
day, they decided to (re)convert to the religion of their fathers but in
the Salafi version, because they rejected the culture of their parents
and even the “Western” culture, which become the symbol of their
self-hatred”.57 This is also because they perceive themselves as ex-
cluded and without the same rights as their peers (like exclusion from
the exams for state level employment or from the opportunity of mo-
bility within the European Union). They believe the Islam proclaimed
and lived by the jihadists is the right path to follow to be a good
Muslim and the Islamic state is the only place in the world where one
can be a good Muslim. In addition, the charm and strength of the mes-
sage of ISIS compared to that of other fundamentalist groups, includ-
ing Al Qaeda, is that ISIS has offered the young who fail to find their
place in the West both for socio-economic reasons, rights, opportunit-
ies, values and lifestyles, not just a cause to fight for, which makes
them feel part of the community (ummah) of the believers, but also a
physical place where they can be full citizens and true believers.58
6. Terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy: the challenge of cit-
izenship
In one of the most popular ISIS propaganda videos, “Clanging
of the Swords”, in particular the fourth episode, at a certain point a
foreign fighter is clearly seen taking the floor and showing his Koso-
var passport. Surrounded by other comrades who wield passports of
different nationalities, he announces the expansion of the Islamic State
under the caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, promises war against the infi-
dels by brandishing the saber, planning the cleansing of the Arabian
Peninsula by the dictators, announces the conquest of the Zionist
Jerusalem, of Rome and of Spain.
57 O. Roy, “What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism? –A scientific
perspective on the causes/circumstances of joining the scene”, speech at European
University Institute, BKA Autumn Conference, 18-19 November 2015.
58 See also V. Premazzi, “Oltre la motivazione socio-economica, il fascino
del Califfato tra i giovani figli di immigrati in Europa”, A. Pin, C. Pellegrino (eds.),
Europa e Islam attualità di una relazione (Padova: Marsilio, 2016), pp. 66ff.
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As L. S. Battaglia59 points out, the sequence has its peak of
drama and action when the Kosovar foreign fighter loudly declares his
belonging to the one and only umma identified in the Islamic State and
steps on his passport, soon imitated by all the others. Later in the
video the same scene is repeated: the foreign fighter, this time, comes
from Bahrain and is surrounded by two young Saudis. All wield their
passports. The end is the same: they step on their passport, torn and
burned it.
Although there are no data available to show how many foreign
fighters have been convinced by the call of ISIS for its appeal as an Is-
lamic “State”, the video on passports still proves the importance ac-
knowledged to the citizenship so much to devote to it different videos
and appeals.
On the other side, as a response to the attractive power of ISIS,
however, there have also been States that have decided to deny cit-
izenship also to documented long-term residents to punish deviant or
illegal behaviour, and, in particular, terrorism. Some countries have
proposed, and some have already adopted, provisions on grounds of
which suspects of terrorism would be deprived of their citizenship. On
22 November 2015, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
put forward a motion to allow the country's government to withdraw
citizenship of those who join the Islamic State. “Whoever joins ISIS
will not be an Israeli citizen. And if he leaves the borders of the state,
he will not return. I think this lesson is becoming increasingly clear
throughout the international arena, and it is fitting that we lead this ef-
fort as well,” Netanyahu said.60 In early December, the authorities of
Dagestan proposed to the Russian Duma to amend the country's cit-
izenship law to deprive of citizenship those who “left Russia to take
part in terrorist activities”. Moreover, those who act or acted against
Russian peace-keeping or military forces and obstructed them in the
discharge of their duties during international, inter-territorial or other
armed conflicts, will also forfeit their citizenship. One more cause for
citizenship revocation is committing terrorist acts against Russian na-
59 L. S. Battaglia, “Tarantino Style Jihad 3.0: l'apocalisse mediale del nuovo
fondamentalismo”, A. Zaccuri (ed.), Il tablet e la mezzaluna: Islam e media al tempo
del meticciato (Padova: Marsilio, 2016).
60 See H. Keinon, “Netanyahu: Israelis joining ISIS will lose citizenship”,
The Jerusalem Post, November 23, 2015.
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tionals, embassies, missions and their employees abroad. According to
lawmakers, the bill is aimed at enhancing the national security.61 Sim-
ilar initiative has also resonated in the Belgian public discourse, where
the Flemish nationalist party NVA, argues for amendments to citizen-
ship law to allow the deprivation of nationality to descendants of Bel-
gian citizens (second and third generations) convicted of terrorism.
Australia has moved to strip dual nationals who “have fought in gov-
ernment-designated militant groups or engaged in activities that would
support terrorism, such as training, recruitment, or making donations”
already in June 2015 when it adopted the Allegiance to Australia bill.
In December 2015, the bill was amended and leads to automatic loss
of Australian citizenship for individuals suspected of terrorism who
are 14 years or older, even in the absence of conviction.62 The parlia-
ment of Azerbaijan amended the country's s citizenship law on 4
December 2017 to withdraw citizenship of those involved in terrorist
activity and actions aimed at the violent change of the constitutional
system of Azerbaijan. Under the new rules, such individuals will be
automatically deprived of Azerbaijani citizenship.
These hard-nosed, repressive tactics, however, have not been
accompanied by an equally significant preventive approach in some
countries like Italy, where any program or strategy aimed towards
counter-radicalization or de-radicalization wasn't developed63 but has
focus mainly on expulsions. In 2017 the expulsions ordered by decree
of the Minister of the Interior for security reasons were 105, compared
to 66 in 2016.
From a national security perspective, they promise to be a quick
way to get rid of suspected terrorists. In this respect, Italy stands out in
Europe. In fact, the country has made extensive use of expulsions of
foreign suspects in counter-terrorism, especially in the last two years.64
All deportees are allegedly related to Islamist ideology. The vast
61 See also RAPSI, Russia Legal Information Agency, Russian lawmakers
propose stripping of citizenship for terrorism, December, 4, 2015.
62 See also Vice News, Australia Moves to Strip Suspected Terrorists of Cit-
izenship—So Long As They're Dual Citizens, December, 4, 2015.
63 See L. Vidino, L'Italia e il terrorismo in casa: che fare? (Milano: Epoké-
ISPI, 2016).
64 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from
the Italian Case (The Hague: ICCT, 2017).
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majority come from North Africa and the Balkans. Actually, ad-
ministrative deportations have become a key element of Italy's
counter-terrorism policy. According to various security and terrorism
experts,65 the extensive use of this tool, associated with restrictive cit-
izenship laws, represents an important factor to explain why Italy has
thus far escaped terrorist violence. In Italy, the measure of deportation
can be potentially used against a large number of individuals. In fact,
many extremists, including home-grown jihadists who were born or
grew up in the country, may not have citizenship and could therefore
be subject to deportation (on the contrary, Italian nationals cannot be
expelled). The behaviours that lead to a deportation order do not need
to be connected to the use of terrorist violence: many non-EU citizens
were expelled from Italy because, for example, they had displayed ex-
tremist attitudes or paid tribute to jihadist organisations.
Moreover, according to Marone,66 given Italy's long history of
confronting domestic terrorism (such as the Red Brigades in the 1970s
and early 1980s) and sophisticated criminal organizations (in particu-
lar, the Sicilian Mafia, the 'Ndrangheta and the Camorra),67 Italian au-
thorities developed skills and legal tools that are useful in confronting
jihadist terrorism. Additionally, over the last few years, Italian law-
makers have passed various laws aimed at strengthening the country's
already extensive counterterrorism legislation, and adapting it to the
current threat. In general, Italy gives priority to the criminal justice
system in its approach to counter-terrorism, as Italian authorities have
ample powers to conduct lengthy surveillance operations and pre-
emptive raids. Two antiterrorism laws, adopted in 2005 and in 2015,
in addition, expanded the hypotheses for the administrative deporta-
tion of non-EU citizens. In particular, the antiterrorism law adopted in
July 2005 (Law No. 155/2005), soon after the attacks in London,
grants the Minister of the Interior or, upon delegation, the Prefect the
65 L. Vidino, F. Marone, E. Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbour: Radicalization
and Jihadist Attacks in the West (ISPI/PoE-GWU/ICCT-The Hague, 2017).
66 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from
the Italian Case (The Hague: ICCT, 2017).
67 F. Marone, “The Italian Way of Counterterrorism: From a Consolidated
Experience to an Integrated Approach”, S. N. Romaniuk et al. (eds.), The Palgrave
Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017),
pp. 479ff.
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power to order the deportation of a foreign citizen against whom, in
particular, there are “well-founded reasons to believe that his/her stay
in the territory of the State may in any way facilitate terrorist
organizations or activities, at the national or international level” (Art.
3). As Marone explains, “this law provides that the deportation order
can be suspended or even revoked if, in practice, the affected indi-
vidual agrees to collaborate with the authorities”.68 Moreover, a new
antiterrorism law adopted in April 2015 (Law No. 43/2015), after the
attacks in Paris, expanded the hypotheses for the administrative de-
portation of a foreign citizen, by order of the Prefect, for reasons of
“social dangerousness”. This law also expressly refers to the category
of (non-Italian) aspiring foreign fighters. The provision —states Ma-
rone— “fits with the discipline of personal preventive measures that
are already applied to many suspects. Ultimately, administrative de-
portation represents a discretionary act of the executive (or its repres-
entatives on the territory). The deportation order is not subject to prior
judicial validation on the merits and is immediately enforceable. The
decision can be appealed before the administrative court (Tribunale
Amministrativo Regionale, TAR), but its execution cannot be suspen-
ded. The deportation implies a no-re-entry for a period of time determ-
ined on a case-by-case basis (for example, in a few recent cases, as
many as 15 years). It is important to note that the removal (allontana-
mento) of any foreign citizen for reasons of security, by order of the
Ministry of the Interior, is regulated by different norms (in particular,
Legislative Decree No. 30/2007), more favourable for the affected in-
dividual, and is subject to judicial validation”.
Administrative deportations are often ordered when evidence
against an individual is deemed insufficient for prosecution, but suffi-
cient enough to determine that he/she may pose a threat to national se-
curity.69 According to experts,70 the wide use of this tool represents an
important factor in maintaining low levels of radicalization in the
68 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from
the Italian Case (The Hague: ICCT, 2017).
69 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from
the Italian Case (ICCT-The Hague, March 2017).
70 F. Marone, L. Vidino, The Jihadist Threat in Italy: A Primer (Milano: ISPI,
2017).
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country, as the use of fast-track deportations can help prevent the
formation of extremist networks on national territory.
Obviously, the measure of administrative deportation is not ex-
empt from risks and shortcomings. According to Marone,71 one of the
main expert in Italy on the issue, we can distinguish two main types of
problem. The first is of a legal nature and is associated, in particular,
with the question of human rights protection. The second is pragmatic
and concerns possible counterproductive consequences, from a
counter-terrorism perspective. As regards the first type of problem, the
measure of administrative deportation is imposed upon a suspect
without the procedural guarantees associated with criminal prosecu-
tion, including prior judicial review, appropriate standard of proof and
assessment of evidence, and full compliance with the principle of the
presumption of innocence. In addition, the expulsion can result in vi-
olations of human rights in the country of destination.72
In this regard, in recent years, the European Court of Human
Rights has reasserted, also in relation to an influential case from
Italy,73 in 2008, the prohibition on sending individuals to States in
which they face a “real risk” of torture, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment. In this respect, it is worth noting that today a significant number
of Italy's terrorism-related deportations concern suspects from the
Balkans, where there is supposed to be little risk of torture.74
Moreover, at the global level, deportations may run the risk of
turning into a simple buck-passing action, that transfers an alleged
problem from one State to another, without solving it. On the second
point, the issue of citizenship is massively raised on expulsions: be-
cause the assumption is that if some of the suspects had had the cit-
izenship they could not have been expelled, and it involves especially
71 F. Marone, The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from
the Italian Case (The Hague: ICCT, 2017).
72 L. Masera, “Il terrorismo e le politiche migratorie: sulle espulsioni dello
straniero sospettato di terrorismo”, Terrorismo Internazionale, Politiche della
Sicurezza, Diritti Fondamentali, Gli speciali di Questione Giustizia, settembre 2016,
pp. 76ff.
73 F. De Londras, “Saadi vs Italy: European Court of Human Rights Reasserts
the Absolute Prohibition on Refoulement in Terrorism Extradition Cases”, Insights,
12, 9 (May 13, 2008).
74 See also M. Abrams, “Italy deters terrorism with tough citizenship, de-
portation policies”, Stars and Stripes, October, 14, 2016.
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the second generation that if became citizens they could not be ex-
pelled. But at the same time, we can not consider the implication of a
restrictive citizenship law and of double standard applicable for de-
portations risking, as a counterproductive consequence, their
radicalization.
7. Can jihadism be the answer?
In the 1990s the association of immigration and crime and se-
curity mostly concerned Albanians, at the time the most numerous im-
migrant group in Italy. As a result of this stigmatization, Albanians
chose an assimilation strategy of integration.75 Subsequently —after
9/11 and a visible growing Muslim presence in Italy— feelings of hos-
tility, partly fuelled by commentators, writers and journalists, were
directed towards this specific group. In most surveys of the media, the
predominant image of Islam is that of a threat to security, culture and
basic Western values. Then it was the turn of the Roma (and, by
extension through ignorance, Romanians in general), as a result of
some violent episodes involving some of them, pounced upon by the
press and leading to outright attacks on some of their settlements.76
In recent years, partly as a result of the economic crisis, general
racism has grown against the vast category of “immigrants” without
any distinction between new arrivals and those already settled, some
even holding Italian citizenship. The situation has deteriorated in the
last years, findings a new target in refugees and asylum-seekers. In
this context, the proclamation of the Islamic State and the attacks car-
ried out by its adherents have shone the racism spotlight again on the
“Muslims” issue, re-activating the barely-forgotten Muslim-terrorism
and immigrant-terrorism relationships. Indeed, hostility towards im-
migrants overlaps with animosity shown towards Islamic extremism,
justified by accusations of disloyalty towards the countries where nu-
merous, variegated Islamic communities reside, constituting an in-
ternal enemy threatening to perpetrate violent attacks against their
host countries.
75 V. Romania, Farsi passare per italiani. Strategie di mimetismo sociale
(Roma: Carocci, 2004).
76 Among them, the most notorious example was the burning of the Roma
camp in Continassa, Turin, in 2011.
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Since summer 2014, with the proclamation of the Islamic State
and the first decapitations of Western citizens, national media have re-
peated the same mistake as they had made after 9/11, using double
standards and generalizations and thereby helping to fuel fear and hos-
tility. One headline after another warned of the potential presence in
Italy of what the press termed “the terrorists next door,” creating a cli-
mate of fear in public opinion. Specifically, there was increasing
attention on this topic and a growing number of articles dealing with
Islam and Muslim communities in an accusatory, aggressive, attacking
tone. The Pulitzer Prize winner, Glen Greenwald, commenting on
coverage of the January, 2015, Paris attacks, notes that: “It's
absolutely the really scary climate that has emerged in the wake of
Paris, an extremely anti-Muslim strain of animosity that we've seen
historically in the past and that is both ugly and really dangerous”.77
Italian newspaper Libero got sued because of its headline “Bastardi
Islamici” (Muslim Bastards), published after the attack to Charlie
Hebdo. Television news programmes, newspapers and magazines play
–sometimes contradictory– variations on the Muslims-terrorists,
Islam-terrorism theme. In particular, many headlines screamingly
demanded that Italian Muslim communities should take a stand
against terrorists and terrorism, almost as a provocation or necessity to
defend themselves against the public accusation of complicity by
collective responsibility or connivance with terrorist activity. Less
publicity was given, however, to campaigns promoted in various
Italian cities, like, Not in My Name, where they explicitly distance
themselves, by word and deed, on the part of prominent
representatives and spokespersons from Italian Muslim communities.
It was regularly underlined that the lack of integration and the
discrimination-emphasized, also by the media-can feed fundamental-
ism and that the construction of stereotypes and generalizations can
lead, as a response to discrimination, racism and Islamophobia, per-
ceived and experienced, to the formation of reactive identities and the
risk of radicalization. As stated by a representative of the Milan Is-
lamic Association: “Fundamentalism occupies a small space which
grows with injustice: the more injustice grows, the more this space
77 Media Diversity Institute, Paris Attacks: What the Media Could Have
Done Differently, November, 24 2015.
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grows because it fuels fundamentalist ideas. What I mean is this: when
there are feelings like Islamophobia accompanied by, say, an attack in
the newspapers, the mass media, prejudices et cetera against Islam and
Muslims…when the Muslim, for example, is investigated and “black-
listed” only because he is a Muslim, he feels under attack and his
calm, responsible, civil tone begins to crack. That is where cultural ag-
gressiveness, the aggressiveness of prejudices, grows; where there is a
risk of feeding integralism, even within the community”.78
Incidents of violent fundamentalism, along with the sensational-
ist approach of the media to the issue, are a likely risk of fuelling ex-
ploitation, populist tendencies and of giving support to forms of anti-
Islam political propaganda, and anti-immigration feeling in general, at
the local level, which may, in turn, hinder the process of integration
and the commitment of the associations on the ground to the recogni-
tion of their rights. “Let's say that in my opinion rather than revealing
changes in attitude we have witnessed the usual exploitation, when we
see phenomena of this type. Obviously, they then become part of the
public political discourse of groups who use them to try to deny some
rights. We are specifically engaged in a campaign on behalf of free-
dom of worship, the possibility of setting up official religious spaces,
a campaign which we have been conducting for some time. All this
talk about ISIS use as a polemical political argument of those who
were against […]”.79
ISIS and the series of attacks in Europe have therefore not
played in favour of Muslims and the recognition of their presence in
the public space and, consequently, of the enjoyment of rights, but
have contributed to increase prejudices, suspicions and forms of Is-
lamophobia that, amplified by the mass media, risk to determine or in-
crease, especially among young people, the dynamics of rejection, so-
cial isolation, resentment that can lead to adherence to extremist mes-
sages and radicalization processes in reaction to a situation that is no
longer judged bearable.
78 Interview made in October 2015. See also S. Coglievina, V. Premazzi,
“L'Islam in Italia di fronte al fondamentalismo violento”, M. Diez, A. Plebani (eds.),
La galassia fondamentalista tra jihad armato e partecipazione politica (Padova:
Marsilio, 2015), pp. 126ff.
79 Representative, Coordinamento Associazioni Islamiche Milano, interview
by the author, October 2015.
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If it is true that radicalization (and all Italian foreign fighters
who have left for Syria and Iraq confirm this) has multiple causes, not
only discrimination and the perception of refusal, and can engage in
weaknesses, sometimes even personal ones, of individuals who end up
embracing religious practices far from their family experiences, rad-
ical and irreconcilable visions with the context of life until joining in-
ternational jihadism, because in search of “meaning” for their own life
and belonging to a community,80 it is also, however, important not to
create “people under surveillance” or second-class citizens, who must
prove to be devoted to Islam and good citizens.81
Exclusion and difficulty in becoming citizens, in being recog-
nized with the same rights together with certain security measures
such as expulsions can therefore worsen this perception and lead to
the risk of forms of radicalization and violent extremism. The fact that
the citizenship reform wasn't approved risks to have the undesirable
effect of intensifying the feelings of frustration and anger and even the
sense of revenge, at the individual level and not only for Muslims as it
affected second generations of all origins and religions, forcing them
to find an alternative to the feeling of belonging to the state they were
born in but where they still feel and are excluded.
The best among the possible endings, which is already taking
place significantly, is a new migration, often following the acquisition
of citizenship, years after the first submission of the application, to
other European countries. The worst is, as repeatedly pointed out, the
development of forms of reactive identity that can activate radicaliza-
tion processes and up to join terrorism groups. The path of the citizen-
ship reform continues to seem not an easy one, despite the promises of
various representatives of the national institutions, but at the same
time it is increasingly needed because the lack of recognition is a time
bomb that could sooner or later burst into our hands and then we could
only say that “soon was yesterday” as the slogan of one of the citizen-
80 V. Premazzi, “Oltre la motivazione socio-economica, il fascino del Cal-
iffato tra i giovani figli di immigrati in Europa”, A. Pin, C. Pellegrino (eds.), Europa e
Islam attualità di una relazione (Padova: Marsilio, 2016), pp. 66ff.
81 See also S. Coglievina, V. Premazzi, “L'Islam in Italia di fronte al fonda-
mentalismo violento”, M. Diez, A. Plebani (eds.), La galassia fondamentalista tra ji-
had armato e partecipazione politica (Padova: Marsilio, 2015), pp. 126ff.
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ship reform national campaigns.82 Finally, it is also important to un-
derline how it was pointed out by L. Guglielminetti, Italian expert of
the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) of the European Com-
mission, that the anti-terrorism strategy, to be effective, must therefore
be more complex and articulated than relying only on restrictions and
deportations and that it is of fundamental importance to ensure the
possession and protection of the rights in counterterrorism laws and
strategies.83
82 See also V. Premazzi, Ius soli (#SenatoRispondi), Amico Missioni Con-
solata, November 18, 2016.
83 L. Guglielminetti, “Fine legislatura senza ius soli ne lotta alla radicalizza-
zione. Il perché”, Homme révolté, January 10, 2018.
Media and Violence in Europe:
The case of growing Islamophobia in Italy
Ines Peta
The goal of this study is to determine the possible factors lead-
ing to increased anti-Muslim sentiment in Italy. Islamophobia is a
phenomenon that has barely been studied in this country. Therefore
there is a manifest lack of data on Islamophobic incidents.
Nevertheless some recent surveys give a glimpse into the extent
of the phenomenon and some interesting reports, such as European Is-
lamophobia Reports published by SETA Foundation, address this
topic. We begin by examining first anti-Muslim attitudes in the United
States and Europe through a secondary analysis of two recent Pew Re-
search Center surveys in order to underline the common demographic
predictors of Islamophobia. We then analyze the specific case of Italy
and the potential relationship between exposure to negative news
about Muslim-related issues and attitudes toward Muslims in this
country.
1. Preliminary definition
The term Islamophobia was first used in 1922 by the French
scholar Étienne Dinet, but fell into disregard until the 1990s.
Generally speaking, it is a word that indicates a dislike of Islam
and Muslims from a secular Western perspective.1 However, there are
no clear cut global recognized definition for it.
Etymologically, the term suggests an irrational fear (phobia) of
Islam, but it is evident that dislike or hostility toward Muslims or the
Islamic religion is not Islamophobic in the literal (and psychiatric)
sense of the word.
1 On the definition of Islamophobia and on its controversial relationship with
the concept of anti-Semitism, see in particular M. Bunzl, “Between Anti-Semitism
and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe”, American Ethnologist, 32, 4
(2005), pp. 499-508; B. Krondorfer, “Introduction: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia:
Twins or Category Mistake?”, CrossCurrents, 63, 3 (2015), pp. 292-296; J. Renton,
B. Gidley (eds.), Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: a Shared Story?
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
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Furthermore, the sources and causes of hatreds, fears and dis-
criminatory practices towards Muslims cannot easily be determined.
Are they primarily religious in nature or social and political? Are they
the product of modernity or go back to the eleventh century Christian
crusades against Muslims? Such ambiguity, however, does not change
the social reality of fears, prejudices, discrimination or hostility that
Muslim people experience and in which Islamic religion plays the ma-
jor role, especially after 9/11. Certainly the word Islamophobia is im-
perfect, but the numerous and differentiated manifestations of preju-
dice cannot be easily captured in a short definition. So by Islamopho-
bia we refer to a wide and differentiated variety of discriminatory and
exclusionary practices and stigmatizing definitions of Muslims and Is-
lam.
2. The common predictors of Islamophobia
A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2017 asked Amer-
icans to rate members of nine religious groups (Jews, Muslims, Cath-
olics, mainline Protestants, evangelical Christians, Buddhists, Hindus
and Mormons) on a “feeling thermometer” from 0 to 100, where 0 re-
flects the most negative rating and 100 the most positive.
Overall, Americans gave Muslims an average rating of 48 de-
grees. They view more warmly the seven other religious groups.
The survey shows that anti-Muslim attitudes are closely linked
to political party. Republicans and those who lean toward the Repub-
lican Party gave Muslims an average rating of 39, considerably colder
than Democrats' rating toward Muslims (56). Other demographic
factors, especially education and age, are associated with views to-
ward Muslims. Younger respondents and Americans with college de-
grees give warmer ratings to Muslims compared with older respond-
ents and those who have less education. It is also worthwhile to men-
tion that fewer than half of Americans say they personally know a
Muslim (45%). Those who do not know Muslims rate this group on
the colder side of the scale, but those who do know someone who is a
Muslim rate this group on the warmer side.2
2 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Americans Express Increas-
ingly Warm Feelings Toward Religious Groups (2017).
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Another Pew Research Center survey conducted in the spring of
2016 in 10 European countries shows that half or more in Hungary
(72%), Italy (69%), Poland (66%), Greece (65%) and Spain (50%)
have a very or somewhat unfavorable view of Muslims. And in Italy
(36%), Hungary (35%) and Greece (32%), roughly a third hold very
unfavorable opinions. Majorities in the other nations surveyed (Neth-
erlands, Sweden, France, Germany, UK) express positive attitudes
about Muslims. Nonetheless, at least a quarter in each country have
negative views of Muslims. The survey shows that also in Europe neg-
ative attitudes toward Muslims are strongly associated with political
conservatism: people who place themselves on the right side of the
ideological scale are much more likely than those on the left to see
Muslims negatively. In many countries, older people and those with
less education are more negative toward Muslims. This survey did not
ask whether respondents know Muslims personally. However, the res-
ults show that in countries where the Muslim presence is higher, the
perception of Muslims is more positive.3
The common and most consistent demographic predictors of Is-
lamophobia on both sides of the Atlantic therefore seems to be polit-
ical ideology, age, education and social contact between majority
populations and Muslim minorities. It is interesting to note that the
result of our analysis confirms the data of a former study based on
previous surveys and polls.4
3. Islamophobia in Italy
In Italy, as in the rest of Europe, Islamophobia seems to be
strictly linked to the growing refugee crisis and the frequent terrorist
attacks. People's sense of insecurity, certainly present at least since 11
September 2001, seems to have increased recently following the at-
tacks which occurred in Paris in 2015. For this reason, we analyze the
growing Islamophobia in Italy starting from that year until today.
In a survey carried out in November 2015, 58% of respondents
said they had a negative impression of Islam, 27% of which very neg-
3 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Europeans Fear Wave of
Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs (2016).
4 C. Ogan, L. Willnat, R. Pennington, M. Bashir, “The rise of anti-Muslim
prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States”, The Interna-
tional Communication Gazette, 76, 1 (2014), pp. 27-46.
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ative and 31% quite negative. Furthermore, 16% of respondents
blamed Islam as a whole for the attacks that took place in Paris.5
The Euro-barometer on discrimination 2015 shows that 39% of
Italian respondents say they would be uncomfortable working with a
Muslim person. This is higher than for any other religious group.
Moreover, less than half of the Italian respondents (41%) would feel at
ease if one of their children were in a love relationship with a Muslim
person.6
The 2016 Pew Research Center survey mentioned above shows
that in all 10 European countries surveyed, people who have a more
negative view of Muslims are also much more concerned about the
threat of refugees. When it comes to defining the specific threat from
refugees, Europeans perceive the possibility of domestic terrorism and
a negative economic impact as bigger concerns than crime. In Italy
65% of respondents say that refugees are a burden because they take
away jobs and social benefits (only 21% take the opposite view that
refugees' economic contributions make their country stronger) and
60% believe that they increase the likelihood of terrorism (only 28%
believe, on the contrary, that refugees will not increase the chance of
domestic terrorist attacks).7
The 2017 Demos report on security in Italy and Europe con-
firms the link immigration/terrorism and immigration/economic disad-
vantages, documenting a growing fear of the foreigner. The report
shows that in Italy 39% of respondents see the immigrant as a threat to
national security and public safety, 36% as a threat to employment,
emphasizing that both indicators have increased by about 5 points
compared to 2016 and provide the highest values recorded since 2007
up to today.8
A survey conducted by the Chatham House Europe Program
between December 2016 and January 2017 shows that 51% of re-
spondents in Italy agreed to the statement “All further migration from
5 Demos & Pi, Gli attentati di Parigi, available online as pdf.
6 Special Euro-Barometer 437, Discriminations in the EU in 2015.
7 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Europeans Fear Wave of
Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs, pp. 30-31.
8 Demos & Pi, X Rapporto sulla sicurezza e l'insicurezza sociale in Italia e in
Europa (2017), available online as pdf.
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mainly Muslim countries should be stopped”.9 The Ipsos Perils of
Perception Survey 2016 found that the current and the future Muslim
Population are enormously overestimated in Europe. The average
guess in Italy is that 20% of the population are Muslim and 31% will
be Muslim in 2020, while the current percentage is 3.7% (17% overes-
timation) and the projection for 2020 is 4.9% (26% overestimation).10
Connecting these data to each other, we can suggest that this overes-
timation is linked to unfavorable views regarding Muslims, connected
in turn with the perceived negative impact of migrants on economy
and security.
4. The role of media
The 2015 and 2016 European Islamophobia Reports published
by SETA Foundation documented several Islamophobic incidents in
various sectors of the Italian society, such as education, employment,
politics, media, cyberspace and judiciary system.11 In this paper we
focus on the media sector, which in our opinion has played and
continues to play a decisive role in spreading Islamophobia. In recent
years two issues have dominated the media agenda: the link between
terrorism and immigration and the economic and social costs from
immigration; according to the above mentioned surveys, both these
issues have gradually become a major source of concern for Italians.
Our analysis will focus on the first issue, as it targets specific-
ally Muslim migrants rather than migrants in general. Before discuss-
ing in detail the presence of the migration-Islam-terrorism nexus in the
Italian media, however, it is useful to start from a general analysis of
some problematic words used by Western media. This issue was re-
cently the subject of the UNESCO paper Terrorism and the Media: A
Handbook for Journalists.12
9 Chatham House Europe Program, What Do Europeans Think About Muslim
Immigration? (2017), available online as pdf.
10 Ipsos-Mori, Perils of Perceptions 2016, available online as pdf.
11 G. A. Siino, N. Levantino, “Islamophobia in Italy, National Report 2015”,
European Islamophobia Report 2015, E. Bayrakli, F. Hafez (eds.) (Istanbul: SETA,
2015); C. Giacalone, “Islamophobia in Italy. National Report 2016”, European Is-
lamophobia Report 2016, E. Bayrakli, F. Hafez (eds.) (Istanbul: SETA, 2016).
12 UNESCO, Terrorism and the Media: A Handbook for Journalists (2017).
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In his famous book Covering Islam, E. Said showed that the
Western media were considering Islam as a kind of scapegoat for
everything unpleasant that was happening in the Muslim world and he
identified a series of words-container-useful to direct the public opin-
ion-to illustrate these “pre-judgments” in the media, such as Islam,
nation, democracy, Christianity.13 Said's reflection was based primar-
ily on the experience of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the incident
involving 52 Americans held captive for many days in the US em-
bassy in Tehran in January 1981. Therefore it was influenced by the
historical events of that period. In an interesting analysis, L. S.
Battaglia wonders: “if Said were to rewrite this essay today which
words would he focus on? In other words, talking to the Western me-
dia, which are the empty shells which immediately resonate with
meaning and guide public opinion towards a precise reading of the
facts of international news?”. In her opinion, the words used to trans-
fer bias in the media, in the narrative of the Middle East, are: Islam,
terrorism, fundamentalism, sectarianism, jihad, Muslim Brotherhood,
Al-Qaeda and, most recently, Islamic as an adjective associated with
State.14 We focus on Islam, fundamentalism, terrorism and jihad/ji-
hadism, as these appear to be the central keywords whose
characterization has a decisive influence on the specification of all
others.
As for the term Islam, it is undeniable that even today all the
political, social, economic and cultural shortcomings of Muslim soci-
eties are hitched together and to Islam with a capital “I”. Islam then
becomes the source and the prime mover of all contemporary history
in a vast and differentiated territory that extends from the Philippines
to Morocco and from Scandinavia, if we take account of Muslim
minorities in Europe, to South Africa. As Mohammed Arkoun clearly
explained, it is true that the sort of Islamic discourse common to the
various Islamic movements defined as “fundamentalists” proposes the
powerful image of a single, eternal Islam, the ideal model for historic
action to liberate the world from the Western, imperialistic, materialist
model. But it is also true that “Western media seize up this monolithic
13 E. Said, Covering Islam: how the media and the experts determine how we
see the rest of the world (New York: Vintage Books, 1981).
14 L. S. Battaglia, “Bias in the media: covering Islam after 9/11” (2016).
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view and transpose it into a discourse suitable to the social imaginary
of Western countries” without any critical inter-mediation from the
social, historical and religious sciences.15
Western reporting about terrorist attacks, for example, almost
always notes a connection to Islam. But it often ends there. As Philip
Seib points out, “many journalists shy away from religious topics, and
this creates a vacuum of public knowledge that leads to defining a reli-
gion of 1.6 billion people by the acts of the few who spill blood in a
Manchester arena or a Baghdad marketplace. And because there is
such limited understanding of Islam in the non-Muslim world, many
news consumers are prone to accept the idea that Islam-equals-terror-
ism”. After all, Islam usually disappears from the news until the next
tragedy.16
When journalists want to differentiate within Islam, they usu-
ally just talk about “moderate” Islam or “moderate” Muslims, but
these expressions implicitly suggest that Islam is generally and essen-
tially not “moderate”. A few examples in the Italian media: “#NotIn-
MyName: la campagna social dei musulmani moderati” (#NotInMy-
Name: the social campaign of moderate Muslims, La Repubblica);
“C'è un Islam moderato amico delle donne e della democrazia” (There
is a moderate Islam friendly with women and democracy, Il Corriere);
“L'Islam non è moderato ma molti musulmani sì”, (Islam is not mod-
erate but many Muslims are, La Stampa).
Moreover, as Laura Silvia Battaglia writes, “[…] to be serious,
moderate Islam does not exist in the sense that there exists a historical
traditional Islam in the context of which what is defined as
radical/political Islam of the Wahhabi and the successive Salafi type,
is considered by traditional Islam a crystallized and literal interpreta-
tion of the Qur'an”.17
Fundamentalism is another wrong category applied to Islam;
the term was created in the 1920s in the United States to designate
Protestant Christians and in the years between 1920 and 1978 the cat-
egory “fundamentalist” was almost never used except in reference to
15 M. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, Common Questions, Uncommon Answers
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 7.
16 Philip Seib, Superficial, Speculative, Breathless: Outdated Terrorism Re-
porting Must Change (2017).
17 L. S. Battaglia, “Bias in the media: covering Islam after 9/11” (2016).
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them. This began to change in 1979 when the Iranian revolution de-
posed the Shah. Starting with that event, Muslims have been and con-
tinue to be characterized as fundamentalists with great frequency, to
the point that the term is today used almost exclusively to refer to
Muslims. Leaving aside the discussions on the correctness of the term
to define the variegated galaxy of extremist movements,18 it is un-
deniable that the word fundamentalism, like the word terrorism, is
now frequently associated with the adjective Islamic.
Fundamentalism and terrorism are thus regularly identified as
essentially “Islamic”, thus connecting Islam as a whole to the actions
of those who claim to follow it to wage their war. However, usually
no one classifies as “Christian” or “Western” terrorism the violent
actions of white supremacists and far-right extremists like the
Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik.
Another word often abused by the media is jihadism.
This term is increasingly used, if only to avoid using the expres-
sion “Islamic terrorist”. However, the word jihad means “effort”, not
“holy war”, and it appears 41 times in the Qur'an, often in the idio-
matic expression “effort on the path to God” (al-jihad fi sabil Allah).
This effort can be peaceful or warlike, but it cannot be identified with
the narrow and aggressive concept of jihad used by terrorists.19 By fo-
cusing on the latter, the Western media has inadvertently reinforced
the link between terrorism and Islam within the Western conscious-
ness and contributed to the negative perception of Islam held by an in-
creasing percentage of the Western public.
5. Islamophobia in Italian media
As 2015 European Islamophobia Report points out, after the at-
tacks in Paris in January and November, some newspaper, such as Il
18 On this term and on its meaning in Arabic, see P. Maggiolini, “Il fonda-
mentalismo islamico: mille volti che guardano un'unica verità”, La galassia fonda-
mentalista tra jihad armato e partecipazione politica, A. Plebani, M. Díez (eds.)
(Venezia: Marsilio, 2015), pp. 26-39.
19 See the interesting analysis of A. Asfaruddin, Striving in the Path of God,
Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought (New York: Oxford University Press,
2013). See also I. Peta, “Alle fonti del jihad: guerra santa o sforzo pacifico sulla via di
Dio?”, La galassia fondamentalista tra jihad armato e partecipazione politica, pp. 40-
49.
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Giornale and Libero, have been very critical of Muslims.20 In the af-
termath of the Charlie Hebdo attack against French journalists in
January, for example, the newspaper Il Giornale issued the headline:
“Macellai Islamici” (Islamic Butchers), referring to these events in
terms of a clash of civilizations and associating terrorism with migra-
tion. Similarly, after the events in Paris in November 2015, the
magazine Libero issued its frontpage headline: “Bastardi Islamici” (Is-
lamic Bastards). Inaccuracy and misrepresentation have also been fea-
tures of the way in which certain media have been reporting the
news.21
The following European Islamophobia Report noted in 2016 an
increase of 2% of titles related to anxiety caused by the so-called
Daesh followers in Italy and Europe compared to the previous year,
pointing out that all titles/articles related to this category established a
connection between immigration and terrorism. In addition, following
the New Year's Eve assaults on women in Cologne, the report docu-
ments caused several distortion of data and racist interpretations of the
events, as well as very superficial and stigmatizing media discussions
on the identity of migrants, and in particular of Arabs.22
One of the most discussed analyses was the one written by
Maurizio Molinari, director of the newspaper La Stampa. He defined
the “group assault on women in Cologne” as “a tribal act that origin-
ates from the implosion of the Arab states in North Africa and the
Middle East”, implosion that “brings back tribes and clans as elements
of aggregation, enhancing primordial forms of violence”. In this way,
he established a link between North African/Middle Eastern culture-
reduced to an atavistic tribalism-and violence against women, general-
izing the culture of violence as a basis of identity for Arab migrants
and refugees. Furthermore, several Italian newspapers reported an in-
terview given by an imam in Cologne to a Russian TV.
During this interview, the imam stated that the victims of the
New Year's Eve violent acts in that city, were themselves responsible
for their sexual assault because they were dressing inappropriately and
wearing perfume. However, there was no established connection
20 G. A. Siino, N. Levantino,“Islamophobia in Italy, National Report 2015”, p. 282.
21 G. A. Siino, N. Levantino,“Islamophobia in Italy, National Report 2015”, p. 283.
22 C. Giacalone, “Islamophobia in Italy, National Report 2016”, p. 310.
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between the events occurred that night and the statement of that imam,
called in many titles “the imam of Cologne”, even if there are count-
less imams in the city. A few examples: “L'imam di Colonia: gli stupri
colpa del profumo delle vostre donne” (The Imam of Cologne: The
rapes are caused by your women's perfume, Il Giornale); “Donne pro-
fumate, hanno provocato: la frase choc dell'imam di Colonia, indig-
nazione globale” (Scented women have provoked: the shocking state-
ment of the Imam of Cologne, global indignation, Libero); “L'imam
sugli attacchi di Colonia: Donne svestite e con un profumo che
istigava” (The imam on the Cologne attacks: Women half-naked and
with a perfume that instigated, Il Corriere). This contributed to create
a connection in the mind of readers between violence and religious
identity of migrants, namely Islamic religion.
This Islam-violence-migration link seems to be a growing dan-
gerous trend. The 2017 Carta di Roma Report on Media and Immigra-
tion noted an increase of 20% of alarmist tones in dealing with the mi-
gration phenomenon compared to the previous year and emphasizes
that religion has taken a major role in defining the foreigner. The re-
port identifies 146 titles/articles on the front-page of the newspapers
Libero, Il Giornale and La Verità that are discriminatory and contain
dangerous speech, because they establish a link between
ethnic/racial/religious affiliation and negative or dangerous behaviors.
20% of these articles can be associated with the religious factor.23 The
report also notes that in the prime time Broadcasting news, Islam in
2017 was present in 4% of journalistic reports and in 6 out of 10 re-
ports the meaning associated with it was negative.24
More generally, the media discourse on Islam and immigration
is ideologically oriented, primarily focusing on migratory flows' man-
agement and people's security and reporting the opinions of political
actors on these issues, while the voice of the protagonists (immigrants,
Muslims) is almost completely absent.25
The lack of migrants/Muslims voices in the media has several
negative consequences; above all others, it paves the way to the use of
23 P. Barretta, G. Milazzo, Notizie da paura. Quinto rapporto Carta di Roma
2017, pp. 11-12, 20-21.
24 P. Barretta, G. Milazzo, Notizie da paura, p. 12.
25 Ibid., pp. 20-25, 48-49.
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biased categorizations and a dehumanizing language that inevitably
impact the public opinion.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis found support for the hypothesis that Italian media
have a great deal of responsibility in negative view of Muslims and Is-
lam. In fact, the Media play a significant role in filling cultural gaps or
informing the public opinion when the subject of public discourse is
beyond people's direct experience,26 as is the case of Italy, where
Muslim immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon and Islam
entered public debate only after 9/11 and subsequent terrorist at-
tacks.27 The influence of media seems particularly relevant on older
people.28 And we have found that older age, lower education and ab-
sence of social contact with Muslims, in addition to political ideology,
are the most consistent demographic predictors of Islamophobia.
We believe that for Islamophobia to decline, the public needs
first to challenge their assumptions about Muslims and Islam.
However, since the political debate and the media coverage of
Islam and Muslims continue to describe them as the “others” and to
exclude them from the resources/rights/descriptions of an alleged
“we”, deconstructing and then exposing the roots of Islamophobic
ideas in public discourse is still a major challenge in Italy. To this pur-
pose, a crucial step in the right direction could be a serious
reconsideration of the mainstream idea of Europe and its relationship
with Islam. The history of the continent cannot be properly told
without taking into account the influential role of the Muslim pres-
ence, which has touched every single country in the continent.
The common perception of Islam as alien to the other monothe-
istic religions and to European culture and thought is historically inac-
curate. “Islam”, as a religion, was born in the wake of Judaism and
26 See on this the recent study of M. Stone, Snake and Stranger: Media
Coverage of Muslims and Refugee Policy, 2017: https://shorensteincenter.org/media-
coverage-muslims-refugee-policy/.
27 I. Peta, “L'Islam in Italia e a Milano: patrimonio comune e fattori di dif-
ferenziazione”, La sfida del meticciato nella migrazione musulmana, C. Regalia, C.
Giuliani, S. G. Meda (eds.) (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2016), pp. 26-43.
28 C. Ogan, L. Willnat, R. Pennington, M. Bashir, “The rise of anti-Muslim
prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States”, p. 41.
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Christianity and, as a driving force in the rise of the Arab and Turkish
empires, took control of the Mediterranean area from the seventh to
the twelfth centuries and again, with the direction of the Ottoman
Turks, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. That means, in
the words of Mohammed Arkoun, “the cultures of the Mediterranean
region shared a single historical destiny that the scientific study of his-
tory, independent of the ideologies that divide the northern and south-
ern or the eastern and western coasts of the Mediterranean, is far from
confronting”.29
The paradoxical relationship of Europe with Muslims, who
have been vastly relevant to its history but are also constantly ex-
cluded from it, is central to how the European imagination has figured
them. Edward Said has shown how this “othering” has often pro-
ceeded through the contrast between the Western Europe and its Ori-
entalism.30 Despite centuries of common milestones and mutual inter-
actions, in fact, the history of the southern and eastern coasts of the
Mediterranean continues to be the domain of specialists in Arab and
Turkish studies and what is taught about the Arab or Muslim countries
is highly conditioned by the European, Western perspective. To fix
this imbalance, it is urgent that scholars intervene to rectify historical
perspectives, fill in substantial gaps and eliminate prejudices. A redis-
covery of the common past in a critical way would permit scholars to
explain why what we call “Islam” and “the West” stand opposed to
each other as two poles of knowledge and civilization, even though
they sit on the same philosophical-religious pedestal.
29M. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, Common Questions, Uncommon Answers, p. 8.
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